On the Existence of Spacetime Structure

I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the so-called Hole Argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one must fix an investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the broader debate between realists and instrumentalists.Comment: 42 pages, 2 figures, forthcoming (2015) in British Journal for Philosophy of Scienc

Scientific Realism Versus Antirealism in Science Education

Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers ask questions to their students to check whether they have grasped the content of a scientific theory. If the students are antirealists, they are also caught in Moore’s paradox when they respond positively to their teachers’ questions, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Finally, neither teachers nor students can understand phenomena in terms of scientific theories, if they are antirealists

How Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation is realist and solves the measurement problem

The field of interpretation of quantum mechanics emerged in an attempt to solve the measurement problem. This turned on the perception that Niels Bohr avoided addressing the measurement problem by taking an instrumentalist view of quantum mechanics. I argue that this view is mistaken and Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics is realist. Moreover, Bohr's interpretation, which is different from textbook quantum mechanics (which is due more to Von Neumann and Paul Dirac), succeeds in solving the measurement problem. While the claim that Bohr dissolves the measurement problem within the limits of the epistemological framework he assumes has been made by a few authors, rarely has the case been made that Bohr's project unambiguously and completely overcomes the measurement problem. I make the strong case that Bohr eliminated the measurement problem altogether. For this, I put forward two new postulates through which to make sense of Bohr's interpretation. The article thus seeks to single out Bohr's interpretation from the various views that go together under the umbrella of orthodox quantum mechanics, and which have been traditionally considered susceptible to the measurement problem. It shows that Bohr's interpretation should be classified along with those like hidden variable theories, collapse models, modal interpretations etc., which offer a solution to the measurement problem and are committed to a realist ontology.Comment: 22 page

Scientific Realism Versus Antirealism in Science Education

Scientific realists believe both what a scientific theory says about observables and unobservables. In contrast, scientific antirealists believe what a scientific theory says about observables, but not about unobservables. I argue that scientific realism is a more useful doctrine than scientific antirealism in science classrooms. If science teachers are antirealists, they are caught in Moore’s paradox when they help their students grasp the content of a scientific theory, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Teachers ask questions to their students to check whether they have grasped the content of a scientific theory. If the students are antirealists, they are also caught in Moore’s paradox when they respond positively to their teachers’ questions, and when they explain a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory. Finally, neither teachers nor students can understand phenomena in terms of scientific theories, if they are antirealists

The Fertility of Theories

In addition to empirical adequacy and compatibility with other current theories, scientific theories are commonly judged on three criteria ' simplicity, elegance, and fertility. Fertility has received comparatively little attention in the philosophical literature. A definition of a certain sort of fertility, called P-fertility, proposed by Ernan McMullin, is that it consists in the capacity of a theory to be successfully modified over time to explain new experimental data or theoretical insights. McMullin made the major claim that he has a novel and perhaps the sole argument for Scientific Realism. His argument involves two strands (i) theories must be considered diachronically and it is an historical fact that long standing successful scientific theories are P-fertile, and (ii) the correct explanation of this fact is that these theories reflect the realities of a mind-independent world. A rebuttal of McMullin's position given in the literature is considered and rejected. His argument therefore requires further consideration. The plausible first strand of McMullin's argument is accepted for the purposes of discussion, and thus the observation requires explanation, either along McMullin's own lines or otherwise. The concept of diachronicity and the implications of accepting a diachronic view of scientific theories are considered. The identity of theory across time can be understood both from a Realist and an Anti-realist perspective via the concept of significant claims in the successive versions of the long standing successful theories. This defuses a possible objection to McMullin's argument, namely that by assuming diachronicity he begs the question against the Anti-realist. Explanations of the conjunction of success and P-fertility are examined from the perspective of Scientific Realism and the major current Anti-realist stances ' Entity Realism, Structural Realism, Instrumentalism, and Internal Realism. 3 To justify the second strand of McMullin's argument, a notion of the approximate truth or of the verisimilitude of theories is required. Inter alia it is argued that a distinction must be made between the approximate truth of a scientific theory and that of a simple assertion or a simple narrative. The concepts of the approximate truth of scientific theories and their verisimilitude are explored and some serious difficulties are identified. First, it is difficult to accommodate differences in respect as well as in degree in delineating the nature of an approximately true theory. Second, it is difficult to give a satisfactory account of the metric used to assess the verisimilitude of theories. It is argued that in any case no version of these concepts can adequately support the second strand of McMullin's thesis. This is because, at best, approximate truth and verisimilitude can only support a pragmatic claim ' the improved empirical adequacy of successive versions of the long standing theory. In contrast, McMullin's thesis requires that successor versions generally are better theories. Third, there is an intractable theory dependent weighting problem posed by the open ended nature of scientific theories in contrast with the closed narratives describing idealized models. The role of the approximate truth of scientific theories is explored, within the frameworks of Realism and Anti-realism, with regard to the possible responses to the existence of two highly successful, well corroborated, but incompatible theories ' general relativity and quantum mechanics. It is suggested that Scientific Realism itself, not only McMullin's argument for Scientific Realism, requires the notion of approximate truth or verisimilitude of theories. Putnam's Internal Realism is considered, and, if as I suggest, no adequate account of the concepts of the approximate truth or verisimilitude of scientific theories can be given, Internal Realism (which need not draw on these concepts because of its denial that there is a unique correct description of the world) is more plausible than the full blooded Scientific Realism advocated by McMullin, despite granting the claim of the historical observation of the conjunction between long standing successful theories and their P-fertility

