Условия истинности модальных предложений в логике У. Оккама

The article reconstructs W. Ockham’s approach to the analysis of veracity conditions of modal propositions. General features of the semantics of modal propositions are explicated.  The author argues that they are semantically similar to the propositions about the past and the future and that the contingence of the propositions cum dicto and sine dicto is incorrect. Key words: Medieval modal logic, sine dicto and cum dicto, de re and de dicto, supposition, nominalism.Статья посвящена реконструкции подхода средневекового схоласта У. Оккама к анализу условий истинности модальных предложений. В ней эксплицированы общие черты семантики модальных предложений в логике Оккама и выявлена их семантическая близость к высказываниям о будущем и прошлом, а также обоснован вывод о том, что сближение предложений sine dicto с de re нельзя считать корректным.Ключевые слова: средневековая модальная логика, sine dicto и cum dicto, de re и de dicto, суппозиция, номинализ

Spinoza and Crescas on Modality

The first section of the chapter will address the philosophy of modality among Spinoza’s medieval Jewish predecessors, and, primarily, in Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410/11), a bold and original, anti-Aristotelian philosopher. This section should both complement the discussion of modality in medieval Christian and Islamic philosophy in the previous chapters of this volume and provide some lesser-known historical background to Spinoza’s own engagement with modal philosophy. Following a section on Spinoza’s definitions of his main modal concepts and his understanding of contingency, I will turn, in the third section, to discuss the extent of Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism. The recent debate about whether Spinoza was a strict necessitarian has resulted in quite a few insights about Spinoza’s modal philosophy, but it has also detracted attention from some basic questions about Spinoza’s modal philosophy, and in the fourth and last section of the chapter, I will attempt to chart the foundational questions that still have been barely explored. The primary aim of this chapter it to provide a survey and outline of the chief elements of Spinoza’s modal philosophy. Still, beyond the mere overview of Spinoza’s arguments (and some major scholarly debates), I will also advance two original theses. First, I will show that Spinoza makes a distinction between two notions of contingency, and that once this important distinction is observed, Spinoza’s various assertions about contingency turn out to be consistent. Secondly, I will discuss the text (E2a1) which is commonly taken to be the strongest and most stubborn proof against the reading of Spinoza as strict necessitarianism; I will show that the basic meaning of this text has been widely misunderstood, and that E2a1 is perfectly compatible with strict necessitarianism

El problema de la contingencia en Leibniz hacia 1690: importancia, interpretaciones actuales y modelos alternativos de fundamentación

En 1686 Leibniz propuso su “solución definitiva” al problema de la contingencia. Pero las tensiones que siguió afrontando su metafísica modal evidencian la presencia de modelos alternativos de fundamentación. Así, hacia 1690, su teoría del análisis infinito debió complementarse con la tesis de la indemostrabilidad de lo óptimo.In 1686, Leibniz put forward his “definitive solution” to the problem of contingency. However, his modal metaphysics kept on facing some difficulties which arose from alternative explicative frameworks. Hence, by 1690, his theory of infinite analysis had to be supplemented with the statement of indemonstrability of the best.Fil: Escobar Viré, Maximiliano. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Keskustelu Jumalan kaitselmuksesta modernissa teistisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa

