Pareto Optimality and Strategy Proofness in Group Argument Evaluation (Extended Version)

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the nature of agents' preferences

Experimental Assessment of Aggregation Principles in Argumentation-Enabled Collective Intelligence

On the Web, there is always a need to aggregate opinions from the crowd (as in posts, social networks, forums, etc.). Different mechanisms have been implemented to capture these opinions such as Like in Facebook, Favorite in Twitter, thumbs-up/-down, flagging, and so on. However, in more contested domains (e.g., Wikipedia, political discussion, and climate change discussion), these mechanisms are not sufficient, since they only deal with each issue independently without considering the relationships between different claims. We can view a set of conflicting arguments as a graph in which the nodes represent arguments and the arcs between these nodes represent the defeat relation. A group of people can then collectively evaluate such graphs. To do this, the group must use a rule to aggregate their individual opinions about the entire argument graph. Here we present the first experimental evaluation of different principles commonly employed by aggregation rules presented in the literature. We use randomized controlled experiments to investigate which principles people consider better at aggregating opinions under different conditions. Our analysis reveals a number of factors, not captured by traditional formal models, that play an important role in determining the efficacy of aggregation. These results help bring formal models of argumentation closer to real-world application

A model to support collective reasoning: Formalization, analysis and computational assessment

Inspired by e-participation systems, in this paper we propose a new model to represent human debates and methods to obtain collective conclusions from them. This model overcomes drawbacks of existing approaches by allowing users to introduce new pieces of information into the discussion, to relate them to existing pieces, and also to express their opinion on the pieces proposed by other users. In addition, our model does not assume that users' opinions are rational in order to extract information from it, an assumption that significantly limits current approaches. Instead, we define a weaker notion of rationality that characterises coherent opinions, and we consider different scenarios based on the coherence of individual opinions and the level of consensus that users have on the debate structure. Considering these two factors, we analyse the outcomes of different opinion aggregation functions that compute a collective decision based on the individual opinions and the debate structure. In particular, we demonstrate that aggregated opinions can be coherent even if there is a lack of consensus and individual opinions are not coherent. We conclude our analysis with a computational evaluation demonstrating that collective opinions can be computed efficiently for real-sized debates

A dialectical approach for argument-based judgment aggregation

The current paper provides a dialectical interpretation of the argumentation-based judgment aggregation operators of Caminada and Pigozzi. In particular, we define discussion-based proof procedures for the foundational concepts of down-admissible and up-complete. We then show how these proof procedures can be used as the basis of dialectical proof procedures for the sceptical, credulous and super credulous judgment aggregation operators