Deflating Truth about Taste

In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter is accepted, a local counterexample to IA can be constructed. We focus on the domain of basic taste and we develop two variants of a subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology that seems palatable in that domain. Although we undertake no commitment to this being the right metaphysical cum epistemological package for basic taste, we contend that if the metaphysics and the epistemology of basic taste are understood along these lines, they call for a truth property whose nature is not distinctively normative—contra what IA predicts. This result shows that the success of IA requires certain substantial metaphysical and epistemological principles and that, consequently, a proper assessment of IA cannot avoid taking a stance on the metaphysics and the epistemology of the domain where it is claimed to be successful. Although we conjecture that IA might succeed in other domains, in this paper we don’t take a stand on this issue. We conclude by briefly discussing the significance of this result for the debate on alethic pluralism

Alethic deflationism and normativity: a critique = Deflacionismo alético e normatividade: uma crítica

O artigo começa destacando que praticamente ninguém se opõe a reivindicações como "considerar uma afirmação, uma crença ou um pensamento como verdadeiro ou falso é considerá-lo como correto ou errado" - uma afirmação que mostra que a verdade é intrinsecamente normativa. Sabe-se que os deflacionistas aléticos negam isso. Paul Horwich, por exemplo, sustenta que nada mostra que a verdade é um conceito normativo da maneira que deveria ser. Ao confiar em uma distinção entre as dimensões da normatividade, tentarei identificar a fraqueza do argumento de Horwich no fato de que ele trabalha com uma interpretação de normatividade forte, desnecessária, quando uma interpretação mais fraca seria mais do que suficiente. No entanto, a impressão pode persistir de que uma compreensão diferente da normatividade da verdade por parte dos deflacionistas poderia eventualmente mostrar a compatibilidade entre o deflacionismo e a normatividade alética. A parte restante do artigo dedica-se a afirmar que esta é uma impressão errada. Por conseguinte, afirma-se que a normatividade exercida pela verdade é imputável, em última análise, ao mundo, e a reivindicação provocativa é defendida de que o deflacionismo alético não possui os recursos conceituais para explicar a relação entre a linguagem e o mund

alethic deflationism and normativity a critique

The paper starts by highlighting that virtually nobody would object to claims such as "to regard an assertion or a belief or a thought as true or false is to regard it as being right or wrong"—a claim that shows that truth is intrinsically normative. It is well known that alethic deflationists deny this. Paul Horwich, for instance, maintains that nothing shows that TRUTH is a normative concept in the way that OUGHT is. By relying on a distinction among dimensions of normativity I will try to pinpoint the weakness of Horwich's argument in the fact that he works with a strong, uncalled-for, interpretation of normativity, whereas a weaker interpretation is more than enough. However, the impression might persist that a different understanding of the normativity of truth on the part of deflationists could eventually show the compatibility between alethic deflationism and normativity. The remaining part of the paper is devoted to contend that this is a wrong impression. Accordingly, it is stated that the normativity exerted by truth is ascribable in the final analysis to the world, and the provocative claim is defended that alethic deflationism lacks the conceptual resources to account for the relation between language and the world.***Deflacionismo Alético e Normatividade: Uma Crítica***O artigo começa destacando que praticamente ninguém se opõe a reivindicações como "considerar uma afirmação, uma crença ou um pensamento como verdadeiro ou falso é considerá-lo como correto ou errado" - uma afirmação que mostra que a verdade é intrinsecamente normativa. Sabe-se que os deflacionistas aléticos negam isso. Paul Horwich, por exemplo, sustenta que nada mostra que a verdade é um conceito normativo da maneira que deveria ser. Ao confiar em uma distinção entre as dimensões da normatividade, tentarei identificar a fraqueza do argumento de Horwich no fato de que ele trabalha com uma interpretação de normatividade forte, desnecessária, quando uma interpretação mais fraca seria mais do que suficiente. No entanto, a impressão pode persistir de que uma compreensão diferente da normatividade da verdade por parte dos deflacionistas poderia eventualmente mostrar a compatibilidade entre o deflacionismo e a normatividade alética. A parte restante do artigo dedica-se a afirmar que esta é uma impressão errada. Por conseguinte, afirma-se que a normatividade exercida pela verdade é imputável, em última análise, ao mundo, e a reivindicação provocativa é defendida de que o deflacionismo alético não possui os recursos conceituais para explicar a relação entre a linguagem e o mundo

Pluralism and Normativity in Truth and Logic

In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a).1 Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible

