Information Technology Platforms: Definition and Research Directions

The concept of an information technology (IT) related platform is broad and covers phenomena ranging from the operating system Linux to the Internet. Such platforms are of increasing importance to innovation and value creation across many facets of industry and daily life. There is, however, a lack of common understanding in both research and industry about what is mean by the term platform when related to IT. This lack of consensus is detrimental to research and knowledge development. Thus, the aims of this study are to: (i) provide a sound definition of the IT-platform concept by identifying its distinguishing dimensions; and (ii) identify important current research directions for the IT-platform concept. To achieve these aims a systematic literature review was undertaken with 133 relevant articles taken from major information systems journals, conferences, and business publications. The study contributes by providing a sound base for future research into IT-platforms.Comment: Research-in-progress ISBN# 978-0-646-95337-3 Presented at the Australasian Conference on Information Systems 2015 (arXiv:1605.01032

Understanding Platform Loyalty in the Cloud: A Configurational View on ISV´s Costs and Benefits

Platform-as-a-service (PaaS) providers are increasingly engaged in nurturing vibrant ecosystems of independent software vendors (ISVs) by offering standardized services. However, cloud ecosystems have also been known for its fluctuation and high rates of desertion. A currently under-researched explanation for this low traction and high rates of fluctuation may lie in the fact that ISVs face considerable costs when joining and acting on a specific platform. If these costs are too high, they can rapidly outweigh the additional value generated by the ecosystem. This study therefore explains the role of different configurations of cost-inducing factors and resource benefits in influencing an ISV´s platform loyalty. By using a configurational approach based on fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (FsQCA), we display complex interactional effects of cost and benefits as causal conditions on ISVs’ intention to stay in the ecosystem and thus provide valuable insights for both practice as well as theory on platform ecosystems

Seeding for quality of platform complements: evidence from Amazon’s Alexa ecosystem

An important objective for digital platform governance is to ensure the creation of high-quality complements. For nascent platforms, complements are typically the main force in attracting early adopters and, consequently, further improving platform’s attractiveness to potential complementors. In this research-in-progress paper, we study seeding – direct financial support to selected complements by the platform owner – as an indirect governance mechanism in motivating the complement quality improvement in general. The dataset consists of 499 connected home complements on Amazon’s Alexa platform that were released during the first three years after the platform launch. The preliminary findings reveal that complements launched after platform owner’s seeding actions generally show better quality. Such a quality improvement effect seems to be reinforced if the platform owner can conduct repetitive seeding on the same complement. However, the effectiveness of repetitive seeding may vary depending on the investment and the maturity of the target complement’s business

B2B App Store Governance in Software Platform Ecosystems: Dimensions and Types

The ever-increasing customer demand for use case-specific B2B software puts platform owners into a challenging situation where integrating a B2B app store into their digital platform becomes a necessity to manage the dynamics of software platform ecosystems. However, platform owners face uncertainty and experiment, while platform ecosystem research provides limited guidance for specific B2B app store governance. Closing this gap, we use multiple case studies and develop three taxonomies for architecture, control mechanisms, and demand generation to provide an overview of the solution space for B2B app store governance. We further derive three robust B2B app store governance types: platform play, transaction channel, and community platform. This paper enriches the B2C-driven and core-offering related research on digital platform governance with tangible B2B app store governance dimensions and types. We envision to guide practitioners in identifying and selecting governance characteristics to remain competitive and provide innovation for their B2B app stores

DO NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES AFFECT PLATFORM MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONS? THE IMPACT OF MORAL AND REGULATORY LEGITIMACY ON PLATFORM GOVERNANCE

When allowing third parties to join their platforms, platform owners run the risk of attracting harmful third-party complements. Existing literature considers that low-quality offerings negatively affect cross-side user satisfaction and attractiveness, ultimately harming the platform\u27s reputation and stability. However, recent events show that negative externalities from third-party offerings can also motivate platform sponsors to adapt their membership conditions. Existing platform literature does not explain the underlying theoretical mechanisms. In this paper, we examine why platform sponsors adjust the conditions that govern third parties joining their platforms in response to negative externalities. We apply legitimacy theory to a critical case on a payment transaction platform. We find that negative externalities affect both moral and regulatory legitimacy, which in turn motivate the platform sponsor to adjust the conditions under which third parties may join the platform

