Stability of Influence Maximization

The present article serves as an erratum to our paper of the same title, which was presented and published in the KDD 2014 conference. In that article, we claimed falsely that the objective function defined in Section 1.4 is non-monotone submodular. We are deeply indebted to Debmalya Mandal, Jean Pouget-Abadie and Yaron Singer for bringing to our attention a counter-example to that claim. Subsequent to becoming aware of the counter-example, we have shown that the objective function is in fact NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of $O(n^{1-\epsilon})$ for any $\epsilon > 0$. In an attempt to fix the record, the present article combines the problem motivation, models, and experimental results sections from the original incorrect article with the new hardness result. We would like readers to only cite and use this version (which will remain an unpublished note) instead of the incorrect conference version.Comment: Erratum of Paper "Stability of Influence Maximization" which was presented and published in the KDD1

Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments

We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model of online social computing systems such as online Q&A forums and of credit sharing in scientific co-authorship settings. We show that the maximum feasible produced value can be well approximated by simple local sharing rules where users are approximately rewarded in proportion to their marginal contributions and that this holds even under incomplete information about the player's abilities and effort constraints. For natural instances we show almost 95% optimality at equilibrium. When players incur a cost for their effort, we identify a threshold phenomenon: the efficiency is a constant fraction of the optimal when the cost is strictly convex and decreases with the number of players if the cost is linear

Greedy Minimization of Weakly Supermodular Set Functions

Many problems in data mining and unsupervised machine learning take the form of minimizing a set function with cardinality constraints. More explicitly, denote by [n] the set {1,...,n} and let f(S) be a function from 2^[n] to R+. Our goal is to minimize f(S) subject to |S| <= k. These problems include clustering and covering problems as well as sparse regression, matrix approximation problems and many others. These combinatorial problems are hard to minimize in general. Finding good (e.g. constant factor) approximate solutions for them requires significant sophistication and highly specialized algorithms. In this paper we analyze the behavior of the greedy algorithm to all of these problems. We start by claiming that the functions above are special. A trivial observation is that they are non-negative and non-increasing, that is, f(S) >= f(union(S,T)) >= 0 for any S and T. This immediately shows that expanding solution sets is (at least potentially) beneficial in terms of reducing the function value. But, monotonicity is not sufficient to ensure that any number of greedy extensions of a given solution would significantly reduce the objective function

PMU Placement Optimization for Efficient State Estimation in Smart Grid

© 1983-2012 IEEE. This paper investigates phasor measurement unit (PMU) placement for informative state estimation in smart grid by incorporating various constraints for observability. Observability constitutes an important property for PMU placement to characterize the depth of the buses' reachability by the placed PMUs, but addressing it solely by binary linear programming as in many works still does not guarantee a good estimate for the grid state. Some existing works have considered optimization of some estimation indices by ignoring the observability requirements for computational ease and thus potentially lead to trivial results such as acceptance of the estimate for an unobserved state component as its unconditional mean. In this work, the PMU placement optimization problem is considered by minimizing the mean squared error or maximizing the mutual information between the measurement output and grid state subject to observability constraints, which incorporate operating conditions such as presence of zero injection buses, contingency of measurement loss, and limitation of communication channels per PMU. The proposed design is thus free from the fundamental shortcomings in the existing PMU placement designs. The problems are posed as large scale binary nonlinear optimization problems involving thousands of binary variables, for which this paper develops efficient algorithms for computational solutions. Their performance is analyzed in detail through numerical examples on large scale IEEE power networks. The solution method is also shown to be extendable to AC power flow models, which are formulated by nonlinear equations

Complementarities and systems: Understanding japanese economic organization

The performance of the Japanese economy in the last forty five years, during which it has gone from post war destitution and near collapse to one of the richest and most productive in the world is unmatched in human history. The purposes of this essay are to interpret both the characteristic features of Japanese economic organization in terms of the concept of complementarity, and some recent developments in Japanese economy, and to speculate on its future.

Foreign Influence and Welfare

How do foreign interests influence the policy determination process? What are the welfare implications of such foreign influence? In this paper we develop a model of foreign influence and apply it to the study of optimal tariffs. We develop a two-country voting model of electoral competition, where we allow the incumbent party in each country to take costly actions that probabilistically affect the electoral outcome in the other country. We show that policies end up maximizing a weighted sum of domestic and foreign welfare, and we study the determinants of this weight. We show that foreign influence may be welfare-enhancing from the point of view of aggregate world welfare because it helps alleviate externalities arising from cross-border effects of policies. Foreign influence can however prove harmful in the presence of large imbalances in influence power across countries. We apply our model of foreign influence to the study of optimal trade policy. We derive a modified formula for the optimal import tariff and show that a country's import tariff is more distorted whenever the influenced country is small relative to the influencing country and whenever natural trade barriers between the two countries are small.