Size-Change Termination as a Contract

Termination is an important but undecidable program property, which has led to a large body of work on static methods for conservatively predicting or enforcing termination. One such method is the size-change termination approach of Lee, Jones, and Ben-Amram, which operates in two phases: (1) abstract programs into "size-change graphs," and (2) check these graphs for the size-change property: the existence of paths that lead to infinite decreasing sequences. We transpose these two phases with an operational semantics that accounts for the run-time enforcement of the size-change property, postponing (or entirely avoiding) program abstraction. This choice has two key consequences: (1) size-change termination can be checked at run-time and (2) termination can be rephrased as a safety property analyzed using existing methods for systematic abstraction. We formulate run-time size-change checks as contracts in the style of Findler and Felleisen. The result compliments existing contracts that enforce partial correctness specifications to obtain contracts for total correctness. Our approach combines the robustness of the size-change principle for termination with the precise information available at run-time. It has tunable overhead and can check for nontermination without the conservativeness necessary in static checking. To obtain a sound and computable termination analysis, we apply existing abstract interpretation techniques directly to the operational semantics, avoiding the need for custom abstractions for termination. The resulting analyzer is competitive with with existing, purpose-built analyzers

Using reversible computing to achieve fail-safety

This paper describes a fail-safe design approach that can be used to achieve a high level of fail-safety with conventional computing equipment which may contain design flaws. The method is based on the well-established concept of reversible computing. Conventional programs destroy information and hence cannot be reversed. However it is easy to define a virtual machine that preserves sufficient intermediate information to permit reversal. Any program implemented on this virtual machine is inherently reversible. The integrity of a calculation can therefore be checked by reversing back from the output values and checking for the equivalence of intermediate values and original input values. By using different machine instructions on the forward and reverse paths, errors in any single instruction execution can be revealed. Random corruptions in data values are also detected. An assessment of the performance of the reversible computer design for a simple reactor trip application indicates that it runs about ten times slower than a conventional software implementation and requires about 20 kilobytes of additional storage. The trials also show a fail-safe bias of better than 99.998% for random data corruptions, and it is argued that failures due to systematic flaws could achieve similar levels of fail-safe bias. Potential extensions and applications of the technique are discussed

A Historical Perspective on Runtime Assertion Checking in Software Development

This report presents initial results in the area of software testing and analysis produced as part of the Software Engineering Impact Project. The report describes the historical development of runtime assertion checking, including a description of the origins of and significant features associated with assertion checking mechanisms, and initial findings about current industrial use. A future report will provide a more comprehensive assessment of development practice, for which we invite readers of this report to contribute information