Lobbying as a form of political dialogue in Ukrainian society

The article considers lobbyism problems in the  Ukraine, defining such notions as lobbyism, an object and a subject of lobbyism, lobbyism process. It explains both positive and negative sides of lobbyism, describes basic forms and methods of lobbyist activities, and also the ways of lobbyism legal regulation. Questions related to the practice of lobbyism in Ukraine are very vital and require answers from the side of concerned specialists of economic and political community.У статті розглянуто проблеми лобізму в Україні. Розкриваються такі поняття як: лобізм, об'єкт і суб'єкт лобізму, процес лобізму. Докладно висвітлені як позитивні, так і негативні сторони лобізму, описані основні форми і методи лобістської діяльності, шляхи вирішення правового регулювання лобізму. Актуальність питань, пов'язаних з практикою лобізму в Україні, вимагає відповіді на них з боку зацікавлених фахівців економічного і політичного співтовариства

Transition to Market Economy in Eastern Europe: Interest Groups and Political Institutions in Russia

The article analyzes the causes of the incoherent reformprogram in Russia in the last decade. It argues that the slow and partial policies can be attributed to a viscous combination of lobbyism and constitutional design. Because the post-communist transitions after 1989 were non violent “velvet revolutions,” the old state monopolies were not removed. State monopolies have small-group advantages in contrast to the large group of private firms, which are numerous and not yet organized. It leads to an asymmetrical pattern of lobbyism in favor of non-transition, which can only be mitigated by establishing dispersed political institutions, that can raise the price on rent-seeking. In Russia the centralized political institutions of the past were not replaced. Hence, Russia inherited both interest groups and political institutions of the late communist era – an unfortunate starting point for carrying out comprehensive economic reforms. Free trade with the West and potential competition may put pressure on the old state monopolies. However, lobbies in the European Union may oppose free trade to maintain their monopoly.

The Political Economy of Climate Change Policy in the EU: Auction and Grandfathering

Based on the political support function model by Hillman (1982), we consider the choice of policy instruments in environmental regulation. More specifically, we extend the Hillman model so that it can incorporate the connection between the relative strength of lobby groups, the chosen level of regulation and the choice of instrument to facilitate the achievement of this level. We apply this model to explain the shift from auction to grandfathered emission trading in the EU. When explaining this shift in policy, we focus on climate change policy and the three main interest groups, namely industry, consumers and environ-mentalists. From a pure economic point of view, taxation or auctions are clearly preferable to grandfathering. However, from our political economy model, the opposite conclusion might emerge, suggesting the counter-intuitive result that grandfathering, compared to taxation and auction, might give a stronger pres-sure to increase the emission target level.Political support function, political economy, environmental regula-tion, lobbyism, rent-seeking, taxation, auction, grandfathering, emission trad-ing, European Union, interest groups, industry, consumers, environmentalists

Особливості процесу формування інституту лобізму

Мацкевич Р. М. Особливості формування інституту лобізму / Р. М. Мацкевич // Актуальні проблеми політики : зб. наук. пр. / редкол.: С. В. Ківалов (керівник авт. кол.), Л. І. Кормич (ред.), М. А. Польовий (відп. секр.) [та ін.] ; ОНЮА, Південноукр. центр гендер. проблем. – Одеса, 2009. – Вип. 37. – С. 71-76.В статье рассматриваются некоторые вопросы особенностей процесса формирования института лобизма в Украине. В процессе формирования института лоббизма в Украине необходимо использовать практику институционализации лоббизма в развитых странах. Необходимо закрепление на законодательном уровне института лоббизма посредством принятия соответствующих нормативно-правовых актов.In the article some questions of features of process of forming of institute of lobbyism in Ukraine are considered. At process of forming of lobbyism institute in Ukraine it is necessary to use practice of lobbyism institutionalisation at the developed countries. Fixing at legislative level of lobbyism institute is needed by acceptance of the proper legal acts

Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case of GHG trade in the EU

The EU Commission has recently proposed a new directive establishing a framework for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading within the European Union. The idea is to devalue the emission quotas in circulation by the year 2012 at latest, so that the EU will meet its Kyoto target level of an 8% GHG reduction. Our main question is whether the final choice of allocation rule can be explained by potential industrial net winners involved in the policy making process. We answer this question by using rent-seeking theory and by analysing the Green Paper hearing replies from the main industrial groups. In other words, we want to explain and observe how rent-seeking (or lobbyism) affects the de-sign of environmental regulation and energy policy in favour of well-organized industrial interest groups. We argue that some firms are likely to reap a net gain from being regulated by a grandfathered emission trading system. This is so be-cause total costs of emission reduction and lobbyism are likely to be smaller than the total rents from having this type of regulation.Rent-seeking, lobbyism, grandfathering, greenhouse gases, Kyoto Protocol, emission trading, EU

Education policy networks in a comparative perspective: Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain and New Zealand

