Constitutional Design and Political Communication

This paper models the constitutional design process, and points out the importance of political communication (defined as the level of information about the social distribution of policy preferences that individuals hold, at the time of this process) on the "extent" of "democratic restraints" of the socially preferred constitution and on the welfare derived by the society from its implementation. The results demonstrate that the level of political communication has a positive effect on the level of democracy of the socially preferred constitution and on social welfare. Moreover, it is proved that, even if there exist no tolerance for dictatorship by societies in general, the level of democracy demanded by the society, reaches the maximum possible level, only if political communication is "perfect". That is, the socially preferred constitution in cases of "imperfect" political communication incorporates both dictatorial and democratic elements.constitution, political communication, democracy

Does presidentialism breed dictatorship - the case of Turkey and the Erdogan regime

This thesis inquires into presidentialism and its compatibility with democracy. Despite its poor record of achieving sustainable democracy, it is still considered a democratic form of government. Presidentialism is criticized in various ways. Problems arise due to its intrinsic institutional design or due to the political environment where presidentialism is applied. This thesis discusses presidentialism in both ways. Presidentialism and its intrinsic problems and the political environment, the case of Turkey where it is going to be applied. The aim of the thesis is to examine the presidential system and its possible effect on governmental system in Turkey. Whether Turkey will manage to protect its fragile democratic institutions or fall into dictatorship is the main question of this thesis. The thesis also includes the measurement of presidential power to give a comprehensive view on the nature of the presidential system in Turkey. The examination of the constitutional amendment and the Turkish party system reveals that the new system seems likely does not have the necessary institutional tools to provide sustainable democracy.http://www.ester.ee/record=b5145160*es

Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making

Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.Public Finance, Public Choice, Public Economics, Political Economics, Normative Analysis

Endogenous Political Institutions

Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super)majority needed to govern. We analyze both “optimal†constitutional design and â€positive†aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.

Endogenous Political Institutions

Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both 'optimal' constitutional design and 'positive' aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.

MILITARY RESURGENCE IN AFRICAN POLITICS AND THE DRIVE FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

The spate of democratic wave that blew across the continent of Africa in the 1990s came with the hope of economic transformation and an end to the decades of backwardness, poverty and want. Prior to this period, democratic governance was the exception rather than the norm. Military high command across the continent dictated the pace for many decades and most times falling short of the messianic appeal that drew them into politics and governing with their diktat nature and abuse of human rights, the economies of most countries of the continent where the military juntas were entrenched, experienced stall and retrogression, creating contrition for grumbling by the weakened civil society in these countries. However, the turn in the dynamics of the international system following the collapse of communism and insistence of the continent’s development partners on democratization, compelled many of the military juntas to retreat back to their barracks, thus opening the space for inflow of investments which is in dire need to reverberate the ailing economies. But after a brief spell of power in the hands of the civilian authorities, the lustre of power seem to be drawing some elements in the military high command to the old scenarios which resemble a reverse wave of democratization, thus allowing the gains of civilian advancement to be lost while the countries relapse. One of the expected areas of relapses with the resurgence of the military back in power is in capital flows into the countries for development purposes. The examines these issues and concludes that the resurgence of military rule in the West African sub-region is a set back to the development of the countries in the sub-regio

Constructing Institutional Measures: Indicators of Political and Property Rights in Mozambique, 1900-2005

In this paper we focus on the role of political and economic institutions in Mozambique’s development. We produce a set of institutional indicators for Mozambique for the period 1900 through to 2005. The first index tracks political freedoms and is unique in its duration and complexity. The second index is a measure of property rights for Mozambique and such a measure has not existed previously and certainly not for this length of time. The construction of these indices is a painstaking process through historical records but it provides us with a richness of institutional data previously not available. The new institutional indices will allow us to explore the role of the institutional environment in determining economic growth and development in Mozambique over time.Political Rights, Property Rights, Insitutional Indicators, Mozambique

Democratization is the determinant of technological change

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between democracy and technological innovation. The primary findings are that most free countries, measured with liberal, participatory, and constitutional democracy index, have higher technological innovation than less free and more autocratic countries, so that the former have a higher interaction among social, economic and innovation systems with fruitful effects on economic growth and the wealth of nations. In fact “democracy richness” in these countries displays a higher rate of technological innovation. In addition, democratization is an antecedent process (cause) to technological innovation (effect), which is a major wellknown determinant of economic growth. These findings lead to the conclusion that policy makers need to be cognizant of positive association between democratization and technological innovation to sustain modern economic growth and future technological progress in view of the accelerating globalization.Democratization, Technological Innovation, Patents, Royalty Licenses Fee, Economic Grow

Miracle from the Rhein to the Han River:heavy industrialisation of South Korea and its social consequences under Park Chung Hee

This thesis deals with the influence of German philosophical doctrines on the development of heavy industry in South Korea under president Park Chung Hee in the 1970s. It argues that Park’s dictatorship in the 1970s was an archetype of ‘technocratic heavy industrialisation’ with the goal to undergo a very compressed and rapid transition to a heavy industry based economy following the post-Vietnam War détente. Park’s political economy originates from a very German strategy in overcoming ‘systemic vulnerabilities: scarce natural resources and an ominous foreign security threat’. This was to be achieved through the imposition of a military-led authoritarianism and the mobilisation of the entire population in preparation for ‘total war’. In the 1930s and 1940s, political economy of techno-fascism was introduced in Manchuria by the Japanese Army, with German counsel, which was later emulated by the postwar Japanese government and Park’s regime in the 1970s. In the 1970s, Park needed to broaden his ruling coalition, with the military on one side and business on the other, in order to launch his program of heavy industrialisation. Park was also inclined to provide ‘side payments’ to the population to placate democratic militancy opposing his dictatorship. To achieve these goals, Park introduced the term ‘Miracle on the Rhein’ to describe West Germany’s postwar economic rise from the ashes as a model to follow for South Korea. With this economic model and based on German doctrines of total war that were refracted into Korea by way of Japanese colonisation Park introduced the techno-fascist institutions that were to overcome the South Korean predicaments of scarce resources and the Northern Communist security threat. This thesis addresses Park’s dictatorship in terms of mobilisation of national human capital and financial resources, allocation of mobilizeised resources to those specific sectors that accounted for heavy industrialisation, and the social consequences of these policies. To overcome developmental backwardness due to the country’s very late industrialisation, Park adopted Gerschenkron’s catch-up strategy in his pursuit of rapid industrial development. Park then deployed German doctrines and ideas in his pursuit of the industrial transition, which had a substantial impact on educational reform, the socio-economic order and property distribution in South Korea. This thesis shows that Park’s heavy industrialisation had fostered a state-business alliance and a political compromise between the elites and the emergent middle through the state’s intervention into the structure of property ownership while the skill-less labour class remained marginalizeised