Tämän tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää ja analysoida keskustelua Jumalan kaitselmuksesta modernissa teistisessä uskonnonfilosofiassa. Tarkasteltavakseni olen valinnut nykykeskustelun kannalta keskeisiä kompatibilismin, molinismin ja avoimen teismin näkökulmia. Olen taustoittanut modernia keskustelua kristillisen perinteen keskeisillä tulkinnoilla. Keskustelu Jumalan kaitselmuksesta on tällä hetkellä uskonnonfilosofian kentällä vilkasta. Suomessa keskustelu on toistaiseksi ollut varsin vähäistä. Kysymys Jumalan kaitselmuksesta on kuitenkin kaikkina aikoina puhutellut ihmisiä juutalais-kristillisessä perinteessä, sillä se kuuluu olennaisena osana luojajumalan ja hänen luomakuntansa väliseen suhteeseen. Jumalan kaitselmus on kysymyksenä monitahoinen. Käsiteltäessä Jumalan kaitselmusta filosofisena kysymyksenä on nostettava esiin kysymykset Jumalan luonnosta, ihmisen luonnosta sekä Jumalan ja ihmisen välisestä suhteesta. Näin nousee esiin kolme teemaa, jotka ovat samalla keskenään limittäisiä: Yleinen kausaalivaikutus Jumalan ja ihmisen välillä, Jumalan esitieto ja ihmisen tahdonvapaus. Tutkimustehtävänäni on selvittää tulkintoja yleisestä kausaalivaikutuksesta Jumalan ja ihmisen välillä, kysymystä Jumalan esitiedosta ja ihmisen tahdonvapaudesta modernin teistisen uskonnonfilosofian keskustelussa. Keskeinen kysymykseni onkin, kuinka Jumalan suvereniteetin ja ihmisen tahdonvapauden suhdetta on käsitelty. Tästä teemasta nousevia keskeisiä kysymyksiä ovat, missä määrin Jumala on ennalta määrännyt ihmisten vapaat valinnat ja kuinka hän kykenee ihmisen tahdonvapautta kunnioittaen pitämään huolta luoduistaan. Oma kysymyksensä on myös, missä määrin Jumalan esitiedon voidaan ajatella määräävän ennalta luotujen valinnat. Tutkielmani metodina on systemaattinen analyysi. Tutkimuksessani toimin erityisesti argumentaatio- ja vertailevan analyysin pohjalta. Tutkielman johtopäätökset perustuvat tekemääni analyysiin. Tutkielmassani osoitan, että niin kutsuttu Boëthiuksen esitys, jossa hän erottaa yksinkertaisen ja ehdollisen välttämättömyyden, on saanut laajaa kannatusta ja lukuisia sovelluksia myöhempien ajattelijoiden keskuudessa. Vaikka hänen esitystään ei sellaisenaan hyväksyttäisikään, Boëthius on antanut myöhemmille tulkinnoille mielekkäitä lähtökohtia ongelman ratkaisemiseen. Kristillisessä perinteessä argumenttia on toisteltu eri muodoissaan. Sen keskeisenä periaatteena on, että Jumalan tieto vapaiden valintojen tosista propositioista perustuu propositioihin itseensä. Jumalan tieto ei perustu siihen, että hän ennalta määrää vapaat valinnat. Osoitan myös, että kompatibilismin ja molinismin keskeinen ero on siinä, että kompatibilismin, erityisesti Leibnizin mukaan, vapaa yksilö valitsee vapaasti, mutta Jumala on hänet laittanut valitsemaan vapaasti. Molinismin mukaan osan Jumalan tietämistä asioista ihminen valitsee vapaasti ilman Jumalan kausaalista vaikutusta. Sekä molinismi että avoin teismi puoltavat ihmisen libertaarista tahdonvapautta. Avoin teismi eroaa molinismista olennaisilta osin siinä, että avoimen teismin mukaan tulevaisuus on avoin siinä määrin, ettei edes kaikkitietävä olio voi sitä varmasti tietää. Olen tutkielmassani myös käsitellyt modernien teististen uskonnonfilosofien raamatullisia perusteita omille kaitselmusta koskeville näkökulmilleen sekä heidän toisiaan kohtaan osoittamaa kritiikkiä

Fluxus in fieri. Alberto Magno su tempus, aeternitas e semantica delle proposizioni temporali

La tesi è divisa in tre capitoli. Il primo è incentrato sulla questione del tempo fisico in Alberto con particolare attenzione alla (i) struttura del tempo (ii) al problema dell'esistenza e alla sua (iii) conoscibilità. Sono presenti confronti con le opinioni dei Peripatetici arabi e viene ricostruito un argomento di Alberto a sostegno dell'indipendenza del tempo dall'anima. Il secondo capitolo si occupa del rapporto fra tempo e teoria della conoscenza di Alberto. Si analizza il senso comune, l'immaginazione e la memoria. Il terzo capitolo tratta della nozione d'eternità nei suoi vari aspetti formale/materiale, increata/creata, il rapporto fra la definizione Boeziana e quella del Liber de causis. Si affronta la critica d'inconsistenza rivolta alla nozione di eternità boeziana come 'durata atemporale' in W. Kneale e M. Kneale, seguita dalla soluzione di Alberto. Il quarto capitolo è il più teorico e si occupa dell'eventuale peso semantico dei tempi verbali (tenses) all'interno di alcuni tipi di proposizioni, dibattito sviluppatosi perifericamente ad alcune discussioni dottrinali. Esamino che tipo di teoria delle proposizioni viene supportato da Alberto

