Jeffrey-like rules of conditioning for the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence

AbstractJeffrey's rule of conditioning is a rule for changing an additive probability distribution when the human perception of new evidence is obtained. It is a generalization of the normative Bayesian inference. Shafer showed how Jeffrey's generalization of Bayes' rule of conditioning can be reinterpreted in terms of the theory of belief functions. But Shafer's approach is different from the normative Bayesian approach and is not a straight generalization of Jeffrey's rule. There are situations in which we need inference rules that may well provide a convenient generalization of Jeffrey's rule. Therefore we propose new rules of conditioning motivated by the work of Dubois and Prade. Although the weak and strong conditioning rules of Dubois and Prade are generalizations of Bayesian conditioning, they fail to yield Jeffrey's rule as a special case. Jeffrey's rule is a direct consequence of a special case of our conditioning rules. Three kinds of normalizations in the rules of conditioning are discussed

Advances and Applications of Dezert-Smarandache Theory (DSmT) for Information Fusion (Collected Works), Vol. 4

The fourth volume on Advances and Applications of Dezert-Smarandache Theory (DSmT) for information fusion collects theoretical and applied contributions of researchers working in different fields of applications and in mathematics. The contributions (see List of Articles published in this book, at the end of the volume) have been published or presented after disseminating the third volume (2009, http://fs.unm.edu/DSmT-book3.pdf) in international conferences, seminars, workshops and journals. First Part of this book presents the theoretical advancement of DSmT, dealing with Belief functions, conditioning and deconditioning, Analytic Hierarchy Process, Decision Making, Multi-Criteria, evidence theory, combination rule, evidence distance, conflicting belief, sources of evidences with different importance and reliabilities, importance of sources, pignistic probability transformation, Qualitative reasoning under uncertainty, Imprecise belief structures, 2-Tuple linguistic label, Electre Tri Method, hierarchical proportional redistribution, basic belief assignment, subjective probability measure, Smarandache codification, neutrosophic logic, Evidence theory, outranking methods, Dempster-Shafer Theory, Bayes fusion rule, frequentist probability, mean square error, controlling factor, optimal assignment solution, data association, Transferable Belief Model, and others. More applications of DSmT have emerged in the past years since the apparition of the third book of DSmT 2009. Subsequently, the second part of this volume is about applications of DSmT in correlation with Electronic Support Measures, belief function, sensor networks, Ground Moving Target and Multiple target tracking, Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Device, Belief Interacting Multiple Model filter, seismic and acoustic sensor, Support Vector Machines, Alarm classification, ability of human visual system, Uncertainty Representation and Reasoning Evaluation Framework, Threat Assessment, Handwritten Signature Verification, Automatic Aircraft Recognition, Dynamic Data-Driven Application System, adjustment of secure communication trust analysis, and so on. Finally, the third part presents a List of References related with DSmT published or presented along the years since its inception in 2004, chronologically ordered

Conditioning and Interpretation Shifts

This paper develops a probabilistic model of belief change under interpretation shifts, in the context of a problem case from dynamic epistemic logic. Van Benthem [4] has shown that a particular kind of belief change, typical for dynamic epistemic logic, cannot be modelled by standard Bayesian conditioning. I argue that the problems described by van Benthem come about because the belief change alters the semantics in which the change is supposed to be modelled: the new information induces a shift in the interpretation of the sentences. In this paper I show that interpretation shifts can be modeled in terms of updating by conditioning. The model derives from the knowledge structures developed by Fagin et al [8], and hinges on a distinction between the propositional and informational content of sentences. Finally, I show that Dempster-Shafer theory provides the appropriate probability kinematics for the model