1,331 research outputs found
Flexibly Instructable Agents
This paper presents an approach to learning from situated, interactive
tutorial instruction within an ongoing agent. Tutorial instruction is a
flexible (and thus powerful) paradigm for teaching tasks because it allows an
instructor to communicate whatever types of knowledge an agent might need in
whatever situations might arise. To support this flexibility, however, the
agent must be able to learn multiple kinds of knowledge from a broad range of
instructional interactions. Our approach, called situated explanation, achieves
such learning through a combination of analytic and inductive techniques. It
combines a form of explanation-based learning that is situated for each
instruction with a full suite of contextually guided responses to incomplete
explanations. The approach is implemented in an agent called Instructo-Soar
that learns hierarchies of new tasks and other domain knowledge from
interactive natural language instructions. Instructo-Soar meets three key
requirements of flexible instructability that distinguish it from previous
systems: (1) it can take known or unknown commands at any instruction point;
(2) it can handle instructions that apply to either its current situation or to
a hypothetical situation specified in language (as in, for instance,
conditional instructions); and (3) it can learn, from instructions, each class
of knowledge it uses to perform tasks.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file
From Discursive Practice to Logic? Remarks on Logical Expressivism
This paper proposes a novel account of the conditional locution as grounded in practices of goal- directed cooperative dialogue. It is argued that a conditional semantics can be obtained within a language fragment that lacks this locution, but supports assertive, inferential and directive prac- tices. We take Brandomâs logical expressivist programme as a point of departure, but argue that this programme is empirically flawed as it underestimates the pervasive context-dependence of linguistic items including logical vocabulary. We further take issue with his claim that a discursive practice involving only assertion and inference is sufficient for the conservative introduction and deployment of conditional vocabulary. A more promising route is provided by the introduction of directives, as in so-called âpseudo-imperativesâ such as Get individuals to invest their time and the funding will follow: this has a conditional sense that if individuals invest their time, then funding will follow. We propose a semantic analysis for these forms which builds on Kukla and Lanceâs account of prescriptives, and argue that our analysis more faithfully captures the âirrealisâ nature of conditionals. The analysis is presented in terms of an information-state based dialogue model, with the information state comprising a partitioned commitment store. It is argued that our âdialogicalâ analysis of conditional reasoning is faithful to Brandomâs Sellarsian intuition of linguistic practice as a game of giving and asking for reasons. We conclude by contextualising and situating Brandomâs programme against the larger field of practice theory, by means of a comparison with the works of sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, and suggest that this com- parison reveals further challenges to the expressivist programme. We also take note of Narasimhan et alâs recent proposals for agent-based modelling of social practice theory as a possible basis for future development
The role of complexity and input patterns on children's acquisition of adverbial connective function
Practical Language: Its Meaning and Use
I demonstrate that a "speech act" theory of meaning for imperatives isâcontra a dominant position in philosophy and linguisticsâtheoretically desirable. A speech act-theoretic account of the meaning of an imperative !Ï is characterized, broadly, by the following claims.
LINGUISTIC MEANING AS USE
!Ïâs meaning is a matter of the speech act an utterance of it conventionally functions to expressâwhat a speaker conventionally uses it to do (its conventional discourse function, CDF).
IMPERATIVE USE AS PRACTICAL
!Ï's CDF is to express a practical (non-representational) state of mindâone concerning an agent's preferences and plans, rather than her beliefs.
Opposed to speech act accounts is a preponderance of views which deny that a sentence's linguistic meaning is a matter of what speech act it is used to perform, or its CDF. On such accounts, meaning is, instead, a matter of "static" properties of the sentenceâe.g., how it depicts the world as being (or, more neutrally, the properties of a model-theoretic object with which the semantic value of the sentence co-varies). On one version of a static account, an imperative 'shut the window!' might, for instance, depict the world as being such that the window must be shut.
Static accounts are traditionally motivated against speech act-theoretic accounts by appeal to supposedly irremediable explanatory deficiencies in the latter. Whatever a static account loses in saying (prima facie counterintuitively) that an imperative conventionally represents, or expresses a picture of the world, is said to be offset by its ability to explain a variety of phenomena for which speech act-theoretic accounts are said to lack good explanations (even, in many cases, the bare ability to offer something that might meet basic criteria on what a good explanation should be like).
I aim to turn the tables on static accounts. I do this by showing that speech act accounts are capable of giving explanations of phenomena which fans of static accounts have alleged them unable to give. Indeed, for a variety of absolutely fundamental phenomena having to do with the conventional meaning of imperatives (and other types of practical language), speech act accounts provide natural and theoretically satisfying explanations, where a representational account provides none
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