Mean Field Energy Games in Wireless Networks

This work tackles the problem of energy-efficient distributed power control in wireless networks with a large number of transmitters. The problem is modeled by a dynamic game. Each transmitter-receiver communication is characterized by a state given by the available energy and/or the individual channel state and whose evolution is governed by certain dynamics. Since equilibrium analysis in such a (stochastic) game is generally difficult and even impossible, the problem is approximated by exploiting the large system assumption. Under an appropriate exchangeability assumption, the corresponding mean field game is well defined and studied in detail for special cases. The main contribution of this work is to show how mean field games can be applied to the problem under investigation and provide illustrative numerical results. Our results indicate that this approach can lead to significant gains in terms of energy-efficiency at the resulting equilibrium.Comment: IEEE Proc. of Asilomar Conf. on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Nov. 2012, Pacific Grove, CA, US

Energy-Efficient Resource Management in Ultra Dense Small Cell Networks: A Mean-Field Approach

In this paper, a novel approach for joint power control and user scheduling is proposed for optimizing energy efficiency (EE), in terms of bits per unit power, in ultra dense small cell networks (UDNs). To address this problem, a dynamic stochastic game (DSG) is formulated between small cell base stations (SBSs). This game enables to capture the dynamics of both queues and channel states of the system. To solve this game, assuming a large homogeneous UDN deployment, the problem is cast as a mean field game (MFG) in which the MFG equilibrium is analyzed with the aid of two low-complexity tractable partial differential equations. User scheduling is formulated as a stochastic optimization problem and solved using the drift plus penalty (DPP) approach in the framework of Lyapunov optimization. Remarkably, it is shown that by weaving notions from Lyapunov optimization and mean field theory, the proposed solution yields an equilibrium control policy per SBS which maximizes the network utility while ensuring users' quality-of-service. Simulation results show that the proposed approach achieves up to 18:1% gains in EE and 98.2% reductions in the network's outage probability compared to a baseline model.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figures, GLOBECOM 2015 (published

Quadratic Mean Field Games

Mean field games were introduced independently by J-M. Lasry and P-L. Lions, and by M. Huang, R.P. Malham\'e and P. E. Caines, in order to bring a new approach to optimization problems with a large number of interacting agents. The description of such models split in two parts, one describing the evolution of the density of players in some parameter space, the other the value of a cost functional each player tries to minimize for himself, anticipating on the rational behavior of the others. Quadratic Mean Field Games form a particular class among these systems, in which the dynamics of each player is governed by a controlled Langevin equation with an associated cost functional quadratic in the control parameter. In such cases, there exists a deep relationship with the non-linear Schr\"odinger equation in imaginary time, connexion which lead to effective approximation schemes as well as a better understanding of the behavior of Mean Field Games. The aim of this paper is to serve as an introduction to Quadratic Mean Field Games and their connexion with the non-linear Schr\"odinger equation, providing to physicists a good entry point into this new and exciting field.Comment: 62 pages, 4 figure

Schr\"odinger approach to Mean Field Games with negative coordination

Mean Field Games provide a powerful framework to analyze the dynamics of a large number of controlled agents in interaction. Here we consider such systems when the interactions between agents result in a negative coordination and analyze the behavior of the associated system of coupled PDEs using the now well established correspondence with the non linear Schr\"odinger equation. We focus on the long optimization time limit and on configurations such that the game we consider goes through different regimes in which the relative importance of disorder, interactions between agents and external potential varies, which makes possible to get insights on the role of the forward-backward structure of the Mean Field Game equations in relation with the way these various regimes are connected

Théorie des jeux et apprentissage pour les réseaux sans fil distribués

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions des réseaux sans fil dans lesquels les terminaux mobiles sont autonomes dans le choix de leurs configurations de communication. Cette autonomie de décision peut notamment concerner le choix de la technologie d'accès au réseau, le choix du point d'accès, la modulation du signal, les bandes de fréquences occupées, la puissance du signal émis, etc. Typiquement, ces choix de configuration sont réalisés dans le but de maximiser des métriques de performances propres à chaque terminal. Sous l'hypothèse que les terminaux prennent leurs décisions de manière rationnelle afin de maximiser leurs performances, la théorie des jeux s'applique naturellement pour modéliser les interactions entre les décisions des différents terminaux. Plus précisément, l'objectif principal de cette thèse est d'étudier des stratégies d'équilibre de contrôle de puissance d'émission afin de satisfaire des considérations d'efficacité énergétique. Le cadre des jeux stochastiques est particulièrement adapté à ce problème et nous permet notamment de caractériser la région de performance atteignable pour toutes les stratégies de contrôle de puissance qui mènent à un état d'équilibre. Lorsque le nombre de terminaux en jeu est grand, nous faisons appel à la théorie des jeux à champ moyen pour simplifier l'étude du système. Cette théorie nous permet d'étudier non pas les interactions individuelles entre les terminaux, mais l'interaction de chaque terminal avec un champ moyen qui représente l'état global des autres terminaux. Des stratégies de contrôle de puissance optimales du jeu à champ moyen sont étudiées. Une autre partie de la thèse a été consacrée à des problématiques d'apprentissage de points d'équilibre dans les réseaux distribués. En particulier, après avoir caractérisé les positions d'équilibre d'un jeu de positionnement de points d'accès, nous montrons comment des dynamiques de meilleures réponses et d'apprentissage permettent de converger vers un équilibre. Enfin, pour un jeu de contrôle de puissance, la convergence des dynamiques de meilleures réponses vers des points d'équilibre a été étudiée. Il est notamment proposé un algorithme d'adaptation de puissance convergeant vers un équilibre avec une faible connaissance du réseau.In this thesis, we study wireless networks in which mobile terminals are free to choose their communication configuration. Theses configuration choices include access wireless technology, access point association, coding-modulation scheme, occupied bandwidth, power allocation, etc. Typically, these configuration choices are made to maximize some performance metrics associated to every terminals. Under the assumption that mobile terminals take their decisions in a rational manner, game theory can be applied to model the interactions between the terminals. Precisely, the main objective of this thesis is to study energy-efficient power control policies from which no terminal has an interest to deviate. The framework of stochastic games is particularly suited to this problem and allows to characterize the achievable utility region for equilibrium power control strategies. When the number of terminals in the network is large, we invoke mean field game theory to simplify the study of the system. Indeed, in a mean field game, the interactions between a player and all the other players are not considered individually. Instead, one only studies the interactions between each player and a mean field, which is the distribution of the states of all the other players. Optimal power control strategies from the mean field formulation are studied. Another part of this thesis has been focused on learning equilibria in distributed games. In particular, we show how best response dynamics and learning algorithms can converge to an equilibrium in a base station location game. For another scenario, namely a power control problem, we study the convergence of the best response dynamics. In this case, we propose a power control behavioral rule that converges to an equilibrium with very little information about the network.PARIS11-SCD-Bib. électronique (914719901) / SudocSudocFranceF