Understanding Informal Control Modes on Software Platforms – The Mediating Role of Third-Party Developers’ Intrinsic Motivation

Software ecosystem platforms such as Google’s Play Store or Apple’s App Store rely heavily on highly motivated third-party developers who are eager to invest their time and effort into developing and updating apps for platforms. Platform owners are challenged to find a balance between developers’ need for autonomy and a platform’s integrity. Despite the widely acknowledged importance of informal control modes in such contexts, limited empirical work exists on how and why clan and self-control affect developers’ behaviors and performance outcomes on software platforms. Drawing on control theory and motivation literature, we conducted an online survey with 230 Android developers to examine how developers’ intrinsic motivation mediates the effects of informal control modes on developer performance. Our findings show that while intrinsic motivation plays an important role in mediating both informal control modes’ effects, clan control exhibits predominantly stronger downstream effects than self-control. Implications for research and practice are discussed

Mobile Application Quality and Platform Stickiness under Formal vs. Self-Control — Evidence from an Experimental Study

Although control modes have been extensively studied in IS research, minimal research attention has been directed towards understanding how different control mechanisms operate in software-based platforms. Drawing on self-determination theory and IS control literature, we conducted a laboratory experiment with 138 participants in which we examined how well third-party developers contribute to a mobile app development platform in terms of output quality and whether they are willing to stick with this platform under formal (i.e., output and process) and informal (i.e., self) control. We demonstrate that self-control has consistently stronger effects on application quality and platform stickiness than formal control modes. We also shed light on perceived autonomy as explanatory mechanism through which the control modes’ effects are mediated. Taken together, our study highlights the theoretically important finding that self-determination among third-party developers is a stronger driving force than typical hierarchical control mechanisms. Implications for research and practice are discussed

Dynamics in Platform Ecosystems

Platform business models are gaining rapid traction in today’s world. As of 2016, the four most valuable companies—Apple, Google, Amazon and Microsoft—have been using this business model. So do some of the most promising start-ups, including Uber and AirBnB. These providers of multi-sided platforms have a common goal, which is to match producers and consumers in order to create value through their interactions. The evolving ecosystems around a platform business are characterized by network effects among the groups of stakeholders, as each market side is influenced by the other side of the platform. A goal of the platform owner is to create and exploit as many monetization opportunities as possible. As the main revenue source, usually, is based on the interactions on or access to the platform, managing the demand and the supply side is at the core of platform management. One example of an uprising area of business that leverages a platform business model is crowdfunding platforms. These multi-sided markets try to facilitate the interaction of individuals who seek funding for a specific project, with a crowd of people that is willing to invest in the idea. The idea behind the model has been around for a long time, but due to reduced transaction cost is now available on a global scale. As of November 2016, Kickstarter, one of the most famous players in the business of reward-based crowdfunding, has already raised 2.7 billion USD in total pledges and has funded over 114,000 projects. This dissertation tries to shed light on the dynamics that are at work in a platform ecosystem by investigating distinct behaviors of platform participants and observing the impact on other stakeholders and the platform ecosystem as a whole. Each of the papers included in this dissertation focuses on a certain participant or dynamic of the platform ecosystem. With the first article, the theoretical basis of asymmetric information between consumers and producers in a crowdfunding environment is established. Furthermore, it shows that the opinion expressed in the form of electronic Word-of-Mouth (eWOM) and the observable popularity information (e.g. decision-making of other participants) serve as credible quality signals, subsequently influencing consumers’ decision-making. Also, popularity information and eWOM differ significantly in terms of effectiveness over time. Both factors, eWOM and popularity information, can therefore be seen as means to reduce information asymmetries in platform ecosystems. Since the importance of popularity information and eWOM is known to producers, an incentive to manipulate these performance indicators can be deducted. We therefore suspected that producers might establish non-genuine indicators of eWOM or popularity information. Article 2 then identifies a manipulation strategy of project creators on Kickstarter, who illegally alter the number of Facebook Shares their campaign supposedly has. After identifying the fraudulent campaigns, we were able to observe the resulting effects of non-genuine social information on consumer decision-making over time, showing that a short-term gain can be achieved, whereas the total effect is indeed harmful to the campaign. Contrary to the deliberately fake social information sent by the producers, the third article then concerns non-explicit campaign characteristics in the form of personality traits of producers. Here we were able to extract the Big Five personality traits of a project creator from the campaign description and the included video and to analyze their effectiveness for influencing potential consumers. The influence was measured by means of project adoption by the crowd and diffusion on Facebook. Finally, article 4 investigates a governance decision made by the platform provider. Under the condition of a natural experiment, we were able to observe and analyze how a policy change by the platform owner with regard to their gatekeeping strategy can influence a platform ecosystem as a whole, as well as certain participants in particular. The policy change, made by Kickstarter in 2014, lowered the barrier for entering the platform for pro-ject creators, resulting in a shift in average quality, number of projects and platform revenue. Implications for future research and practice are discussed in depth for each article and summarized in the final chapter

