A Review of Kuhnian and Lakatosian “Explanations” in Economics

In the last few decades the influence on economics of the ideas of T. Kuhn and I. Lakatos was considerable. The increasing use of terms like “paradigms” and “scientific research programmes” in almost every field of economics, is indicative of the influence of these two philosophers. Furthermore, the introduction of the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos in economics gave the stimulus for work on the nature of growth of economic knowledge. The paper starts by presenting the main influence of T. Kuhn on theories concerned with the evolution of economic theory. It continues with a review of the main criticisms regarding the appropriateness and applicability of Kuhnian ideas for economics. The same approach is followed in the case of I. Lakatos. After a classification and discussion of the main findings, the paper attempts to offer an interpretation of the general impact of these two philosophers science on ideas relating to the development of economic theories.Development of economics; Economic Methodology; Kuhn; Lakatos

How to Identify Scientifc Revolutions?

Conceptualizing scientific revolutions by means of explicating their causes, their underlying structure and implications has been an important part of Kuhn's philosophy of science and belongs to its legacy. In this paper we show that such “explanatory concepts” of revolutions should be distinguished from a concept based on the identification criteria of scientific revolutions. The aim of this paper is to offer such a concept, and to show that it can be fruitfully used for a further elaboration of the explanatory conceptions of revolutions. On the one hand, our concept can be used to test the preciseness and accuracy of these conceptions, by examining to what extent their criteria fit revolutions as they are defined by our concept. On the other hand, our concept can serve as the basis on which these conceptions can be further specified. We will present four different explanatory concepts of revolutions – Kuhn's, Thagard's, Chen's and Barker's, and Laudan's – and point to the ways in which each of them can be further specified in view of our concept

Technological paradigms revisited - how they contribute to the understanding of open systems of technology

Der techniksoziologische Beitrag betrachtet die Vorstellung technologischer Paradigmen und bewertet den Umfang ihrer Anwendbarkeit auf offene Technologiesysteme. Nach Ansicht des Autors liefert die Idee der technologischen Paradigmen ein analytisches Werkzeug zum Verständnis kognitiver Aspekte des technologischen Wandels unter bestimmten Bedingungen, während sie allerdings nicht den Innovationsprozess erklären können. Die Ausführungen gliedern sich in die folgenden Schritte: Der erste Schritt liefert mit dem Konzept des technologischen Paradigmas nach dem Verständnis von Th. Kuhn die theoretische Grundlage des Aufsatzes. Der zweite Schritt präsentiert die empirische Fallstudie, das Projekt 'Smart Home Technologies', das mittels der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologie die Organisation der Hausarbeit bzw. der Hauhaltsprodukte und damit das Alltagsleben erleichtert. Auf diese Weise vollzieht sich hier die Übertragung technologischer Möglichkeiten von dem Industriemarkt auf den Konsumentenmarkt. Der dritte Schritt umfasst die Anwendung der Definition von technologischen Paradigmen auf den zuvor geschilderten Fall und analysiert das Projekt 'Smart Home' und seine dominanten Koordinationsformen aus der Kuhnschen Perspektive. Der vierte Schritt fasst abschließend die Ergebnisse zusammen und nennt weitere Forschungsaufgaben zum Untersuchungsgegenstand der technologischen Paradigmen in offenen Technologiesystemen. (ICG

Specialisation, Interdisciplinarity, and Incommensurability

Incommensurability may be regarded as driving specialisation, on the one hand, and as posing some problems to interdisciplinarity, on the other hand. It may be argued, however, that incommensurability plays no role in either specialisation or interdisciplinarity. Scientific specialties could be defined as simply 'different' (that is, about different things), rather than 'incommensurable' (that is, competing for the explanation of the same phenomena). Interdisciplinarity could be viewed as the co- ordinated effort of scientists possessing complemetary and interlocking skills, and not as the overcoming of some sort of incommensurable divide. This article provides a comprehensive evaluative examination of the relations between specialisation, interdisciplinarity, and incommensurability. Its aim is to defend the relevance of incommensurability to both specialisation and interdisciplinarity. At the same time, it aims at correcting the tendency, common among many philosophers, to regard incommensurability in a restrictive manner - such as, for example, as an almost purely semantic issu

