New financial order : recommendations by the Issing Committee ; preparing G-20 – London, April 2, 2009

Content A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INCLUDING MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS B. COMPLETE REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 2. RISK MAP 2.1 Why a Risk Map is needed, and for what purpose 2.1.1 Creating a unified data base 2.1.2 Assessing systemic risk 2.1.3 Allowing for coordinated policy action 2.2 Recommendations 3. GLOBAL REGISTER FOR LOANS (CREDIT REGISTER) AND BONDS (SECURITIES REGISTER) 3.1 Objectives of a credit register 3.2 Credit registers in Europe (and beyond) 3.3 Suggestions for a supra-national Credit Register 3.4 Integrating a supra-national Securities Register 3.5 Recommendations 4. HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 4.1 What are hedge funds (activities, location, size, regulation)? 4.2 What are the risks posed by hedge funds (systematic risks, interaction with prime brokers)? 4.3 Routes to better regulation (direct, indirect) 4.4 Recommendations 5. RATING AGENCIES: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 5.1 The role of ratings in bond and structured finance markets, past and present 5.2 Elements of rating integrity (independence, compensation and incentives, transparency) 5.3 Recommendations (registration, transparency, annual report on rating performance) 6. PROCYCLICALITY: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 6.1 What is meant by “procyclicality” and why is it a problem? 6.2 The roots of procyclicality and the lessons it suggests for policymakers 6.2.1 Underpinnings of the phenomenon 6.2.2 Lessons to be learned 6.3 Characteristics of a macrofinancial stability framework 6.4 Recommendations 7. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FORA, IN PARTICULAR THE IMF, BIS AND FSF 7.1 Legitimacy 7.2 Re-focusing the work 7.3 Recommendation

Systemic risk diagnostics: coincident indicators and early warning signals

We propose a novel framework to assess financial system risk. Using a dynamic factor framework based on state-space methods, we construct coincident measures (‘thermometers’) and a forward looking indicator for the likelihood of simultaneous failure of a large number of financial intermediaries. The indicators are based on latent macro-financial and credit risk components for a large data set comprising the U.S., the EU-27 area, and the respective rest of the world. Credit risk conditions can significantly and persistently de-couple from macro-financial fundamentals. Such decoupling can serve as an early warning signal for macro-prudential policy. JEL Classification: G21, C33credit portfolio models, financial crisis, frailty-correlated defaults, state space methods, systemic risk

Recommender Thermometer for Measuring the Preparedness for Flood Resilience Management

A range of various thermometers and similar scales are employed in different human and resilience management activities: Distress Thermometer, Panic Thermometer, Fear Thermometer, fire danger rating, hurricane scales, earthquake scales (Richter Magnitude Scale, Mercalli Scale), Anxiety Thermometer, Help Thermometer, Problem Thermometer, Emotion Thermometer, Depression Thermometer, the Torino scale (assessing asteroid/comet impact prediction), Excessive Heat Watch, etc. Extensive financing of the preparedness for flood resilience management with overheated full-scale resilience management might be compared to someone ill running a fever of 41°C. As the financial crisis hits and resilience management financing cools down it reminds a sick person whose body temperature is too low. The degree indicated by the Recommender Thermometer for Measuring the Preparedness for Flood Resilience Management with a scale between Tmin=34,0° and Tmax=42,0° shows either cool or overheated preparedness for flood resilience management. The formalized presentation of this research shows how changes in the micro, meso and macro environment of resilience management and the extent to which the goals pursued by various interested parties are met cause corresponding changes in the “temperature” of the preparedness for resilience management. Global innovative aspects of the Recommender Thermometer developed by the authors of this paper are, primarily, its capacity to measure the “temperature” of the preparedness for flood resilience management automatically, to compile multiple alternative recommendations (preparedness for floods, including preparing your home for floods, taking precautions against a threat of floods, retrofitting for flood-prone areas, checking your house insurance; preparedness for bushfires, preparedness for cyclones, preparedness for severe storms, preparedness for heat waves, etc.) customised for a specific user, to perform multiple criteria analysis of the recommendations, and to select the ten most rational ones for that user. Across the world, no other system offers these functions yet. The Recommender Thermometer was developed and fine-tuned in the course of the Android (Academic Network for Disaster Resilience to Optimise educational Development) project