International initiatives in education, such as PISA and the Bologna Process, have distinctly changed conditions framing domestic policy-making. This paper sheds light on the territorial and modal dispersion of national education policy networks by means of a systematic network analytical description. The focus is on changing patterns of interactions and coalitions between international and national as well as private and public actors. Therefore, we analyse four countries, i.e. Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain and New Zealand, in a comparative perspective. The findings show that in most countries there is indeed an internationalization of education politics taking place in the sense of an increasing participation of international actors. These actors apply a more and more diversified portfolio of governance instruments. At the same time, however, domestic veto players develop a rich set of strategies to cope, compete or collaborate with international actors. -- Internationale Initiativen, wie z.B. der Bologna Prozess oder die PISA-Studien, haben die Rahmenbedingungen nationaler Bildungspolitik grundlegend verändert. In diesem Arbeitspapier wird die Internationalisierung von Bildungspolitik aus netzwerkanalytischer Perspektive beleuchtet. Ziel ist es, den Wandel von Formen politischer Interaktion und Koalitionen zwischen internationalen und nationalen sowie privaten und öffentlichen Akteuren zu beschreiben. Dazu werden Politiknetzwerke in vier Ländern - Deutschland, Schweiz, Großbritannien und Neuseeland - vergleichend analysiert. Anhand der Befunde lässt sich eine Internationalisierung des Politikfelds Bildung erkennen, d.h. internationale Akteure treten im Kontext nationaler politischer Interaktion zunehmend in Erscheinung. Gleichzeitig zeigt sich, dass auch nationale Vetospieler Strategien entwickeln, um dieser neuen Konstellation in der Bildungspolitik zu begegnen.

Лоббизм как способ представительства интересов бизнеса в политике

Лоббизм широко обсуждался как новый феномен в украинской политической науке. В данной статье автор представляет лоббизм как новую форму общения между властью и бизнесом.Лобізм обговорювався як новий феномен в української політичної науці. В межах даної статті автор презентує лобізм як нову форму спілкування між владою і бізнесом.The lobbyism as a new phenomenon in Ukrainian political science is discussed. In this article the author shows lobbyism is a new form of relationship between power and business

Lobbist Organizations as Conflict Resolution Institute

The study specified in this article is devoted to an important problem in the modern state management practice of Russia - the study of conflict resolution of such a politically significant institute as lobbist organizations. The authors consider the phenomenon from a socio-economic, organizational, political perspective, which is categorized through the conceptual series “government relations - public administration - political institute” and is scientifically justified. The analysis methodology is based on the symbiosis of the neoinstitutional approach and game theory (continuous games) with the rent-oriented behavior of players. The urgency of the problems of lobbist organizations is due to the prolonged political and managerial crisis, both in Europe, the USA and in the countries of Asia. The scientific novelty of this paper is determined by the use of the neoinstitutional approach and the theory of games with the rent-oriented behavior of players as the fundamental methodological direction of the symbiosis when considering lobbist organizations as conflict resolution institutes with all the functions and rules of behavior in a political game inherent in them. The study will be based on the use of such empirical methods as analysis of documents and cases, which justifies the use of a qualitative methodology. The article is one of the first in Russian empirical practice related to the problem of lobbist organizations and, undoubtedly, will make a significant contribution to the study of the conflict logical specific nature of this socio-political institute. The article is part of the grant of the Russian Foundation for Basic Research No. 19-011-31376opn “Conflict logical audit as a system of technologies for influencing ideological youth extremism in modern Russia”

The political economy of a tradable GHG permit market in the European Union

The EU has committed itself to meet an 8% greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction target level following the Kyoto agreement. Therefore, the EU Commission has just proposed a new directive establishing a framework for GHG emissions trading within the European Union. This proposal is the outcome of a policy process started by the EU Commission and its Green Paper from March 2000. The main industrial stakeholders all had the opportunity to comment on the Green Paper and from their positions we will analyse how far they are winners or losers compared to the final directive proposal. Here, we find that the dominant interest groups indeed influenced the final design of an EU GHG market. This industrial rent-seeking most prominently lead to a grandfathered permit allocation rule like the one found in the US tradable permit systems.Rent-seeking; European Union; political economy; Kyoto protocol; greenhouse gases; permit trading; grandfathering

Designing green taxes in a political context: From optimal to feasible environmental regulation

How should green taxation be designed so that it accommodates producer interests? We argue that to design green taxes which are high enough to have the desired incentive effects, tax revenues must be reimbursed, either by earmarking them for environmental subsidies or by reducing other taxes directed at industry. If green tax schemes can be designed this way, industry will have little incentive to mobilise strong opposition to green taxation. However, in practice, the requirement of reimbursement may be difficult to fulfil because, with few exceptions, polluting industries are not homogeneous. This means that reimbursement will redistribute financial resources within industry and thus create winners and losers. Still, green taxes can be used in heterogeneous industries which can be created by operating separate tax schemes for each branch of industry. The Danish case of pesticide taxation demonstrates that relatively high tax levels can be implemented if an equal relationship between the tax object and the object determining the level of refunds exists throughout the sector. This means that revenues can be reimbursed without creating redistribution within producer communities.Green taxation; Policy design; Reimbursement; Lobbyism; Redistribution