480 research outputs found
Private Multiplicative Weights Beyond Linear Queries
A wide variety of fundamental data analyses in machine learning, such as
linear and logistic regression, require minimizing a convex function defined by
the data. Since the data may contain sensitive information about individuals,
and these analyses can leak that sensitive information, it is important to be
able to solve convex minimization in a privacy-preserving way.
A series of recent results show how to accurately solve a single convex
minimization problem in a differentially private manner. However, the same data
is often analyzed repeatedly, and little is known about solving multiple convex
minimization problems with differential privacy. For simpler data analyses,
such as linear queries, there are remarkable differentially private algorithms
such as the private multiplicative weights mechanism (Hardt and Rothblum, FOCS
2010) that accurately answer exponentially many distinct queries. In this work,
we extend these results to the case of convex minimization and show how to give
accurate and differentially private solutions to *exponentially many* convex
minimization problems on a sensitive dataset
Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games
We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative
games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted
congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the
equilibrium selection problem in a strong sense. In particular, we give an
efficient weak mediator: a mechanism which has only the power to listen to
reported types and provide non-binding suggested actions, such that (a) it is
an asymptotic Nash equilibrium for every player to truthfully report their type
to the mediator, and then follow its suggested action; and (b) that when
players do so, they end up coordinating on a particular asymptotic pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of the induced complete information game. In fact,
truthful reporting is an ex-post Nash equilibrium of the mediated game, so our
solution applies even in settings of incomplete information, and even when
player types are arbitrary or worst-case (i.e. not drawn from a common prior).
We achieve this by giving an efficient differentially private algorithm for
computing a Nash equilibrium in such games. The rates of convergence to
equilibrium in all of our results are inverse polynomial in the number of
players . We also apply our main results to a multi-dimensional market game.
Our results can be viewed as giving, for a rich class of games, a more robust
version of the Revelation Principle, in that we work with weaker informational
assumptions (no common prior), yet provide a stronger solution concept (ex-post
Nash versus Bayes Nash equilibrium). In comparison to previous work, our main
conceptual contribution is showing that weak mediators are a game theoretic
object that exist in a wide variety of games -- previously, they were only
known to exist in traffic routing games
Online Learning and Profit Maximization from Revealed Preferences
We consider the problem of learning from revealed preferences in an online
setting. In our framework, each period a consumer buys an optimal bundle of
goods from a merchant according to her (linear) utility function and current
prices, subject to a budget constraint. The merchant observes only the
purchased goods, and seeks to adapt prices to optimize his profits. We give an
efficient algorithm for the merchant's problem that consists of a learning
phase in which the consumer's utility function is (perhaps partially) inferred,
followed by a price optimization step. We also consider an alternative online
learning algorithm for the setting where prices are set exogenously, but the
merchant would still like to predict the bundle that will be bought by the
consumer for purposes of inventory or supply chain management. In contrast with
most prior work on the revealed preferences problem, we demonstrate that by
making stronger assumptions on the form of utility functions, efficient
algorithms for both learning and profit maximization are possible, even in
adaptive, online settings
Constrained Signaling in Auction Design
We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good
(drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does
not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good
that he is selling. Instead, he must come up with a constrained signalling
scheme: a (non injective) mapping from goods to signals, that satisfies the
constraints of his setting. For example, the auctioneer may be able to
communicate only a bounded length message for each good, or he might be legally
constrained in how he can advertise the item being sold. Each candidate
signaling scheme induces an incomplete-information game among the buyers, and
the goal of the auctioneer is to choose the signaling scheme and accompanying
auction format that optimizes welfare. In this paper, we use techniques from
submodular function maximization and no-regret learning to give algorithms for
computing constrained signaling schemes for a variety of constrained signaling
problems
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