Crowdfunding: Platform Dynamics under Asymmetric Information

Platform ecosystems are a growing trend in various industries and many companies that rely on this organizational structure have seen unprecedented growth rates in recent years. Compared to traditional service providers, platforms do not offer products or services directly to their customers, but almost exclusively through complementors who develop and deliver complementary content. Platforms therefore create value by enabling and coordinating interactions between the demand and the supply side. As these platforms are two-sided markets, they are characterized by distinct cross-side network effects, meaning that each side of the market derives externalities from the participation of the respective other group. Crowdfunding platforms rely on this concept and facilitate transactions between individuals who seek funding for a specific project or venture and prospective investors. Crowdfunding platforms are, however, special as the transactions made via the platforms are particularly risky for end-users because of a high level of information asymmetry existing between the market sides. Though a certain level of information asymmetry exists between the distinct market sides in every two-sided market, a number of factors amplify this problem in the crowdfunding context. For instance, there is usually little to no publicly available information such as customer reviews to evaluate the investments ex-ante. The creators of crowdfunding campaigns are therefore able to overstate quality or withhold information as they control the flow of information towards potential investors. Furthermore, many of the projects that are published on crowdfunding platforms are still in their infancy, making it difficult to accurately predict project outcomes. Compared to other types of two-sided markets, the issue of information asymmetry is also more difficult to resolve in crowdfunding because mechanisms such as reputation systems that are frequently applied in other contexts to mitigate this issue are less relevant on crowdfunding platforms. The actual utility of crowdfunding projects is therefore difficult to ascertain at the time the investment decision has to be made and dynamics of crowdfunding are thus different from those in other platform settings. Many open questions still remain with respect to the optimal market design of crowdfunding platforms in order to mitigate information asymmetries. Against this backdrop, four research studies have been conducted to investigate how the behaviors and actions of the distinct groups of market participants (i.e., platform provider, project creators, backers) influence the decision-making of potential backers on crowdfunding platforms. The first study is concerned with the effects actions taken by platform providers can have for the decision-making of backers. More specifically, it is examined how relaxing the input control for crowdfunding projects on Kickstarter affected the decision-making of backers. The second and third study are concerned with the role of social buzz and contribution behavior by previous backers. While the second study is focused on the dynamic interplay of social buzz, prior-contribution behavior, and the respective effects on backer decision-making, the third study describes the repercussions of non-genuine social media likes for project creators. The final study is focused on the influence project creators can have on backers by signaling certain personality traits through their project description and video. Overall, this thesis highlights that, as a result of the high level of information asymmetry on crowdfunding platforms, prospective backers seek alternative information and signals to use for decision support in the face of uncertainty. Platform providers and project creators may use the results to better understand how and why certain actions or behaviors of market participants on crowdfunding platforms affect the decision-making of prospective backers. The findings may therefore help platform providers to optimize the market design of crowdfunding platforms in order to avoid information-related market failure in the long term