MODELING, LEARNING AND REASONING ABOUT PREFERENCE TREES OVER COMBINATORIAL DOMAINS

In my Ph.D. dissertation, I have studied problems arising in various aspects of preferences: preference modeling, preference learning, and preference reasoning, when preferences concern outcomes ranging over combinatorial domains. Preferences is a major research component in artificial intelligence (AI) and decision theory, and is closely related to the social choice theory considered by economists and political scientists. In my dissertation, I have exploited emerging connections between preferences in AI and social choice theory. Most of my research is on qualitative preference representations that extend and combine existing formalisms such as conditional preference nets, lexicographic preference trees, answer-set optimization programs, possibilistic logic, and conditional preference networks; on learning problems that aim at discovering qualitative preference models and predictive preference information from practical data; and on preference reasoning problems centered around qualitative preference optimization and aggregation methods. Applications of my research include recommender systems, decision support tools, multi-agent systems, and Internet trading and marketing platforms

Optimising a nonlinear utility function in multi-objective integer programming

In this paper we develop an algorithm to optimise a nonlinear utility function of multiple objectives over the integer efficient set. Our approach is based on identifying and updating bounds on the individual objectives as well as the optimal utility value. This is done using already known solutions, linear programming relaxations, utility function inversion, and integer programming. We develop a general optimisation algorithm for use with k objectives, and we illustrate our approach using a tri-objective integer programming problem.Comment: 11 pages, 2 tables; v3: minor revisions, to appear in Journal of Global Optimizatio

A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences

International audienceCore-selection is a crucial property of rules in the literature of resource allocation. It is also desirable, from the perspective of mechanism design, to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates the exchange problem where (i) each agent is initially endowed with (possibly multiple) indivisible goods, (ii) agents' preferences are assumed to be conditionally lexicographic, and (iii) side payments are prohibited. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC), based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that ATTC is core-selecting and runs in polynomial time with respect to the number of goods. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under ATTC is NP-hard. We finally clarify relationship of misreporting with splitting and hiding, two different types of manipulations, under ATTC