2,858 research outputs found
Learning Equilibria with Partial Information in Decentralized Wireless Networks
In this article, a survey of several important equilibrium concepts for
decentralized networks is presented. The term decentralized is used here to
refer to scenarios where decisions (e.g., choosing a power allocation policy)
are taken autonomously by devices interacting with each other (e.g., through
mutual interference). The iterative long-term interaction is characterized by
stable points of the wireless network called equilibria. The interest in these
equilibria stems from the relevance of network stability and the fact that they
can be achieved by letting radio devices to repeatedly interact over time. To
achieve these equilibria, several learning techniques, namely, the best
response dynamics, fictitious play, smoothed fictitious play, reinforcement
learning algorithms, and regret matching, are discussed in terms of information
requirements and convergence properties. Most of the notions introduced here,
for both equilibria and learning schemes, are illustrated by a simple case
study, namely, an interference channel with two transmitter-receiver pairs.Comment: 16 pages, 5 figures, 1 table. To appear in IEEE Communication
Magazine, special Issue on Game Theor
Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium
concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such
equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist
polynomial-time algorithms that compute exact (coarse) correlated equilibria.
In light of these results, a natural question is how good are the (coarse)
correlated equilibria that can arise from any efficient algorithm or dynamics.
In this paper we address this question, and establish strong negative
results. In particular, we show that in multiplayer games that have a succinct
representation, it is NP-hard to compute any coarse correlated equilibrium (or
approximate coarse correlated equilibrium) with welfare strictly better than
the worst possible. The focus on succinct games ensures that the underlying
complexity question is interesting; many multiplayer games of interest are in
fact succinct. Our results imply that, while one can efficiently compute a
coarse correlated equilibrium, one cannot provide any nontrivial welfare
guarantee for the resulting equilibrium, unless P=NP. We show that analogous
hardness results hold for correlated equilibria, and persist under the
egalitarian objective or Pareto optimality.
To complement the hardness results, we develop an algorithmic framework that
identifies settings in which we can efficiently compute an approximate
correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare. We use this framework to
develop an efficient algorithm for computing an approximate correlated
equilibrium with near-optimal welfare in aggregative games.Comment: 21 page
Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation
mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful
direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism.
For many valuation spaces computing the allocation and payments of the VCG
mechanism, however, is a computationally hard problem. We thus study the
performance of the VCG mechanism when bidders are forced to choose bids from a
subspace of the valuation space for which the VCG outcome can be computed
efficiently. We prove improved upper bounds on the welfare loss for
restrictions to additive bids and upper and lower bounds for restrictions to
non-additive bids. These bounds show that the welfare loss increases in
expressiveness. All our bounds apply to equilibrium concepts that can be
computed in polynomial time as well as to learning outcomes
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
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