Locating epistemic value

Many epistemologists are attracted to the idea that knowledge is valuable in a way that stands out when compared to the value of other doxastic attitudes. Some philosophers, including Linda Zagzebski, Jonathan Kvanvig, Richard Swinburne, and Duncan Pritchard have objected to contemporary theories of knowledge on the grounds that the analyses these theories offer fail to sufficiently distinguish knowledge from mere true belief. One particularly clear instance of this is the Swamping Problem for Process Reliabilism. Goldman and Olsson try to respond to the Swamping Problem on behalf of Reliabilism. In what follows, I first try to motivate and defend an approach to epistemic value. Then I review the Swamping Problem and evaluate Goldman and Olsson’s response to it. Finding their response unsatisfying, I suggest that we try to satisfy Zagzebski et al. by introducing a theory of understanding which answers to the intuitions many endorse about epistemic value.Philosoph

The Tenability of Meaning Irrealism

The Kripke-Wittgenstein (KW) sceptical argument, presented in Chapter 2 of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982), concludes that there are no meaning facts. While realism has been denied for a great many subject matters, the meaning irrealism motivated by KW’s argument has particularly far-reaching consequences. This thesis is an investigation into some of these consequences, in an effort to determine what is at stake in accepting the argument as sound. In Chapter 2, I summarise the argument, assume that it is sound, and consider the consequences for one particular body of talk: discourse about meaning itself. Three models for characterising that discourse are canvassed: error-theory, non-factualism, and mere minimalism. The latter characterisation is made available by adopting the framework for realism debates proposed by Crispin Wright in Truth and Objectivity (1992), of which I give an exposition in Chapter 1. I find in Chapter 2 that the three models of meaning discourse each face serious problems, and that the upshot is a form of meaning eliminativism: there is no value in ascribing meaning. In Chapter 3, I generalise from that discussion and consider the consequences of KW’s sceptical argument for any discourse. I find that we appear forced to adopt what I call global eliminative strong non-factualism, on which no sentence is (1) apt for even minimal truth, (2) correct or incorrect with respect to any norm, and thus (3) such that there would be value lost in abandoning the practice of uttering it. While I find, then, no outright inconsistency in the acceptance of KW’s sceptical argument as sound, it is found to be untenable to do so. If these considerations are correct, then without a straight solution to KW’s argument there is no value in talking at all

Essays on Postdeflationary Substantive Theorizing about Truth

This dissertation explores the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. Postdeflationary theories define the concept of truth or the property of being a true truthbearer in a way that respects the deflationary desiderata of clarity, purity, and metaphysical simplicity, without a necessary commitment to the core negative thesis of the deflationary approach. Postdeflationary substantive theories further acknowledge the complexity and explanatory utility of truth in understanding and defining other concepts and phenomena. The motivation for pursuing this study arises from the so-called contemporary crisis of truth, where a substantive understanding of truth is subjected to widespread skepticism, critique, and even cynicism both inside and outside of philosophy in formal and mundane discourse. To better understand this crisis, particular attention is directed towards the deflationary critique of substantive theories of truth, which is a prevalent point of discussion in contemporary literature on western analytic philosophy. By exploring the limits and philosophical sustainability of deflationary critique of substantive accounts of truth, valuable insight is gained about the contemporary crisis of truth and the potential for substantive theorizing about truth in general. This dissertation composes of an introduction and four original research publications that address two connected themes: exploration of the philosophical sustainability of deflationary critique of substantive theories of truth, and exploration of the prospects for development of the now popular substantive pluralist theories of truth. These themes constitute both negative and positive aspects in relation to analyzing the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. The first part of this dissertation focuses on arguing against the widespread deflationary readings of W.V.O. Quine’s truth, who is widely interpreted as a prominent and influential deflationist in both the secondary literature on his philosophy and contemporary truth-theoretic debates more broadly conceived. The first essay demonstrates that Quine’s immanent conception of truth involves commitments that are incompatible with general and theory-specific framings of the deflationary thesis. The second essay demonstrates conflicts between Quine’s views and what has in recent literature been argued as strong and moderate variants of the deflationary thesis. In conclusion, these essays demonstrate that the widespread deflationary readings of Quine’s truth are mistaken, thus removing a prominent thinker from the deflationists ranks while simultaneously casting suspicion towards the philosophical sustainability of the deflationary approach in general. The second part of this dissertation explores the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth by analyzing the limits and prospects for development of the increasingly popular substantive pluralist theories. The third essay explores different ways in which semantic ambiguity poses trouble for current pluralist models. The fourth essay argues that to achieve the theoretical desiderata that pluralists ask from discourse domains, the latter ought to be individuated on ontological rather than topical grounds. In conclusion, these essays demonstrate that while current pluralist models involve shortcomings, they encompass potential for development and provide a viable prospect for sustainable postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth

