Her Ladyship Chief Justice: The Rise of Female Leaders in the Judiciary in Africa

In recent years, women have been selected as leaders of African judiciaries. This article identifies where and when women have become chief justices and presidents of constitutional courts from 1990 to 2014. We profile women from three civil-law and three common-law countries and find that the women selected meet or exceed the requirements for holding the highest position in the judiciary. We then explore why some African countries, but not others, have had female judicial leaders. We initially find that the selection method may be less important than the type of legal system, the commitment of gatekeepers, the end of major armed conflict, and regional diffusion in explaining why some countries have seen women rise to leadership positions in the judiciary

Remarks of Seth P. Waxman at the Memorial Observance for Justice Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court

Members of the Court, members of the family, and friends of Justice White- Alone among today\u27s speakers, I met Justice White only late in his life. Growing up in the law, my relationship with him was the one many kids today have with Michael Jordan - I wanted to be like White -like the kind of man he was. I still have that aspiration. Like Byron White, I served in the Department of Justice and was altered forever by that honorable institution. And - like Justice White, in my own lesser way, I strove within the walls of this institution to protect the authority of the national government. Those themes of Justice White\u27s remarkable career - his tenure in the national Executive and his championing of the national Legislature - have been marvelously captured in the remarks of my colleagues. It is perhaps fitting then, in this of all places, to conclude by reflecting on Justice White\u27s perspective on the national judicial power - on the role of the federal courts

Do Justices Time Their Retirements Politically? An Empirical Analysis of the Timing and Outcomes of Supreme Court Retirements in the Modern Era

As the rampant speculation preceding Justice Kennedy’s retirement made clear, it is difficult to predict when Justices will retire. Justices often defy the conventional wisdom that a Justice is more likely to retire when the president and Senate share the Justice’s ideology. For example, Justice Ginsburg chose to remain on the Court rather than retire during President Obama’s terms. Her choice is not unusual. Since 1954, a majority of similarly situated Justices refused to retire. In light of this behavior, it is no surprise that existing studies struggle to explain Justices’ retirement decisions and disagree on whether political factors predict retirement. This Article identifies key reasons past studies have found Justices’ retirement decisions inexplicable. No studies measure whether Justices actually succeed in obtaining like-minded successors. Nor do past studies consider accurate measures of ideology while controlling for retirements forced by health. This empirical study of modern-era retirements addresses each of these shortcomings. It constructs more accurate measures of ideology by using voting records to pinpoint ideological similarities or differences between Justices, presidents, and Senators who may appoint a successor. It also differentiates between voluntary retirements and involuntary retirements forced by health. Finally, by comparing the votes of a Justice and his or her successor relative to other Justices remaining on the Court, this study offers the first measure of Justices’ success in obtaining like-minded replacements. The analysis reveals that Justices have had limited opportunities to retire to ideologically compatible presidents and Senates, and even then, limited success in obtaining like-minded replacements. Not all Justices had opportunities to time their retirements politically. Health problems forced many Justices to leave at politically inopportune times, and some Justices near the center of the Court were ideologically distant from leaders of both parties by the time they retired. Further, even Justices who retired to ideologically compatible presidents rarely obtained a successor who closely replicated the retiring Justice’s voting behavior. Limited success in obtaining like-minded replacements explains why Justices flout calls to retire while presidents who share their ideology are in office

Books Received

A List of Books Received by Michigan Law Revie