Isoelastic Agents and Wealth Updates in Machine Learning Markets

Recently, prediction markets have shown considerable promise for developing flexible mechanisms for machine learning. In this paper, agents with isoelastic utilities are considered. It is shown that the costs associated with homogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities produce equilibrium prices corresponding to alpha-mixtures, with a particular form of mixing component relating to each agent's wealth. We also demonstrate that wealth accumulation for logarithmic and other isoelastic agents (through payoffs on prediction of training targets) can implement both Bayesian model updates and mixture weight updates by imposing different market payoff structures. An iterative algorithm is given for market equilibrium computation. We demonstrate that inhomogeneous markets of agents with isoelastic utilities outperform state of the art aggregate classifiers such as random forests, as well as single classifiers (neural networks, decision trees) on a number of machine learning benchmarks, and show that isoelastic combination methods are generally better than their logarithmic counterparts.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2012

Measuring quality, reputation and trust in online communities

In the Internet era the information overload and the challenge to detect quality content has raised the issue of how to rank both resources and users in online communities. In this paper we develop a general ranking method that can simultaneously evaluate users' reputation and objects' quality in an iterative procedure, and that exploits the trust relationships and social acquaintances of users as an additional source of information. We test our method on two real online communities, the EconoPhysics forum and the Last.fm music catalogue, and determine how different variants of the algorithm influence the resultant ranking. We show the benefits of considering trust relationships, and define the form of the algorithm better apt to common situations

Information Aggregation in Exponential Family Markets

We consider the design of prediction market mechanisms known as automated market makers. We show that we can design these mechanisms via the mold of \emph{exponential family distributions}, a popular and well-studied probability distribution template used in statistics. We give a full development of this relationship and explore a range of benefits. We draw connections between the information aggregation of market prices and the belief aggregation of learning agents that rely on exponential family distributions. We develop a very natural analysis of the market behavior as well as the price equilibrium under the assumption that the traders exhibit risk aversion according to exponential utility. We also consider similar aspects under alternative models, such as when traders are budget constrained

The supervised hierarchical Dirichlet process

We propose the supervised hierarchical Dirichlet process (sHDP), a nonparametric generative model for the joint distribution of a group of observations and a response variable directly associated with that whole group. We compare the sHDP with another leading method for regression on grouped data, the supervised latent Dirichlet allocation (sLDA) model. We evaluate our method on two real-world classification problems and two real-world regression problems. Bayesian nonparametric regression models based on the Dirichlet process, such as the Dirichlet process-generalised linear models (DP-GLM) have previously been explored; these models allow flexibility in modelling nonlinear relationships. However, until now, Hierarchical Dirichlet Process (HDP) mixtures have not seen significant use in supervised problems with grouped data since a straightforward application of the HDP on the grouped data results in learnt clusters that are not predictive of the responses. The sHDP solves this problem by allowing for clusters to be learnt jointly from the group structure and from the label assigned to each group.Comment: 14 page