19,105 research outputs found
Abstraction as a basis for the computational interpretation of creative cross-modal metaphor
Various approaches to computational metaphor interpretation are based on pre-existing similarities between source and target domains and/or are based on metaphors already observed to be prevalent in the language. This paper addresses similarity-creating cross-modal metaphoric expressions. It is shown how the âabstract concept as objectâ (or reification) metaphor plays a central role in a large class of metaphoric extensions. The described approach depends on the imposition of abstract ontological components, which represent source concepts, onto target concepts. The challenge of such a system is to represent both denotative and connotative components which are extensible, together with a framework of general domains between which such extensions can conceivably occur. An existing ontology of this kind, consistent with some mathematic concepts and widely held linguistic notions, is outlined. It is suggested that the use of such an abstract representation system is well adapted to the interpretation of both conventional and unconventional metaphor that is similarity-creating
Multimodal Grounding for Language Processing
This survey discusses how recent developments in multimodal processing
facilitate conceptual grounding of language. We categorize the information flow
in multimodal processing with respect to cognitive models of human information
processing and analyze different methods for combining multimodal
representations. Based on this methodological inventory, we discuss the benefit
of multimodal grounding for a variety of language processing tasks and the
challenges that arise. We particularly focus on multimodal grounding of verbs
which play a crucial role for the compositional power of language.Comment: The paper has been published in the Proceedings of the 27 Conference
of Computational Linguistics. Please refer to this version for citations:
https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/papers/C/C18/C18-1197
Against Conventional Wisdom
Conventional wisdom has it that truth is always evaluated using our actual linguistic conventions, even when considering counterfactual scenarios in which different conventions are adopted. This principle has been invoked in a number of philosophical arguments, including Kripkeâs defense of the necessity of identity and Lewyâs objection to modal conventionalism. But it is false. It fails in the presence of what Einheuser (2006) calls c-monsters, or convention-shifting expressions (on analogy with Kaplanâs monsters, or context-shifting expressions). We show that c-monsters naturally arise in contexts, such as metalinguistic negotiations, where speakers entertain alternative conventions. We develop an expressivist theoryâinspired by Barker (2002) and MacFarlane (2016) on vague predications and Einheuser (2006) on counterconventionalsâto model these shifts in convention. Using this framework, we reassess the philosophical arguments that invoked the conventional wisdom
Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and their Variants
This paper argues that truth predicates in natural language and their variants, predicates of correctness, satisfaction and validity, do not apply to propositions (not even with 'that'-clauses), but rather to a range of attitudinal and modal objects. As such natural language reflects a notion of truth that is primarily a normative notion of correctness constitutive of representational objects. The paper moreover argues that 'true' is part of a larger class of satisfaction predicates whose semantic differences are best accounted for in terms of a truthmaker theory along the lines of Fine's recent truthmaker semantics
Metaphoric coherence: Distinguishing verbal metaphor from `anomaly\u27
Theories and computational models of metaphor comprehension generally circumvent the question of metaphor versus âanomalyâ in favor of a treatment of metaphor versus literal language. Making the distinction between metaphoric and âanomalousâ expressions is subject to wide variation in judgment, yet humans agree that some potentially metaphoric expressions are much more comprehensible than others. In the context of a program which interprets simple isolated sentences that are potential instances of crossâmodal and other verbal metaphor, I consider some possible coherence criteria which must be satisfied for an expression to be âconceivableâ metaphorically. Metaphoric constraints on object nominals are represented as abstracted or extended along with the invariant structural components of the verb meaning in a metaphor. This approach distinguishes what is preserved in metaphoric extension from that which is âviolatedâ, thus referring to both âsimilarityâ and âdissimilarityâ views of metaphor. The role and potential limits of represented abstracted properties and constraints is discussed as they relate to the recognition of incoherent semantic combinations and the rejection or adjustment of metaphoric interpretations
Evaluating the Representational Hub of Language and Vision Models
The multimodal models used in the emerging field at the intersection of
computational linguistics and computer vision implement the bottom-up
processing of the `Hub and Spoke' architecture proposed in cognitive science to
represent how the brain processes and combines multi-sensory inputs. In
particular, the Hub is implemented as a neural network encoder. We investigate
the effect on this encoder of various vision-and-language tasks proposed in the
literature: visual question answering, visual reference resolution, and
visually grounded dialogue. To measure the quality of the representations
learned by the encoder, we use two kinds of analyses. First, we evaluate the
encoder pre-trained on the different vision-and-language tasks on an existing
diagnostic task designed to assess multimodal semantic understanding. Second,
we carry out a battery of analyses aimed at studying how the encoder merges and
exploits the two modalities.Comment: Accepted to IWCS 201
Can Modal Skepticism Defeat Humean Skepticism?
My topic is moderate modal skepticism in the spirit of Peter van Inwagen. Here understood, this is a conservative version of modal empiricism that severely limits the extent to which an ordinary agent can reasonably believe âexoticâ possibility claims. I offer a novel argument in support of this brand of skepticism: modal skepticism grounds an attractive (and novel) reply to Humean skepticism. Thus, I propose that modal skepticism be accepted on the basis of its theoretical utility as a tool for dissolving philosophical paradox
Gavagai again
Quine (1960, ch.2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. âRabbitâ might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous âargument from belowâ to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the matter as to how reference is to be divided. Putative counterexamples to Quineâs claim have been put forward in the past (see especially Evans, 1975; Fodor, 1993), and various patches have been suggested (e.g. Wright, 1997). One lacuna in this literature is that one does not find any detailed presentation of what exactly these interpretations are supposed to be. Drawing on contemporary literature on persistence, the present paper sets out detailed semantic treatments for fragments of English, whereby predicates such as ârabbitâ divide their reference over four-dimensional continuants (Quineâs rabbits), instantaneous temporal slices of those continuants (Quineâs rabbit-slices) and the simple elements which compose those slices (undetached rabbit parts) respectively. Once we have the systematic interpretations on the table, we can get to work evaluating them
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