Reference, context and propositions

This thesis is a detailed investigation of a web of philosophical problems surrounding what I call Kripke' s Thesis: if proper names are directly referential then such identity statements as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', which are constructed from two distinct but co-referential proper names, are necessary and yet a posteriori. Chapter 1 clarifies some confusions surrounding Kripke's view about rigidity (rigid designation) and his theory of naming. Problems concerning the scope interpretation of rigidity, rigid descriptions, and Kaplan-rigidity are dealt with. My major claim is that the fundamental notion of Kripke's theory of naming is direct reference, not rigidity. In Chapter 2, I first establish the 'modal half of Kripke's Thesis. Then an objection against Kripke's Thesis is presented. The central claim of the objection is this: given that proper names are directly referential and that the proposition expressed by (e.g.) 'Hesperus is Hesperus' is a priori, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' expresses the same proposition as 'Hesperus is Hesperus', and is therefore a priori. An attempt, based on a suggestion by Plantinga, to defend Kripke's Thesis is shown to be unsuccessful. In Chapter 3, it is first noted that the objection previously presented involves the assumption (T): 'a priori' applies primarily to propositions and derivatively to sentences. Then, on the basis of Stalnaker's semantic apparatus of propositional concepts, a two-dimensional account of a priority is developed. By rejecting (T) and embracing a sentence-relative view of 'a priori propositions', this account provides a defence of Kripke's Thesis. It is argued that this is not an ad hoc defence. In Chapter 4, attention turns to some problems concerning context dependence, a central feature of the two-dimensional account proposed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 starts with the observation that the account seems to be committed to an indexical treatment of proper names. This prompts a demonstration of the compatibility of indexicality and rigidity. The demonstration, drawing on Kaplan's semantics for indexicals, introduces, however, the more serious problem of how to square the purported indexicality of proper names, as revealed by the two-dimensional account, with Kaplan's contention that proper names have a stable character. A solution which invokes the notion of frame relativity is proposed. The first section of Chapter 5 aims to clarify the intricate relation between 'singular propositions' and 'direct reference'. The rest of the chapter is a detailed analysis of Salmon's attempt to refute Kripke's Thesis. It is argued that Salmon's attempt fails, and that the source of his failure lies in his characterization of a priority. Some objections to this analysis are considered and rejected

The semantics and metaphysics of contingent identity

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2001.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-101).The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter considers how we ought to understand a thesis of contingent identity if it is to accomplish the work it is proposed to accomplish while at the same time avoiding certain obvious and otherwise persuasive objections. I begin by presenting a metaphysical thesis I call the Thesis of Contingent Identity, and defending it against alternatives. I then set out the principal objection to the Thesis, the objection from modal properties, and offer a response. The chapter concludes with an appendix devoted to criticizing Allan Gibbard's and H. W. Noonan's accounts of contingent identity and their relpies to the objection from modal properties. The chief weakness in their proposals is that they concentrate on the semantical while neglecting the central metaphysical issues of contingent identity. In the process, they compromise the metaphysics they had intended to defend. The second chapter contains a discussion of some of the technical issues surrounding the Thesis of Contingent Identity. A robust version of the semantics outlined in the first chapter is presented and contrasted with competing alternatives. It has been said that semantic considerations alone cannot decide against contingent identity; I show why this is so. The chapter ends by considering in what sense the Thesis actually expresses contingent identity, and how it affects our views on which logic is the best modal logic for metaphysical necessity. The third chapter investigates and criticizes challenges to the Thesis of Contingent Identity from the transitivity of identity and the thesis that names are rigid designators. I argue that, according to the approach to contingent identity outlined in the previous chapters, the identity relation behaves normally. Claims that it violates transitivity are based on an equivocation which is exposed by paying careful attention to the notion of perspective. Similarly, I argue that the thesis that names are rigid designators is compatible with the Thesis of Contingent Identity. I review the debate between Kripke and Gibbard and criticize the weakness in the latter's approach. Moreover, I argue that close scrutiny of the influence and function of names uncovers an equivocation in certain arguments purporting to establish an incompatibility between contingent identity and rigid designation. These considerations point to the hypothesis that some names might have multiple possible referents. The chapter concludes with some elaboration and defense of this hypothesis.by Anthony E. Gray.Ph.D

