Modelling spatial recall, mental imagery and neglect

We present a computational model of the neural mechanisms in the pari-etal and temporal lobes that support spatial navigation, recall of scenes and imagery of the products of recall. Long term representations are stored in the hippocampus, and are associated with local spatial and object-related features in the parahippocampal region. Viewer-centered representations are dynamically generated from long term memory in the parietal part of the model. The model thereby simulates recall and im-agery of locations and objects in complex environments. After parietal damage, the model exhibits hemispatial neglect in mental imagery that rotates with the imagined perspective of the observer, as in the famous Milan Square experiment [1]. Our model makes novel predictions for the neural representations in the parahippocampal and parietal regions and for behavior in healthy volunteers and neuropsychological patients.

Hallucination as Mental Imagery

Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is treated marks an important stance in one of the most hotly contested debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between 'relationalists' and 'representationalists'. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental imagery, then we have a very straightforward way of arguing against disjunctivism: if hallucination is a form of mental imagery and if mental imagery and perception have some substantive common denominator, then a fortiori, perception and hallucination will also have a substantive common denominator

Mental imagery and fiction

Fictions evoke imagery, and their value consists partly in that achievement. This paper offers analysis of this neglected topic. Section 2 identifies relevant philosophical background. Section 3 offers a working definition of imagery. Section 4 identifies empirical work on visual imagery. Sections 5 and 6 criticize imagery essentialism, through the lens of genuine fictional narratives. This outcome, though, is not wholly critical. The expressed spirit of imagery essentialism is to encourage philosophers to ‘put the image back into the imagination’. The weakened conclusion is that while an image is not essential to imagining, it should be returned to our theories of imagination

Why Successful Performance in Imagery Tasks Does not Require the Manipulation of Mental Imagery

Nanay (2017) argues for unconscious mental imagery, inter alia based on the assumption that successful performance in imagery tasks requires the manipulation of mental imagery. I challenge this assumption with the help of results presented in Shepard and Metzler (1971), Zeman et al. (2010), and Keogh and Pearson (2018). The studies suggest that imagery tasks can be successfully performed by means of cognitive/propositional strategies which do not rely on imagery

Editorial. Creativity and mental imagery

Considering the pivotal role that creative ideas play in human societies, and creativity's contribution to multiple aspects of human life, understanding the cognitive components underlying creativity has become increasingly fundamental. Since the Five-Stages Model of the creative process proposed by Wallas (1926), creativity has become associated with topics as wide-ranging as from problem-solving (Plucker et al., 2004) to art (van Leeuwen et al., 1999; Batt et al., 2010). Furthermore, creativity has been identified as a predictor for educational success and wellbeing (Plucker et al., 2004), and has been proposed as a way to improve the quality of life in healthy and pathological agin

Forward search, pattern recognition and visualization in expert chess: A reply to Chabris and Hearst (2003)

Chabris and Hearst (2003) produce new data on the question of the respective role of pattern recognition and forward search in expert behaviour. They argue that their data show that search is more important than claimed by Chase and Simon (1973). They also note that the role of mental imagery has been neglected in expertise research and propose that theories of expertise should integrate pattern recognition, search, and mental imagery. In this commentary, I show that their results are not clear-cut and can also be taken as supporting the predominant role of pattern recognition. Previous theories such as the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973) and the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), as well as a computer model (SEARCH; Gobet, 1997) have already integrated mechanisms of pattern recognition, forward search and mental imagery. Methods for addressing the respective roles of pattern recognition and search are proposed

Mental Imagery and Its Connection to the Universe

This poster displays the concept of mental imagery and its relationship to spirituality and religion. Mental imagery is first defined, and its usages and functions are explained. The five principles of mental imagery by Finke (1989) are discussed to understand the complexity of mental imagery. This poster showcases the neurological side of mental imagery, including the role of the cerebral cortex and the pineal gland. It also explains what can stimulate and inhibit mental imagery. The overarching connection between mental imagery and spirituality is shown. Research on ancient religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism is described to show how concepts such as mental imagery and “the third eye” have been used throughout centuries. Lastly, the poster touches on how practicing mindfulness, meditation, and manifesting influence both spirituality and mental imagery. Overall, this poster showcases the concept of mental imagery and its strong ties with the universe, religion, and spirituality

Emotional Mental Imagery as Simulation of Reality: Fear and Beyond—A Tribute to Peter Lang

AbstractThis article pays tribute to the seminal paper by Peter J. Lang (1977; this journal), “Imagery in Therapy: Information Processing Analysis of Fear.” We review research and clinical practice developments in the past five decades with reference to key insights from Lang’s theory and experimental work on emotional mental imagery. First, we summarize and recontextualize Lang’s bio-informational theory of emotional mental imagery (1977, 1979) within contemporary theoretical developments on the function of mental imagery. Second, Lang’s proposal that mental imagery can evoke emotional responses is evaluated by reviewing empirical evidence that mental imagery has a powerful impact on negative as well as positive emotions at neurophysiological and subjective levels. Third, we review contemporary cognitive and behavioral therapeutic practices that use mental imagery, and consider points of extension and departure from Lang’s original investigation of mental imagery in fear-extinction behavior change. Fourth, Lang’s experimental work on emotional imagery is revisited in light of contemporary research on emotional psychopathology-linked individual differences in mental imagery. Finally, key insights from Lang’s experiments on training emotional response during imagery are discussed in relation to how specific techniques may be harnessed to enhance adaptive emotional mental imagery training in future research

Block design performance in the Williams syndrome phenotype: A problem with mental imagery?

Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare genetic disorder which, among other characteristics, has a distinctive cognitive profile. Non-verbal abilities are generally poor in relation to verbal abilities, but also show varying levels of ability in relation to each other. Performance on block construction tasks represents arguably the weakest non-verbal ability in WS. In this study we examined two requirements of block construction tasks in 21 individuals with WS and 21 typically developing (TD) control individuals. The Squares task, a novel two-dimensional block construction task, manipulated patterns by segmentation and perceptual cohesiveness to investigate the first factor, processing preference (local or global), and by obliqueness to examine the second factor, the ability to use mental imagery. These two factors were investigated directly by the Children?s Embedded Figures Test (CEFT; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971) and a mental rotation task respectively. Results showed that individuals with WS did not differ from the TD group in their processing style. However, the ability to use mental imagery was significantly poorer in the WS group than the TD group. This suggests that weak performance on the block construction tasks in WS may relate to an inability to use mental imagery