Modal logics are coalgebraic

Applications of modal logics are abundant in computer science, and a large number of structurally different modal logics have been successfully employed in a diverse spectrum of application contexts. Coalgebraic semantics, on the other hand, provides a uniform and encompassing view on the large variety of specific logics used in particular domains. The coalgebraic approach is generic and compositional: tools and techniques simultaneously apply to a large class of application areas and can moreover be combined in a modular way. In particular, this facilitates a pick-and-choose approach to domain specific formalisms, applicable across the entire scope of application areas, leading to generic software tools that are easier to design, to implement, and to maintain. This paper substantiates the authors' firm belief that the systematic exploitation of the coalgebraic nature of modal logic will not only have impact on the field of modal logic itself but also lead to significant progress in a number of areas within computer science, such as knowledge representation and concurrency/mobility

The novel application of optimization and charge blended energy management control for component downsizing within a plug-in hybrid electric vehicle

The adoption of Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs) is widely seen as an interim solution for the decarbonization of the transport sector. Within a PHEV, determining the required energy storage capacity of the battery remains one of the primary concerns for vehicle manufacturers and system integrators. This fact is particularly pertinent since the battery constitutes the largest contributor to vehicle mass. Furthermore, the financial cost associated with the procurement, design and integration of battery systems is often cited as one of the main barriers to vehicle commercialization. The ability to integrate the optimization of the energy management control system with the sizing of key PHEV powertrain components presents a significant area of research. Contained within this paper is an optimization study in which a charge blended strategy is used to facilitate the downsizing of the electrical machine, the internal combustion engine and the high voltage battery. An improved Equivalent Consumption Method has been used to manage the optimal power split within the powertrain as the PHEV traverses a range of different drivecycles. For a target CO2 value and drivecycle, results show that this approach can yield significant downsizing opportunities, with cost reductions on the order of 2%–9% being realizable

On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people’s private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignoranc

Logic, Rational Agency, and Intelligent Interaction

... make a plea for recasting logic as a theory of interactive agency, and show how this perspective fits both old achievements and new broader ambitions for the field

An abstract approach to reasoning about games with mistaken and changing beliefs

We do not believe that logic is the sole answer to deep and intriguing questions about human behaviour, but we think that it might be a useful tool in simulating and understanding it to a certain degree and in specifically restricted areas of application. We do not aim to resolve the question of what rational behaviour in games with mistaken and changing beliefs is. Rather, we develop a formal and abstract framework that allows us to reason about behaviour in games with mistaken and changing beliefs leaving aside normative questions concerning whether the agents are behaving “rationally”; we focus on what agents do in a game. In this paper, we are not concerned with the reasoning process of the (ideal) economic agent; rather, our intended application is artificial agents, e.g., autonomous agents interacting with a human user or with each other as part of a computer game or in a virtual world. We give a story of mistaken beliefs that is a typical example of the situation in which we should want our formal setting to be applied. Then we give the definitions for our formal system and how to use this setting to get a backward induction solution. We then apply our semantics to the story related earlier and give an analysis of it. Our final section contains a discussion of related work and future projects. We discuss the advantages of our approach over existing approaches and indicate how it can be connected to the existing literature

What will they say?—Public Announcement Games

Dynamic epistemic logic describes the possible information-changingactions available to individual agents, and their knowledge pre- and post conditions.For example, public announcement logic describes actions in the form of public,truthful announcements. However, little research so far has considered describing andanalysing rational choice between such actions, i.e., predictingwhat rational self-interestedagents actually will or should do. Since the outcome of information exchangeultimately depends on the actions chosen by all the agents in the system, and assumingthat agents have preferences over such outcomes, this is a game theoretic scenario.This is, in our opinion, an interesting general research direction, combining logic andgame theory in the study of rational information exchange. In this article we take somefirst steps in this direction: we consider the case where available actions are publicannouncements, and where each agent has a (typically epistemic) goal formula thatshe would like to become true. What will each agent announce? The truth of the goalformula also depends on the announcements made by other agents. We analyse suchpublic announcement games