Deep dive on politician impersonating accounts in social media

International audienceThere is an ever-growing number of users who duplicate the social media accounts of celebrities or generally impersonate their presence on online social media as well as Instagram. Of course, this has led to an increasing interest in detecting fake profiles and investigating their behaviour. We begin this research by targeting a few famous politicians, including Donald J. Trump, Barack Obama, and Emmanuel Macron and collecting their activity for the period of 3 months using a specifically-designed crawler across Instagram. We then experimented with several profile characteristics such as user-name, display name, biography, and profile picture to identify impersonator among 1,5M unique users. Using publicly crawled data, our model was able to distinguish crowds of impersonators and political bots. We continued by providing an analysis of the characteristics and behaviour of these impersonators. Finally, we conclude the analysis by classifying impersonators into four different categories

Identity Resolution across Different Social Networks using Similarity Analysis

Today the Social Networking Sites have become very popular and are used by most of the people. This is because the Social Networking sites are playing different roles in different fields and facilitating the needs of its users from time to time. The most common purpose why people join in to these websites is to get connected with people and sharing information. An individual may be signed in on more than one Social Networking Site so identifying the same individual on different Social Networking sites is a task. To accomplish this task the proposed system uses the Similarity Analysis method on the available information details

The Digital Architectures of Social Media: Comparing Political Campaigning on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat in the 2016 U.S. Election

The present study argues that political communication on social media is mediated by a platform's digital architecture, defined as the technical protocols that enable, constrain, and shape user behavior in a virtual space. A framework for understanding digital architectures is introduced, and four platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat) are compared along the typology. Using the 2016 US election as a case, interviews with three Republican digital strategists are combined with social media data to qualify the studyies theoretical claim that a platform's network structure, functionality, algorithmic filtering, and datafication model affect political campaign strategy on social media

From Bonehead to @realDonaldTrump : A Review of Studies on Online Usernames

In many online services, we are identified by self-chosen usernames, also known as nicknames or pseudonyms. Usernames have been studied quite extensively within several academic disciplines, yet few existing literature reviews or meta-analyses provide a comprehensive picture of the name category. This article addresses this gap by thoroughly analyzing 103 research articles with usernames as their primary focus. Despite the great variety of approaches taken to investigate usernames, three main types of studies can be identified: (1) qualitative analyses examining username semantics, the motivations for name choices, and how the names are linked to the identities of the users; (2) experiments testing the communicative functions of usernames; and (3) computational studies analyzing large corpora of usernames to acquire information about the users and their behavior. The current review investigates the terminology, objectives, methods, data, results, and impact of these three study types in detail. Finally, research gaps and potential directions for future works are discussed. As this investigation will demonstrate, more research is needed to examine naming practices in social media, username-related online discrimination and harassment, and username usage in conversations.Peer reviewe

Typification of impersonated accounts on Instagram

International audienceFake accounts and Impersonators on Online Social Networks such as Instagram are turning difficulties for society. This has attended to an increasing interest in detecting fake profiles and investigating their behaviours. Questions like who are impersonators? what are their characteristics? and are they bots? will arise. To answer, we begin this research by collecting data from three important communities on Instagram including “Politician”, “News agency”, and “Sports star”. Inside each community, four verified top accounts are picked. Based on the users who reacted to their published posts, we detect 4K impersonators [1]. Then we employed well-known clustering methods to distribute impersonators into separated clusters to observe obscure behaviours and unusual profile characteristics. We also studied the cross-group analysis of clusters inside each community to explore engagements. Finally, we conclude the study by providing a complete investigation of the bot-like cluste

An Empirical Study on Android for Saving Non-shared Data on Public Storage

With millions of apps that can be downloaded from official or third-party market, Android has become one of the most popular mobile platforms today. These apps help people in all kinds of ways and thus have access to lots of user's data that in general fall into three categories: sensitive data, data to be shared with other apps, and non-sensitive data not to be shared with others. For the first and second type of data, Android has provided very good storage models: an app's private sensitive data are saved to its private folder that can only be access by the app itself, and the data to be shared are saved to public storage (either the external SD card or the emulated SD card area on internal FLASH memory). But for the last type, i.e., an app's non-sensitive and non-shared data, there is a big problem in Android's current storage model which essentially encourages an app to save its non-sensitive data to shared public storage that can be accessed by other apps. At first glance, it seems no problem to do so, as those data are non-sensitive after all, but it implicitly assumes that app developers could correctly identify all sensitive data and prevent all possible information leakage from private-but-non-sensitive data. In this paper, we will demonstrate that this is an invalid assumption with a thorough survey on information leaks of those apps that had followed Android's recommended storage model for non-sensitive data. Our studies showed that highly sensitive information from billions of users can be easily hacked by exploiting the mentioned problematic storage model. Although our empirical studies are based on a limited set of apps, the identified problems are never isolated or accidental bugs of those apps being investigated. On the contrary, the problem is rooted from the vulnerable storage model recommended by Android. To mitigate the threat, we also propose a defense framework

Potential mass surveillance and privacy violations in proximity-based social applications

Proximity-based social applications let users interact with people that are currently close to them, by revealing some information about their preferences and whereabouts. This information is acquired through passive geo-localisation and used to build a sense of serendipitous discovery of people, places and interests. Unfortunately, while this class of applications opens different interactions possibilities for people in urban settings, obtaining access to certain identity information could lead a possible privacy attacker to identify and follow a user in their movements in a specific period of time. The same information shared through the platform could also help an attacker to link the victim's online profiles to physical identities. We analyse a set of popular dating application that shares users relative distances within a certain radius and show how, by using the information shared on these platforms, it is possible to formalise a multilateration attack, able to identify the user actual position. The same attack can also be used to follow a user in all their movements within a certain period of time, therefore identifying their habits and Points of Interest across the city. Furthermore we introduce a social attack which uses common Facebook likes to profile a person and finally identify their real identity