Extended Modal Realism — A New Solution to Problems Related to Non-existence

This thesis argues that we should consider extended modal realism as a new player in the debate about non-existence. The primary aim is to show that extended modal realism is a viable theory when it comes to solving problems of non-existence. At times I will argue that extended modal realism has advantages over Lewisian modal realism when it comes to examining the problems of non-existence, not only in the case of problems relating to thought but also problems concerning truth as well. However, I do not intend for the proposed advantages of extended modal realism to be presented as knockdown arguments against other strategies. Not only do I argue that extended modal realism is viable when it comes to solving these problems, but I also make adjustments and additions to the theory that supports the conclusion of this thesis, and I argue that these are improvements to the modal realist theory. I include arguments for a new theory of existence that removes the need for the extended modal realist to rely on set-theoretic notations to understand existence, which I consider problematic. I argue for the revival of the Lewis-Rosen proposal for truth-making and a semantic instrumentalist theory of thought, both of which naturally accompany extended modal realism. Throughout this thesis, I will comment on the proposals and strategies of other authors, and some of these comments will be critical. At this very early stage, I want to clarify that this thesis's success does not rest on showing that all other competitor theories fail. I only include critical comments to situate extended modal realism within the landscape of viable positions that are available for one to occupy

Philosophy and science in Berkeley’s de motu

My main Intention in writing this thesis is to give a greater insight into Berkeley's philosophical concerns with eighteenth century science as expressed in de Motu. I have written this thesis in four parts, covering the scientific background, the philosohical background, an exposition of de Motu itself, and a more modern treatment of de Motu.In the scientific background I cover such topics as the relation between Descartes and Newton, Newton’s achievement, Newton's position regarding such matters as the status of gravity and motion. In the philosophical background I discuss such matters as Berkeley's sources, the nature of Occasionalism, Occasionalism's alternative to realism, and Berkeley's divergence from Malebranche. In the third section I deal with Berkeley's anti-realist construal of scientific language, his treatment of absolute space, his attack on Descartes causal paradigm, the meaning of scientific terms, the connection between explanation and realism (if any), and between cause and explanation. In the fourth section I compare and contrast Berkeley and Popper, discuss instrumentalism and its relation to explanation. Popper's muddled beliefs about Berkeley’s philosophy of language and its implications for Berkeley’s philosophy of science. I also discuss such topics as Berkeley's conception of explanation, the difference between Berkeley's and Popper's realism; and the the role of the scientific test. I will also defend instrumentalists and Berkeley from the charge that their view of scientific theories reduces them to mere computation rules

Telling the truth in economic theory

Need a theory's assumptions be true? In a since notorious essay, the economist Friedman argued they need not be and in abstract theories often won't be. The first part of the thesis discusses his case, which has been widely misunderstood,. It concludes that, whilst false assumptions may fulfil the role of epitomising and implying truth, those in Friedman's key economic example do not. The rest of the thesis then relates Friedman's case to that in defence of general equilibrium theory (the heart of orthodox economic theory) and argues that this defence fails. Two complementary arguments against the defenders' position are presented, the first working from the fact that the theory's assumptions are not true and the second considering what would happen if they were - the conclusion being that the theory relates neither to actual cases nor to possible polar ones. Comparisons drawn with rival economic theories end this case-study in the philosophy of economics