Is God the Necessary Being?

This paper briefly presents and engages with four competing hypotheses as to the most plausible explanation for the beginning of the universe. After clarifying some terminology, I will first establish both scientific and philosophical reasons for accepting the notion of an absolute beginning over a past eternal universe. Next, I will interact with Lawrence Krauss’ two versions of “nothing” and speculation of a multiverse as possible suggestions for what that first cause might be. In response, I will demonstrate the logical inadequacy of this approach, and by extension all other non-metaphysical theories. Ultimately, I will determine that, due to the logical contradictions inherent in physical explanations, one is epistemically justified in postulating a metaphysical deistic God as the Necessary Being responsible for the material cause of the universe

Bion Theory: an answer to the question Why is there Something rather than Nothing?

Why is there something rather than nothing? This paper explores one particular argument in favor of the answer that 'the existence of nothing' would amount to a logical contradiction. This argument consists of positing the existence of a novel entity, called a bion, of which all contingent things can be composed yet itself is non-contingent. First an overview of historical attempts to compile a systematic and exhaustive list of answers to the question is presented as context. Then follows an analysis of how the antropic principle would manifest itself in a world that consists of information and at the same time conforms to modal realism. Next, a thought experiment introduces bions as the foundation of such a world, showing how under these circumstances the ultimate origin of all existing things would be explained. The non-contingent nature of bions themselves is subsequently argued via a discussion of the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, this theory centered on the existence of bions is integrated into the worldview of Popperian metaphysics. According to the latter's criteria, I conclude that bion theory provides an integral answer to why there is something rather than nothing

The Multiverse and Participatory Metaphysics

This dissertation brings a new philosophical perspective to an important topic in the contemporary theology and science dialogue, specifically the theological reception of multiverse thought in modern cosmology. In light of recent cosmological speculation about the plausibility of a ‘multiverse,’ a cosmic ensemble in which our own universe is just one of many, theological responses have largely focused on the question of whether such a multiverse might be an alternative to divine design (or might itself be compatible with divine design). However, this approach neglects the fundamental metaphysical issues entailed in the multiverse proposal, including its entanglement of the one and the many (a paradox which has itself been a central concern of theological reflection), as well as its intimations of cosmic multiplicity, diversity, and infinity. In this dissertation I provide the first systematic theological engagement with these metaphysical implications. My approach is to draw on ancient and medieval resources (neglected not only in multiverse discussions but also in the theology and science field more generally) to show that the concept of metaphysical participation provides a particularly fertile ground on which theology can engage constructively with multiverse thought. To that end, I focus specifically on the participatory thought of Plato, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa, each of whom seek to understand how a physical cosmos of complexity and immensity might share in divine existence of unity and simplicity. I bring their insights into interaction with a diverse range of contemporary theological, philosophical, and scientific figures to demonstrate that a participatory account of the relationship between God and creation argues for greater continuity between theology and the multiverse proposal in modern cosmology.The Faraday Institute for Science and Religio

A Set-Theoretic Metaphysics for Quantum Mechanics

Set theory brought revolution to philosophy of mathematics and it can bring revolution to philosophy of physics too. All that stands in the way is the intuition that sets of physical objects cannot themselves be physical objects, which appears to depend on the ubiquitous assumption that it is possible for there to exist numerically distinct observers in qualitatively identical mental states. Overturning that assumption opens the way to construing an object in superposition in an observers environment as a set of objects in definite states. The components of the superposition are subsets for which all the elements are in the same definite state. So an environmental z-spin-up electron becomes a set of elemental electrons each of which has definite spin for one orientation but lacks indefinite spin for other orientations. The environmental z-spin-up electron has subsets of elemental electrons for every orientation but it is only the subset with spins on the z-axis for which all the elements of the subset have the same value, namely spin-up. The subset of elemental electrons with spins on the x-axis has subsets of spin-up and spin-down elemental electrons of equal measure. Observers only detect the spins of environmental electrons, not those of elemental electrons.Comment: only 6k word

On the Probability of Plenitude

I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence

Some comments on "The Mathematical Universe"

I discuss some problems related to extreme mathematical realism, focusing on a recently proposed "shut-up-and-calculate" approach to physics (arXiv:0704.0646, arXiv:0709.4024). I offer arguments for a moderate alternative, the essence of which lies in the acceptance that mathematics is (at least in part) a human construction, and discuss concrete consequences of this--at first sight purely philosophical--difference in point of view.Comment: 11 page