'God exists': meaning, reference and Anselm’s proslogion

Over the last century, philosophy has comprehensively criticised the 'common- sense' view of the proposition 'God exists' as being meaningfixl. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to show that instances of 'God exists' can be considered meaningful, whether or not God does in fact exist. From the intuitive premise of compositionality - that the meaning of a proposition is determined by the meaning of its parts - I ask what options 'God exists' presents. Its appearance is that of a simple subject-predicate sentence, restricting possible difficulties in interpreting compositionality; it appears to take a subject and attribute a property to that subject. However, several problems are apparent. The first is the concept of existence. The first chapter, therefore, compares the views of Bertrand Russell with recent work by Colin McGinn, arguing in favour of existence as a predicate. McGinn presents a challenge to allowing the predication of existence of 'God’, centred around the concepts by which ontological arguments characterise 'God'. The second chapter, as an historical-theological angle on the meaningfulness of 'God exists’, takes up this challenge in an attempt to resolve it using Anselm's Proslogion, which is traditionally thought to demonstrate the existence of God by using the idea of God. Analysis of the Proslogion and the thought underlying it do not provide an entirely acceptable resolution, but lay the foundations for the remainder of the thesis.The third chapter argues for the rejection of McGinn's challenge. Having provided arguments for seeing 'God exists' as a subject-predicate sentence, and noted the difficulties in conceiving adequately of God, I address the problem of what account to give of 'God’. Against a background of debate in the philosophy of language, I advocate understanding 'God' as a name in God exists', and argue for a view of the meaning and reference of 'God’ based upon the work of Jerome Gellman. Finally, I combine relevant elements from existence, reference and meaning - incorporating theological suggestions arising from Anselm - to provide a model for the meaningfulness of 'God exists' which, I argue, demonstrates God exists' to be a meaningful proposition if God does in fact exist or if God does not in fact exist

Are two Dimensions Too Many? - A one-dimensional rival to two-dimensional semantics

We discuss two interpretations of two-dimensional semantics (2DMS) due to D. Chalmers and R. Stalnaker. The main problem with both interpretations of the formal framework is the relinquishng of rigidity for terms. They are in a sense unfaithful to an agent's beliefs. We present alternative principles to capture what we take to be agents's beliefs, namely: the principles of hyper-rigidity and backward reference to actuality. We propose then to go back to a one-dimensional semantics which affords a satisfactory model of beliefs reports. Our proposal, like 2DMS, addresses typical problems of representation for beliefs and epistemological difficulties related to modal knowledge

Modality, rationalism, and conditionals

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, February 2007.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-108).This thesis consists of three interconnected papers on apriority, modality, and conditionals. In "Playground Conditionals," I look at three philosophical debates, each of which turns on the epistemic status of a certain kind of conditional-what I call a playground conditional. I argue that a close consideration of playground conditionals gives us a better appreciation of what we can do with conditionals and, ultimately, some guidance concerning what to say about the three philosophical debates. In "Modal Rationalism, Two Dimensionalism, and our Counteractual Sisters", I consider the prospects for modal rationalism in the wake of Kripke's Naming and Necessity. Recently there has been a modal rationalist revival, thanks in part to the development of the "two-dimensional" semantic framework. This framework associates two intensions (a primary intension and a secondary intension) with every sentence. The difficulty comes in finding a definition of primary and secondary intension that would lend the desired support to modal rationalism. After exploring and rejecting some of the proposed definitions in the literature, I sketch an account that can, I think, offer some support to a suitably framed modal rationalism.(cont.) Finally, in "A Guide to Modal Guidance," I set about to get clearer on how, exactly, we come to know modal truths. I start by considering two arguments that are designed to show that our access to modal knowledge cannot come from conceivability arguments. I show that, these arguments are mistaken. In the process, I attempt to outline a broader and more realistic modal epistemology than one that focuses exclusively on conceivability. I then consider and reject a version of modal rationalism which says that ideal conceivability gives us a priori access to modality. Against this, I argue that our modal knowledge is predominantly a posteriori, and that our knowledge of ideal conceivability is always a posteriori. In the end, however, I attempt to salvage something that preserves the spirit, if not the letter, of modal rationalism.by Jason Decker.Ph.D

Under Pressure from the Empirical Data: Does Externalism Rest on a Mistaken Psychological Theory?

The tradition of semantic externalism that follows Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) is built on the assumption that the folk have essentialist commitments about natural kinds. Externalists commonly take the body of empirical data concerning psychological essentialism as support for this claim. However, recent empirical findings (Malt, 1994; Kalish, 2002) call the psychological theory of essentialism into question. This thesis examines the relevance of these findings to both essentialism and semantic externalism. I argue that these findings suggest that these theories fail to reflect folk beliefs about natural kinds and folk natural kind term usage. This leads me to propose an alternative thesis-- the Ambiguity Thesis-- that is better able to accommodate the existing body of empirical data

