827 research outputs found
Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?
The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and
their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many
areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status,
and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic
view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical
and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about
their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering
complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic
absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of
logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the
impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep
logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open,
modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.Comment: 27 pages. To appear in: The life and work of Leon Henkin: Essays on
his contributions (Studies in Universal Logic) eds: Manzano, M., Sain, I. and
Alonso, E., 201
Evidence and plausibility in neighborhood structures
The intuitive notion of evidence has both semantic and syntactic features. In
this paper, we develop an {\em evidence logic} for epistemic agents faced with
possibly contradictory evidence from different sources. The logic is based on a
neighborhood semantics, where a neighborhood indicates that the agent has
reason to believe that the true state of the world lies in . Further notions
of relative plausibility between worlds and beliefs based on the latter
ordering are then defined in terms of this evidence structure, yielding our
intended models for evidence-based beliefs. In addition, we also consider a
second more general flavor, where belief and plausibility are modeled using
additional primitive relations, and we prove a representation theorem showing
that each such general model is a -morphic image of an intended one. This
semantics invites a number of natural special cases, depending on how uniform
we make the evidence sets, and how coherent their total structure. We give a
structural study of the resulting `uniform' and `flat' models. Our main result
are sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics of all four major model
classes with respect to the modal language of evidence, belief and safe belief.
We conclude with an outlook toward logics for the dynamics of changing
evidence, and the resulting language extensions and connections with logics of
plausibility change
Logical dynamics meets logical pluralism?
Where is logic heading today? There is a general feeling that the discipline is broadening its scope and agenda beyond classical foundational issues, and maybe even a concern that, like Stephen Leacock’s famous horseman, it is ‘riding off madly in all directions’. So, what is the resultant vector? There seem to be two broad answers in circulation today. One is logical pluralism, locating the new scope of logic in charting a wide variety of reasoning styles, often marked by non-classical structural rules of inference. This is the new program that I subscribed to in my work on sub-structural logics around 1990, and it is a powerful movement today. But gradually, I have changed my mind about the crux of what logic should become. I would now say that the main issue is not variety of reasoning styles and notions of consequence, but the variety of informational tasks performed by intelligent interacting agents, of which inference is only one among many, involving observation, memory, questions and answers, dialogue, or general communication. And logical systems should deal with a wide variety of these, making information-carrying events first-class citizens in their set-up. The purpose of this brief paper is to contrast and compare the two approaches, drawing freely on some insights from earlier published papers. In particular, I will argue that logical dynamics sets itself the more ambitious diagnostic goal of explaining why substructural phenomena occur, by ‘deconstructing’ them into classical logic plus an explicit account of the relevant informational events
The Modal Logic of Stepwise Removal
We investigate the modal logic of stepwise removal of objects, both for its
intrinsic interest as a logic of quantification without replacement, and as a
pilot study to better understand the complexity jumps between dynamic epistemic
logics of model transformations and logics of freely chosen graph changes that
get registered in a growing memory. After introducing this logic
() and its corresponding removal modality, we analyze its
expressive power and prove a bisimulation characterization theorem. We then
provide a complete Hilbert-style axiomatization for the logic of stepwise
removal in a hybrid language enriched with nominals and public announcement
operators. Next, we show that model-checking for is
PSPACE-complete, while its satisfiability problem is undecidable. Lastly, we
consider an issue of fine-structure: the expressive power gained by adding the
stepwise removal modality to fragments of first-order logic
Resolving Distributed Knowledge
Distributed knowledge is the sum of the knowledge in a group; what someone
who is able to discern between two possible worlds whenever any member of the
group can discern between them, would know. Sometimes distributed knowledge is
referred to as the potential knowledge of a group, or the joint knowledge they
could obtain if they had unlimited means of communication. In epistemic logic,
the formula D_G{\phi} is intended to express the fact that group G has
distributed knowledge of {\phi}, that there is enough information in the group
to infer {\phi}. But this is not the same as reasoning about what happens if
the members of the group share their information. In this paper we introduce an
operator R_G, such that R_G{\phi} means that {\phi} is true after G have shared
all their information with each other - after G's distributed knowledge has
been resolved. The R_G operators are called resolution operators. Semantically,
we say that an expression R_G{\phi} is true iff {\phi} is true in what van
Benthem [11, p. 249] calls (G's) communication core; the model update obtained
by removing links to states for members of G that are not linked by all members
of G. We study logics with different combinations of resolution operators and
operators for common and distributed knowledge. Of particular interest is the
relationship between distributed and common knowledge. The main results are
sound and complete axiomatizations.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729
Knowability Relative to Information
We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models the topic-sensitivity of information, allowing us to invalidate controversial forms of epistemic closure while validating less controversial ones. Thus, unlike the standard modal framework for epistemic logic, KRI accommodates plausible approaches to the Kripke-Harman dogmatism paradox, which bear on non-monotonicity, or on topic-sensitivity. KRI also strikes a better balance between agent idealization and a non-trivial logic of knowledge ascriptions
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