McTaggart's paradox and Smith's tensed theory of time

Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence of the transitory temporal properties of pastness, presentness and futurity , and those who deny their existence. We shall see that the debate centers around the ontological status of succession and the B-relations of earlier and later . I shall argue that Smith's tensed theory fails because he cannot account for the sense in which events have their tensed properties successively, and he cannot account for the direction of time.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43817/1/11229_2004_Article_BF00413606.pd

Is there a difference between the Metaphysics of A- and B- Time?

Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams’ thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is sympathetic with a B-theoretic ontology.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/83488/1/Oaklander_Is_There_a_Difference.pd

A Defence of the B-Theory of Time with Respect to the Problem of Change

I attend to the debate between the A-theory of time and the B- theory of time by evaluating how each theory accounts for the possibility of change. I conclude in favour of the B-theory of time as an account of change. I begin by considering McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time. I connect McTaggart’s argument, and the attendant A-theory versus B-theory debate, to an argument against the possibility of change. This argument, the problem of change, can be refuted by adopting either of an A-theory or B-theory account of change. I evaluate different approaches to change offered by various A-theories, including presentism, the growing block theory, the moving spotlight theory, and then proceed to consider different B-theory accounts of change, including relativiser endurantism, adverbialist endurantism, and perdurantism. I consider objections to each of these views. Finally, I compare the costs incurred by the best of the A-theory accounts and the best of the B-theorist accounts.Thesis (MPhil.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 202

Temporal minimalism : the metaphysics of time and temporality

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