Water has a microstructural essence after all

In recent years attacks on the Kripke-Putnam approach to natural kinds and natural kind terms have proliferated. In a recent paper, Häggqvist and Wikforss (The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1-23, 2017) attack the once-dominant essentialist account of natural kinds. Häggqvist & Wikforss also suggest that it is time to return to some sort of cluster-based descriptivist semantics for natural kind terms, thus targeting both the metaphysical and semantic tenets that underpin the Kripke-Putnam approach. In our paper we want to challenge both parts of Häggqvist and Wikforss' project. We will argue that the anti-essentialist considerations and arguments they raise against the Kripke-Putnam view are far from compelling in some cases, and certainly not decisive against a reasonable form of the view. On the semantic side, although Häggqvist and Wikforss give few details about what a viable cluster-based descriptivist theory should look like, we will argue that one can already see the approach to be a non-starter. Ignorance and error arguments of the kinds provided by Kripke and Putnam continue to be decisive objections. The only way we can see to save the cluster descriptivist approach is to make the essential properties postulated by Kripke and Putnam become essential features of the descriptive cluster. But this makes the success of the approach parasitic on the correctness of the Kripke-Putnam view

Three Conceptions of Modal Realism

The thesis is divided into three sections. The first of these is a critique of the conceptions of modal realism due to Lewis; the second, a critique of that due to McGinn. The third section comprises the development and initial evaluation of a third conception of moral realism which I term secondary modal realism. In Section One of the thesis [Ch.1- Ch.5] I argue against the acceptability of the objectual modal realism of David Lewis and I argue (tentatively) for one theory of the meaning of possible world statements which is consistent with this denial of the existence of possible worlds. Chapters 1- 4 concern the former argument, Ch.5 concerns the latter. In Ch.1, I argue that there is no genuine semantic utility afforded by the adoption of realism about possible worlds. The case is (i) that the genuine semantical utility which does accrue via the ontological commitment to possible worlds can be had without that ontological commitmment and (ii) that other claims to semanti utility which are associated with possible world semantics do not reflect legitimate semantic-explanatory interests. The main part of the discussion of objectual realism - constituted by Chapters 2, 3 & 4 - takes a different turn. Since Lewis is fond of comparing his modal realism to realism about the entities of mathematics, I attempt to show that, on both epistemological and metaphysical grounds, the comparison is quite unfavourable for objectual modal realism. In Ch.2, I defend the objectual modal realist's right to an a priori epistemology of modality in face of Benaceraffs dilemma, but, it is argued in Ch.3, even granted a priority, there is still a serious epistemological difficulty since the internal epistemology of modal realism which is proposed by Lewis is seriously flawed. In Ch.4, it is argued that there is at least one important metaphysical consideration which militates against an ontological commitment to worlds but which does not appear to have the same impact re. mathematical ontology, viz: that the mooted possible worlds are identification- transcendent. Having made the case for anti-realism about possible worlds I am concerned in Ch.5 with the outline of a theory of the meaning of possible world statements which is consistent with this ontological position. I argue for the unacceptability of a theory, outlined by Forbes, which depends upon the claim that possible world statements do not mean what they appear to mean. I then counterpose the options of an error theory and a metaphor theory of world-talk arguing that while both of these are prima facie tenable, the latter is preferable. In Section Two of the thesis [Ch.6 - Ch.9] I deal with the non-objectual modal realism of McGinn. Having set out the salient theses of McGinn's conception of modal realism [Ch.6], the critique of this conception follows. Ch. 6: the variety and resources of anti-realisms about modality are seriously underestimated by McGinn. In particular the option of anti-realism based on the strategy of proposing a sceptical solution as a response to a sceptical paradox is ignored. Ch.7: McGinn proposes that the only defensible form of modal realism consists in endorsing the thesis of supervenience (without reduction) of the modal on the actual. However, the discussion of supervenience fails to acknowledge many of the difficulties associated with the application of supervenience and related theses in the modal case. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that acceptance of modal/actual supervenience involves no commitment to modal realism. Ch.8: consideration of the issues that flow from the discussion of the thesis of supervenience should point towards a central question of modal epistemology i.e. whether modal knowledge is attainable by conceptual means alone. However, McGinn's discussion of supervenience leads him away from this central question and as a result he mislocates the problematic nature of modal epistemology in the claim that we cannot represent modal facts as causally explaining our knowledge of them. Ch.9:The modal realism that McGinn offers is wholly unacceptable since it provides neither a clear conception of the truth-conditions of modal statements nor any account of how we detect modalities. The realism he offers is redolent of sceptical paradox and seems ripe for an anti-realist treatment in the form of a sceptical solution. Hence, the upshot of the first two sections is that the existing conceptions of modal realism, i.e. those of Lewis and of McGinn respectively, are indefensible. In Section Three of the thesis [Ch.10 - Ch. 12] the aim is to characterize and evaluate a third conception of modal realism - secondary modal realism. This project is inspired by (i) McDowell's secondary quality conception of moral reality and (ii) the observation of crucial similarities between the failings of more traditional conceptions of moral realism and those conceptions of modal realisms dealt with above. In Ch.10, I argue that anthropocentricity as opposed to perceptibility is the feature of paradigmatic secondary properties which is an appropriately generalizable feature of secondary realism and that a proper conception of the standard of correctness for secondary property judgments facilitates the extrapolation of that standard to the cases of moral and modal judgement. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.)