Essence, Explanation, and Modal Knowledge

The primary aim of this project is to put forward a novel account of knowledge of metaphysical modality. I call this the “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account of modal knowledge, because it relies on the following two main theses: (a) knowledge of metaphysical necessity is grounded in knowledge of essence; and (b) essences are properties, sets of properties, or mechanisms, having distinctive explanatory powers for how things are. While thesis (a) is quite popular in the current debates, mostly thanks to Kit Fine’s recent work in modal metaphysics, thesis (b) introduces an original brand of essentialism. As I show by means of various examples involving both kinds and individuals, it seems fruitful to think of essences as underlying cores which cause a multitude of typical properties of things. Because of this, essences explain why those properties consistently co-occur in those kinds and individuals—in this sense essences are “superexplanatory” for how things are. This account of essence has crucial consequences at the epistemological level. For essences are things that we discover empirically, typically via scientific investigation. Although the discovery of essence has been held to be a central task of philosophy since Aristotle introduced it, essences have also been often disparaged in contemporary debates as hidden mysterious entities, or some sort of relic of a pre-scientific era. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account aims to overcome those prejudices and show that there is a scientifically grounded way to clarify in what sense essential properties constitute the “nature” of things. If this is correct, the epistemology of central cases of metaphysical necessity is much easier than many have thought. For we infer what is necessarily true of things from our knowledge of what is essential to things. The Essentialist Superexplanatory account owes much to the work of Saul Kripke in the 1970s and 1980s; especially to his main insight that modal knowledge proceeds inferentially, from premises concerning the actual makeup of the world to conclusions about the non-actual and necessary. In fact, a further crucial component of my account is a Kripkean bridge-principle connecting essence and necessity, both at the constitutive-metaphysical level and at the epistemic-normative level. In its simplest formulation, this bridge-principle says that if something is essentially in a certain way, then it is (metaphysically) necessarily that way: “If x is essentially F, then necessarily x is F”. Also importantly, from a methodological point of view, the Essentialist Superexplanatory account prioritizes the investigation of modal metaphysics, and of essence in particular, for elucidating knowledge of modality. I call it accordingly a “modal-metaphysics-first” approach to modal knowledge and oppose it to the more traditional “means-first” approach that has dominated the literature in the past twenty years or so. As to the structure of the work, this dissertation is not a traditional monograph. Instead, it is composed of three related but independent research articles, each with its own abstract, plus a final Appendix. Here is a brief summary of each piece. In the first article, “Two Notions of Metaphysical Modality”, I argue that Conceivability-theory as cashed out by David Chalmers does not help cast light on knowledge of genuine metaphysical modality as traditionally pictured by Kripke. Instead, Chalmers’ conceivability only safely ranges over logical-conceptual possibility under standards of ideal coherence. I show how, at bottom, Chalmers and Kripke are operating with two different, incompatible notions of metaphysical modality. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on February 1st, 2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1702-2. In the second article, “Putting Modal Metaphysics First”, I present my metaphysics-first approach to modal knowledge against the dominant tradition and lay out my positive “Essentialist Superexplanatory” account. I use chemical kinds as a case-study and illustrate how essences cause and explain the many properties that are typically shared by all the instances of a kind. Knowing what is essential to (the instances of) the kind in this sense is the basis for knowing what is necessary for (the instances of) the kind. This article was published in Synthese (“online first”) on May 29th, 2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1828-2. In the third article, “Essentialist Constraints on Counterfactual Knowledge”, I turn to Timothy Williamson’s Counterfactual-theory. I discuss a number of problems that have been raised for it by the recent literature and argue that those all ultimately trace back to the failure to elucidate the proper normative constraints on modal reasoning. By means of various examples, I show how the Essentialist Superexplanatory account instead clarifies such constraints, and thus constitutes a better account of how we gain modal knowledge. This article is in preparation for the volume “Modal Thinking”, edited by A. Vaidya and D. Prelevic, forthcoming with Oxford University Press. Finally, in the Appendix, I discuss a category of potentially problematic cases for the Essentialist Superexplanatory account, namely what I call the “purely a priori metaphysical necessities”. I lay out a pluralistic picture of modal space which distinguishes different kinds of necessity, based on their source. Specifically, it distinguishes between two kinds of metaphysical necessities: the “general” vs. the “distinctively” metaphysical necessities. I show how this helps us handle the a priori cases, and sketch a possible way forward for modal epistemology

