Social welfare maximization with fuzzy based genetic algorithm by TCSC and SSSC in double-sided auction market

This paper presents a fuzzy-based genetic algorithm to maximize total system social welfare by best the placement and sizing of TCSC and SSSC devices, considering their investment cost in a double-sided auction market. To introduce more accurate modeling, the valve loading effects are incorporated into the conventional quadratic smooth generator cost curves. In addition, quadratic consumer benefit functions are integrated into the objective function to guarantee that locational marginal prices charged at the demand buses are less than, or equal to, the DisCos benefit, earned by selling the power to retail customers. The proposed approach utilizes fuzzy-based genetic algorithms for optimal scheduling of GenCos and DisCos, as well as optimal placement and sizing of SSSC and TCSC units. In addition, the Newton–Raphson approach is used to minimize the mismatch of the power flow equation. Simulation results on the modified IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 30-bus test systems (with/without line flow constraints, before and after the compensation) are used to examine the impact of SSSC and TCSC on total system social welfare improvement versus their cost. To validate the accuracy of the proposed method, several case studies are presented and simulation results are compared with those generated by genetic and Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) approaches

Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel optimization problem that we remodel as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC. This gives an EPEC, equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for this class of bilevel games and give some applications. We show by examples the effect of network transmission limits, i.e. congestion, on existence of equilibria. Then we study, for more general EPECs, the weaker pure strategy concepts of local Nash and Nash stationary equilibria. We model the latter via complementarity problems, CPs. Finally, we present numerical examples of methods that attempt to find local Nash or Nash stationary equilibria of randomly generated electricity market games. The CP solver PATH is found to be rather effective in this context

An economic evaluation of the potential for distributed energy in Australia

Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) recently completed a major study investigating the value of distributed energy (DE; collectively demand management, energy efficiency and distributed generation) technologies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from Australia’s energy sector (CSIRO, 2009). This comprehensive report covered potential economic, environmental, technical, social, policy and regulatory impacts that could result from the wide scale adoption of these technologies. In this paper we highlight the economic findings from the study. Partial Equilibrium modeling of the stationary and transport sectors found that Australia could achieve a present value welfare gain of around $130 billion when operating under a 450 ppm carbon reduction trajectory through to 2050. Modeling also suggests that reduced volatility in the spot market could decrease average prices by up to 12% in 2030 and 65% in 2050 by using local resources to better cater for an evolving supply-demand imbalance. Further modeling suggests that even a small amount of distributed generation located within a distribution network has the potential to significantly alter electricity prices by changing the merit order of dispatch in an electricity spot market. Changes to the dispatch relative to a base case can have both positive and negative effects on network losses.Distributed energy; Economic modeling; Carbon price; Electricity markets

The More Cooperation, the More Competition? A Cournot Analysis of the Benefits of Electric Market Coupling

Market coupling in Belgian and Dutch markets would permit more efficient use of intercountry transmission, 1) by counting only net flows against transmission limits, 2) by improving access to the Belgian market, and 3) by eliminating the mismatch in timing between interface auctions and the energy spot market. A Cournot market model that accounts for the region’s transmission pricing rules and limitations is used to simulate market outcomes with and without market coupling. This accounts for 1) and 2). Market coupling improves social surplus in the order of 108 €/year, unless it encourages the largest producer in the region to switch from a price-taking strategy in Belgium to a Cournot strategy due to a perceived diminishment of the threat of regulatory intervention. Benefit to Dutch consumers depends on the behavior of this company. The results illustrate how large-scale oligopoly models can be useful for assessing market integration

Scenario-based Economic Dispatch with Uncertain Demand Response

This paper introduces a new computational framework to account for uncertainties in day-ahead electricity market clearing process in the presence of demand response providers. A central challenge when dealing with many demand response providers is the uncertainty of its realization. In this paper, a new economic dispatch framework that is based on the recent theoretical development of the scenario approach is introduced. By removing samples from a finite uncertainty set, this approach improves dispatch performance while guaranteeing a quantifiable risk level with respect to the probability of violating the constraints. The theoretical bound on the level of risk is shown to be a function of the number of scenarios removed. This is appealing to the system operator for the following reasons: (1) the improvement of performance comes at the cost of a quantifiable level of violation probability in the constraints; (2) the violation upper bound does not depend on the probability distribution assumption of the uncertainty in demand response. Numerical simulations on (1) 3-bus and (2) IEEE 14-bus system (3) IEEE 118-bus system suggest that this approach could be a promising alternative in future electricity markets with multiple demand response providers