Financial Market Supervision: European Perspectives

[Excerpt] The global financial crisis has sparked a debate over the cause and impact of the crisis. Academics and policymakers are searching for changes in the financial system that can correct any perceived weaknesses in the structure of regulation, the content of regulations, and the coverage of financial instruments and activities. Since the onset of the crisis, numerous proposals have been advanced to reform or amend the current financial system to help restore economic growth. In the United States, the Obama Administration has proposed a plan to overhaul supervision of the U.S. financial services sector. The proposal would give new authority to the Federal Reserve, create a new Financial Services Oversight Council, create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, and create a new National Bank Supervisor to replace the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision. In contrast, Senator Collins introduced S. 664, the Financial System Stabilization and Reform Act of 2009, with a companion measure, H.R. 1754, that was introduced by Representative Castle in the House of Representatives. The measures would create a Financial Stability Council and grant the Federal Reserve the authority to examine the soundness and safety of the financial system posed by bank holding companies. Other measures include: S. 1682 (Senator Cantwell), the Derivatives Market Manipulation Prevention Act of 2009; S. 1803 (Senator Merkley), the Federal Reserve Accountability Act of 2009; S. 2756 (Senator Warner) the Financial Services Systemic Risk Oversight Council Act of 2009; H.R. 3795 (Representative Frank), the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Acts of 2009; H.R. 3968 (Representative Ellison), to amend the Bank Holding Company Act; and H.R. 3996 (Frank), to improve financial stability. The crisis has underscored the fact that national and international financial markets have become highly integrated, and problems in one market can trigger contagion that can spread both among countries and into economic sectors to affect businesses, employment, and household well being. Similarly, governments in Europe are considering what, if any, changes they should make to their national financial systems. Along with the United States and other countries, European countries also are considering changes to the international systems of financial supervision and regulation in order to ensure prosperity through the smooth operation of domestic and international financial systems. This process may include reconsidering the roles and responsibility of the central banks in the post-financial crisis era. Various organizations and groups are advancing a large number of recommendations and prescriptions. Some goals for any such adjustments may include providing an institutional structure for oversight and regulation that is robust, comprehensive, flexible, and politically feasible while providing appropriate incentive structures to preclude excessive risk-taking. Of course, there are no guarantees that amending the current system or employing a different regulatory and supervisory structure will preclude a repeat of the most recent financial crisis given that financial markets and institutions are continually growing, innovating, and responding to government- and market-imposed constraints. This report addresses the European perspectives on a number of proposals that are being advanced for financial oversight and regulation in Europe. The European experience may be instructive because financial markets in Europe are well developed, European firms often are competitors of U.S. firms, and European governments have faced severe problems of integration and consistency across the various financial structures that exist in Europe

Off-balance sheet exposures and banking crises in OECD countries

Against the background of the acknowledged importance of off-balance-sheet exposures in the sub prime crisis, we seek to investigate whether this was a new phenomenon or common to earlier crises. Using a logit approach to predicting banking crises in 14 OECD countries we find a significant impact of a proxy for the ratio of banks‟ off-balance-sheet activity to total (off and on balance sheet) activity, as well as capital and liquidity ratios, the current account balance and GDP growth. These results are robust to the exclusion of the most crisis prone countries in our model. For early warning purposes we show that real house price growth is a good proxy for off balance sheet activity prior to the sub-prime episode. Variables capturing off-balance sheet activity have been neglected in most early warning models to date. We consider it essential that regulators take into account the results for crisis prediction in regulating banks and their off-balance sheet exposures, and thus controlling their contribution to systemic risk

New financial order : recommendations by the Issing Committee ; preparing G-20 – Washington, November 15, 2008

Content New Financial Architecture (Short Version) 1. Purpose of the paper – causes of the crisis 2. Recommendations 2.1. Incentives 2.2. Transparency 2.3. Regulation and Supervision 2.4. International Institutions 3. Concluding remarks Appendix (Full text) A 1. Causes of the crisis A 2. Improving the Framework A 2.1. Incentives A 2.2. Transparency A 2.3. Regulation and Supervision A 2.4. International Institutions A 3. Concluding remark

A review of early warning system models

Financial crises have not declined in number, frequency or severity over the last two decades, rather the contrary. Each crisis causes enormous costs in the countries concerned. Thus, international financial institutions invest in researching early warning systems (EWS). The Early Warning System models can be made most useful to help sustain global growth and maintain financial stability, especially in light of the lessons learned from the current and past crises.Early Warning System models, financial crises

Financial Stability, New Macro Prudential Arrangements and Shadow Banking: Regulatory Arbitrage and Stringent Basel I I I Regulations

Despite Basel III’s efforts to address capital and liquidity requirements, will the risks linked to regulatory arbitrage increase as a result of Basel III’s more stringent capital and liquidity rules? As well as Basel III reforms which are geared towards greater facilitation of financial stability on a macro prudential basis, further efforts and initiatives aimed at mitigating systemic risks – hence fostering financial stability, have been promulgated through the establishment of the De Larosiere Group, the European Systemic Risk Board, and a working group comprising of “international standard setters and authorities responsible for the translation of G20 commitments into standards.” This paper aims to investigate the impact of Basel III on shadow banking and its facilitation of regulatory arbitrage as well as consider the response of various jurisdictions and standard setting bodies to aims and initiatives aimed at improving their macro prudential frameworks. Furthermore, it will also aim to illustrate why immense work is still required at European level – as regards efforts to address systemic risks on a macro prudential basis. This being the case even though significant efforts and steps have been taken to address the macro prudential framework. In so doing, the paper will also attempt to address how coordination within the macro prudential framework – as well as between micro and macro prudential supervision could be enhanced

Financial liberalization and capital adequacy in models of financial crises

We characterize the effects of financial liberalization indices on OECD banking crises, controlling for the standard macro prudential variables that prevail in the current literature. We use the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World database. This yields a variable that captures credit market regulations which broadly measures the restrictions under which banks operate. We then test for the direct impacts of some of its components, deposit interest rate regulations and private sector credit controls, on crisis probabilities and their indirect effects via capital adequacy. Over the period 1980 – 2012, we find that less regulated markets are associated with a lower crisis frequency, and it appears that the channel comes through strengthening the defence that capital provides. Deposit interest rate liberalisation adds to the strength of capital in protecting against crises. However, private sector credit liberalisation, appears to increase the probability of having a crisis, albeit not significantly. If policy makers are concerned about the costs of low risk events, they may wish to control private sector credit even if it has a probability of affecting significantly crises of between 10 and 20 per cent