Transforming Energy Networks via Peer to Peer Energy Trading: Potential of Game Theoretic Approaches

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading has emerged as a next-generation energy management mechanism for the smart grid that enables each prosumer of the network to participate in energy trading with one another and the grid. This poses a significant challenge in terms of modeling the decision-making process of each participant with conflicting interest and motivating prosumers to participate in energy trading and to cooperate, if necessary, for achieving different energy management goals. Therefore, such decision-making process needs to be built on solid mathematical and signal processing tools that can ensure an efficient operation of the smart grid. This paper provides an overview of the use of game theoretic approaches for P2P energy trading as a feasible and effective means of energy management. As such, we discuss various games and auction theoretic approaches by following a systematic classification to provide information on the importance of game theory for smart energy research. Then, the paper focuses on the P2P energy trading describing its key features and giving an introduction to an existing P2P testbed. Further, the paper zooms into the detail of some specific game and auction theoretic models that have recently been used in P2P energy trading and discusses some important finding of these schemes.Comment: 38 pages, single column, double spac

Contingency Management in Power Systems and Demand Response Market for Ancillary Services in Smart Grids with High Renewable Energy Penetration.

Ph.D. Thesis. University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa 2017

Impact of strategic behavior and ownership of energy storage on provision of flexibility

Energy Storage Systems (ESS) are expected to provide additional flexibility to managed variable power flows in future power systems. It is believed that the business case for ESS as an alternative to traditional network reinforcements can be improved if the assets are able to access additional revenue streams by participating in energy and ancillary services markets. To enable this, the storage may need to be operated by private merchants to circumvent the unbundling principle applied in electricity markets today. However, it is not clear if the right incentives are in place for these entities to operate the ESS in a way that provides the required flexibility and supports the wider system benefits sought by the System Operator (SO). This work seeks to evaluate the impact of strategic behavior of an independent trader operating ESS in a nodal electricity market. The results indicated that a strategic bidder operating ESS tends to underuse the assets leading to suboptimal solution in terms of market welfare, as well as congestion and curtailment reduction, removing some of the potential benefits the ESS can provide to the power system

Optimal Participation of Price-Maker Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESSs) in Energy, Reserve and Pay as Performance Regulation Markets

Motivated by the need of assessing the optimal allocation of battery energy storage services across various markets and the corresponding impact on market operations, an optimization framework is proposed in this work to coordinate the operation of an independent utility-scale price-maker battery energy storage system (BESS) in the energy, spinning reserve and performance-based regulation markets. The entire problem is formulated as a bi-level optimization process, where the structure of all markets is modeled considering the joint operation limits. The strategic bidding behavior of a price-maker BESS in a pay as performance regulation market is investigated. Additionally, a specific approach is introduced for modeling automatic generation control (AGC) signals in the optimization. Although the formulated problem is non-linear, it is converted to mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) to find the optimum solution. The proposed framework is evaluated using test case scenarios created from real-world market data. Case study results show the impact of BESS's price-making behavior on the joint operation of energy, reserve, and regulation markets