Philosophical Commitments, Empirical Evidence, and Theoretical Psychology

The philosophical or theoretical commitments informing psychological research are sometimes characterized, even by theoretical psychologists themselves, as nonempirical, outside the bounds of methodological consideration, and/or nonrational. We argue that this characterization is incoherent. We illustrate our concern by analogy with problematic appeals to Kuhn’s work that have been influential in theoretical psychology. Following the contemporary pragmatist tradition, we argue that our philosophical/theoretical commitments are part of our larger webs of belief, and that for any of these beliefs to have meaning their content must be informed by our practical engagement with the world, i.e., they are based on empirical evidence, broadly construed. It is this empirical basis that allows us to recognize our commitments at all and rationally to assess and criticize them when necessary. We conclude by demonstrating a rational assessment of the philosophical/theoretical commitments underlying a recent study in the social psychology of religion

Krytyczny komentarz na temat poglądów T.S. Kuhna o tzw. rewolucji kopernikańskiej i kilka aktualnych uprzedzeń – barier w społecznościach naukowych

The article is a case study on the views of the famous T.S. Kuhn about the so-called Copernican revolution. Generally, Kuhn is presented as a very successful historian and philosopher of science: an author of world bestsellers. The division among his supporters, i.e. about so-called left-wing and right-wing Kuhnians, is recalled, and the fact that Kuhn himself vehemently dissociated from a large proportion of his adherents. It is also noted here, that in the last 30 years, in addition to abundant hagiographic literature on T. S. Kuhn, there have also been a few critical studies of Kuhn’s achievements. The rest of the article presents the author’s critical analysis of Kuhn’s views on the so-called Copernican Revolution, which formed the basis of Kuhn’s scheme of scientific development presented in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962); i.e. the world’s most famous monograph in social sciences and humanities so far. The criticism encompasses a genesis, content and reception of Kuhn’s views and the development of his interpretations. The analysis is carried out by the means of methodology of historical sciences and a scientific method, which the author describes as the hypothetico-deductive method of correspondence thinking. The criticism is based on the author’s current publications (developed here further on), which were sadly unnoticed by the researchers, although presented in the world center for the Copernican research, and are available on the Internet freely. This fact leads the author to the assumption that international Kuhnian research is underdeveloped seriously and that strong prejudices – barriers may exist in scientific circles, such as, e.g., primacy of number of citations (and other bibliometric indicators) over content analysis, the Matthew effect, the effect of alleged and actual scientific centers and peripheries, some mental remnants of the Cold War, as well as underdevelopment of scientific communication.Artykuł jest studium przypadku na temat poglądów słynnego T.S. Kuhna o tzw. rewolucji kopernikańskiej. Początkowa część artykułu w syntetyczny sposób przedstawia go jako bardzo utytułowanego historyka i filozofa nauki, autora światowych bestselerów; przypomniano tu także podział jego zwolenników, na m.in. tzw. lewicowych albo prawicowych Kuhnowców i fakt, że sam Kuhn stanowczo odcinał się od dużej części tych zwolenników; zwrócono również uwagę, że w ciągu ostatnich 30 lat oprócz bardzo obfitej literatury hagiograficznej na temat T.S. Kuhna, pojawiły się także opracowania krytyczne.   Pozostała część artykułu przedstawia autorską krytyczną analizę poglądów Kuhna na temat tzw. rewolucji kopernikańskiej, które to poglądy stanowiły podstawę schematu rozwoju nauki przedstawionego przez Kuhna w Strukturze rewolucji naukowych (1962), najsłynniejszej dotąd na świecie monografii nauk społeczno-humanistycznych. Krytyka obejmuje genezę, treść i recepcję poglądów Kuhna oraz rozwoju jego interpretacji; czyniona jest ona z perspektywy metodologii nauk historycznych i metody naukowej, którą autor określa mianem hipotetyczno-dedukcyjnej metody myślenia korespondencyjnego. Krytyka oparta jest na nadal aktualnych wcześniejszych publikacjach autora (i ich twórczym rozwinięciu, gdyż nie ogranicza się tylko do omówienia tych publikacji), które z reguły zostały niezauważone przez badaczy myśli T.S. Kuhna, choć powstały w rzeczywistym światowym centrum badań kopernikańskich i są dostępne darmowo w sieci internetowej. Fakt ten skłania autora do wysunięcia przypuszczenia o poważnym niedorozwoju badań Kuhnowskich w skali międzynarodowej oraz o istnieniu w aktualnych środowiskach naukowych silnych uprzedzeń i barier, takich jak np. prymat liczby cytowań (i innych wskaźników bibliometrycznych) nad analizą treści publikacji, efekt Mateusza, efekt rzekomych i faktycznych centrów i peryferiów naukowych, mentalne pozostałości barier zimnej wojny oraz niedorozwój komunikacji naukowej

Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm

A “mature” science, according to Thomas Kuhn, can afford to be uncritical. It has finally answered to its practitioners\u27 satisfaction the fundamental, foundational questions of their field. It finally rests (“for a time,” at least) on an established scientific achievement that epitomizes the accomplished, collective wisdom of an age and defines the terms, conditions, directions, and limits of further refining research. With this “paradigm” in place, researchers are spared the incessant and distracting reexamination of first principles, the extravagant costs of intellectual retooling; they can proceed with confidence, effectiveness, and efficiency to do what they do best: articulating and specifying the received paradigm in more depth and detail, extending and applying it to new areas of interest. Because a paradigm “provides rules that tell the practitioner of a mature specialty what both the world and his science are like,” the practitioner “can concentrate with assurance upon the esoteric problems that these rules and existing knowledge define for him.” Postmodern legal theory appropriates and assimilates Kuhn\u27s insights in ways and to an extent that have not, I think, yet been fully recognized. In describing the development of legal scholarship in Kuhnian terms, I am thus merely elaborating assumptions integral to contemporary intellectual discourse. In particular, interdisciplinary legal scholarship regularly proceeds on the assumption that it possesses a stable, accepted, and uncontroversial paradigm for further research-in other words, that it constitutes a “mature science.” But beneath the institutional trappings of interdisciplinary legal scholarship I detect not a scholarly tradition that has finally resolved to general acclaim all its basic, foundational, methodological problems, but rather one that has never really confronted them. As a result, the attempt to apply the supposed paradigm of interdisciplinary legal scholarship to its subject matter reveals significant “anomalies” in the application. In what follows I shall first analyze and discuss these anomalies and then consider in some detail a specific example of contemporary interdisciplinary legal scholarship

Kuhn's Kantian Dimensions

Two questions should be considered when assessing the Kantian dimensions of Kuhn’s thought. First, was Kuhn himself a Kantian? Second, did Kuhn have an influence on later Kantians and neo-Kantians? Kuhn mentioned Kant as an inspiration, and his focus on explanatory frameworks and on the conditions of knowledge appear Kantian. But Kuhn’s emphasis on learning; on activities of symbolization; on paradigms as practical, not just theoretical; and on the social and community aspects of scientific research as constitutive of scientific reasoning, are all outside the Kantian perspective. Kuhn’s admiration for Kant is tempered by his desire to understand the processes of learning, of initiation into a scientific community, of experimentation using instruments, and of persuasion, drawing on the work of familiar influences, including Piaget, Koyré, and Wittgenstein, and less familiar ones, including Langer, Demos, and Frank. Both Kuhn and Kant were interested in the question: what is the status of science, and what is the role of the scientist in its development and justification? But Kuhn presents science in a much more messy, historically contingent, and socially charged way than Kant does. The paper’s conclusion evaluates Kuhn’s reception among researchers including Richardson and Friedman, assessing the prospects for future work

Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences

In his late years, Thomas Kuhn became interested in the process of scientific specialization, which does not seem to possess the destructive element that is characteristic of scientific revolutions. It therefore makes sense to investigate whether and how Kuhn’s insights about specialization are consistent with, and actually fit, his model of scientific progress through revolutions. In this paper, I argue that the transition toward a new specialty corresponds to a revolutionary change for the group of scientists involved in such a transition. I will clarify the role of the scientific community in revolutionary changes and characterize the incommensurability across specialties as possessing both semantic and methodological aspects. The discussion of the discovery of the structure of DNA will serve both as an illustration of my main argument and as reply to one criticism raised against Kuhn—namely, that his model cannot capture cases of revolutionary yet non-disruptive episodes of scientific progress. Revisiting Kuhn’s ideas on specialization will shed new light on some often overlooked features of scientific change