From Marriages to Coalitions: A Soft CSP Approach

In this workwerepresent the Optimal Stable Marriage problem as a Soft Constraint Satisfaction Problem. In addition, we extend this problem from couples of individuals to coalitions of generic agents, in order to define new coalition-formation principles and stability conditions. In the coalition case, we suppose the preference value as a trust score, since trust can describe a nodes belief in another nodes capabilities, honesty and reliability. Soft constraints represent a general and expressive framework that is able to deal with distinct concepts of optimality by only changing the related c-semiring structure, instead of using di erent ad-hoc algorithms. At last, we propose an implementation of the classical OSM problem by using Integer Linear Programming tools

Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favor of a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments

Borrowing Alone The Theory and Policy Implications of the Commodification of Finance

Over the past 20 years, finance has become commodified. Firms increasingly obtain finance from securities markets, instead of borrowing from commercial banks with which they have long-term relationships, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac package a growing number of mortgages into bonds. When loans are priced by impersonal markets rather than by individual bankers, they become more like commodities. As in many cases when goods are commodified, this trend has important policy implications. This paper describes new Keynesian and social economics perspectives on the difference between traditional and securitized loans, and points out weaknesses in their account of the significance of banking relationships. A social theory of banking, and, particularly, of risk perception, is then developed. Finally, the policy implications of the commodification of finance are examined in light of the social theory.trust, securitization, banks, social economics, discrimination, social networks

"Borrowing Alone: The Theory and Policy Implications of the Commodification of Finance"

Over the past 20 years, finance has become commodified. Firms increasingly obtain finance from securities markets, instead of borrowing from commercial banks with which they have long-term relationships, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac package a growing number of mortgages into bonds. When loans are priced by impersonal markets rather than by individual bankers, they become more like commodities. As in many cases when goods are commodified, this trend has important policy implications. This paper describes new Keynesian and social economics perspectives on the difference between traditional and securitized loans, and points out weaknesses in their account of the significance of banking relationships. A social theory of banking, and, particularly, of risk perception, is then developed. Finally, the policy implications of the commodification of finance are examined in light of the social theory.