Worlds and Objects of Epistemic Space : A study of Jaakko Hintikka's modal semantics

This study focuses on meaning and knowledge by assessing a distinctive view regarding their relation, namely the modal view of Jaakko Hintikka. The development of this view has not been previously scrutinized. By paying close attention to the texts of Hintikka, I show that, despite the extensive deployment of mathematical tools, the articulation of the view remained intuitive and vague. The study calls attention to several points at which Hintikka omits relevant details or disregards foundational questions. Attempts are made to articulate Hintikka’s certain ideas in a more specific manner, and new problems that result are identified. The central claim argued for is that Hintikka’s exposition was unsatisfactory in many respects and hence the view, as it stands, falls short in its explanatory scope compared to current theories in the intersection of logic, semantics, and epistemology. However, I argue that, despite its shortcomings, the prospects of the modal view are not exhausted. This is verified by introducing a new interpretation of the framework and by sketching new applications relevant in philosophy of language and in epistemology. It is also pointed out that certain early advances of the view closely resemble, and therefore anticipate, the central tenets of the currently influential two-dimensional approaches in logic and semantics.Tutkimus paneutuu merkityksen ja tiedon käsitteisiin tarkastelemalla Jaakko Hintikan työtä modaalisen semantiikan parissa. Tutkimus osoittaa, että Hintikka jätti modaalisen semantiikan kehitystyössään avoimeksi useita perustavia kysymyksiä ja yksityiskohtia. Tutkimuksessa pyritään artikuloimaan täsmällisemmin joitakin Hintikan näkemyksiä, ja tunnistetaan uusia syntyviä ongelmia. Keskeisenä väitteenä on, että Hintikan teoreettinen työ jäi monilta osin epätyydyttäväksi, ja siten hänen modaalinen näkemyksensä ei yllä selitysvoimaltaan ja sovelluspotentiaaliltaan samalle tasolle kuin nykyiset filosofiset teoriat, jotka operoivat logiikan, semantiikan ja epistemologian risteyskohdissa. Tästä huolimatta tutkimuksessa argumentoidaan, että Hintikan teoreettinen viitekehys tarjoaa myös uusia kiinnostavia näköaloja. Tämä todennetaan tarjoamalla Hintikan viitekehykselle uusi tulkinta, ja soveltamalla sitä uusiin kielifilosofisiin kysymyksiin. Tutkimus nostaa myös esiin kirjallisuudessa ohitetun tosiasian, että Hintikan työ ennakoi tärkeällä tavalla nykyisin vaikutusvaltaisia kaksi-dimensionaalisia lähestymistapoja logiikassa ja semantiikassa

Foreknowledge, Free Will, and the Divine Power Distinction in Thomas Bradwardine\u27s De futuris contingentibus

Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) was an English philosopher, logician, and theologian of some note; but though recent scholarship has revived an interest in much of his work, little attention has been paid to an early treatise he wrote on the topic of future contingents, entitled De futuris contingentibus. In this thesis I aim to address this deficit, arguing in particular that the treatise makes original use of the divine power distinction to resolve the apparent conflict between God’s foreknowledge on the one hand, and human free will on the other. Bradwardine argues that God’s foreknowledge operates in accord with God’s ordained power, and so relative to God’s ordained power, our actions are indeed compelled; however, because of Bradwardine’s appeal to the distinction in power, he is able to maintain that our actions remain free relative to God’s absolute power, and are thus free, absolutely speaking. This solution is, I argue, unique to Bradwardine, although it seems to be abandoned in his later writing. Bradwardine’s approach to the problem is heavily influenced by three figures in particular — Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, and John Duns Scotus — each of whose solutions I discuss in some detail. Furthermore, Bradwardine explicitly places his own solution in opposition to that of William Ockham, and so I give substantial attention to examining Ockham’s position. But while I agree with Bradwardine’s assessment that Ockham’s position undermines God’s foreknowledge in ways that should be untenable to someone of 14th-century Christian commitments, I argue that Bradwardine’s solution amounts to an equally untenable determinism. An appendix contains excerpts from my own English translation of the De futuris contingentibus (the first into any modern language), in parallel with the original Latin