Algorithmically Efficient Syntactic Characterization of Possibility Domains

We call domain any arbitrary subset of a Cartesian power of the set {0,1} when we think of it as reflecting abstract rationality restrictions on vectors of two-valued judgments on a number of issues. In Computational Social Choice Theory, and in particular in the theory of judgment aggregation, a domain is called a possibility domain if it admits a non-dictatorial aggregator, i.e. if for some k there exists a unanimous (idempotent) function F:D^k - > D which is not a projection function. We prove that a domain is a possibility domain if and only if there is a propositional formula of a certain syntactic form, sometimes called an integrity constraint, whose set of satisfying truth assignments, or models, comprise the domain. We call possibility integrity constraints the formulas of the specific syntactic type we define. Given a possibility domain D, we show how to construct a possibility integrity constraint for D efficiently, i.e, in polynomial time in the size of the domain. We also show how to distinguish formulas that are possibility integrity constraints in linear time in the size of the input formula. Finally, we prove the analogous results for local possibility domains, i.e. domains that admit an aggregator which is not a projection function, even when restricted to any given issue. Our result falls in the realm of classical results that give syntactic characterizations of logical relations that have certain closure properties, like e.g. the result that logical relations component-wise closed under logical AND are precisely the models of Horn formulas. However, our techniques draw from results in judgment aggregation theory as well from results about propositional formulas and logical relations

Equilibrium refinement through negotiation in binary voting

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another’s voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters’ rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the prevote phase

Priority-Based Conflict Resolution in Inconsistent Relational Databases

We study here the impact of priorities on conflict resolution in inconsistent relational databases. We extend the framework of repairs and consistent query answers. We propose a set of postulates that an extended framework should satisfy and consider two instantiations of the framework: (locally preferred) l-repairs and (globally preferred) g-repairs. We study the relationships between them and the impact each notion of repair has on the computational complexity of repair checking and consistent query answers

A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules, and their properties

The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules that have been proposed and studied recently in the literature, together with various properties of such rules. We first focus on the majority-preservation property, which generalizes Condorcet-consistency, and identify which of the rules satisfy it. We study the inclusion relationships that hold between the rules. Finally, we consider two forms of unanimity, monotonicity, homogeneity, and reinforcement, and we identify which of the rules satisfy these properties