Valistuksen perinnöt: Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen kollokvion esitelmiä

Valistuksen perinnöt -kokoelman kirjoitukset pohjautuvat Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen samannimisessä kollokviossa Turussa 12.–13.8.2021 pidettyihin esitelmiin. Kiitos kuuluu seuraaville: järjestelytoimikunnalle tapahtuman järjestämisestä, Turun yliopistolle tiloista ja tekniikasta, filosofian oppiaineen tutkijoille puheenjohtajuuksista sekä erityisesti tietenkin esitelmöitsijöille ja yleisölle.Vuonna 2020 alkanut koronapandemia varjosti kollokvion järjestämistä. Perinteisesti tammikuussa pidettäväksi suunniteltu tapahtuma siirrettiin vallitsevan tautitilanteen takia elokuulle. Kollokvio päädyttiin lopulta pitämään ensimmäistä kertaa niin sanottuna hybriditapahtumana. Osa esitelmistä pidettiin luentosaleissa paikan päällä, osa etäyhteyden välityksellä. Paikan päällä Publicumissa oli kumpanakin päivänä parikymmentä osallistujaa maskeissaan. Zoom-yhteyden kautta esitelmiä seurasi parhaimmillaan useita kymmeniä. Muutamista pienistä teknisistä vastoinkäymisistä huolimatta kompromissiratkaisu vaikutti riittävän onnistuneelta järjestäjien saadessa kiitosta sekä mahdollisuudesta osallistua kollokvioon perinteiseen tapaan että mahdollisuudesta osallistua kollokvioon etänä. Toki tapahtuman yhteisöllisyys jäi aikaisempia kollokvioita vaillinaisemmaksi, kun keskustelu ei aivan samalla tavalla voinut jatkua tauoilla, eikä kollokvioillallistakaan voitu vallitsevissa olosuhteissa järjestää.Yhteensä kollokviossa pidettiin 30 esitelmää, joista kolmasosa löytyy artikkelimuotoon viimeisteltyinä tästä kokoelmasta. Osassa kokoelman kirjoituksissa tarkastellaan valistusta ja sen perintöä klassikkotutkimuksesta käsin, osassa valistuksen projektiin liittyvät kysymykset ja mahdolliset ongelmat tuodaan tähän päivään. Useissa kirjoituksissa nämä kaksi näkökulmaa yhdistyvät. Tämä on luontevaa, sillä valistuksella ei tarkoiteta vain 1600-luvun lopulta 1700-luvun loppuun sijoittuvaa aatehistoriallista ajanjaksoa, joka monin tavoin uudelleen määritti varsinkin eurooppalaista yhteiskuntaelämää. Kyse on myös idearyppäästä, joka perustavalla tavalla määrittää edelleen yhteiskuntaamme, sen instituutioita ja ylipäätään tapaamme suhtautua erilaisiin sosiaalisiin, poliittisiin ja filosofisiin kysymyksiin. Saman-aikaisesti valistuksen perintö näyttäytyy jännitteisenä: Ovatko valistuksen ihanteet ja päämäärät, kuten kansalaisten perusvapaudet ja -oikeudet tai yleispätevien totuuksien tavoittelu, kenties uhattuina tänä päivänä? Miten valistuksen projektiin ylipäätään tulisi suhtautua 2000-luvulla?Valistus ei toisaalta ole koskaan ollut sen enempää aatteellisesti kuin siihen liitetyiltä ideoiltaankaan yhtenäinen tai selvärajainen hanke. Valistuksen perintö on pikemminkin hajanainen kuin ehyt – juuri tästä syystä järjestelytoimikunta päätyi kollokvion nimessä korostamaan hiukan suomen kielen konventioiden vastaisesti valistuksen perintöjä.Valistuksen moniulotteisuus korostui myös kollokvioesitelmissä ja näkyy siten myös tämän kokoelman sisällössä. Valistuksen projektia voidaan tarkastella useista eri näkökulmista, mikä tarjoaa erinomaiset puitteet monipuolisille filosofisille pohdinnoille. Kokoelman kirjoituksissa tarkastellaan muun muassa sukupuolten välistä tasa-arvoa, rationaalisuuden vaatimusta, metafysiikan asemaa suhteessa valistukseen, valistusajattelija Anders Chydeniuksen elämää ja oikeusajattelua, Hegelin valistuskritiikkiä, anarkismin perinnettä, tieteen ja tekniikan kehitykseen liittyviä kysymyksiä, valistukseen liitetyn eettisen ajattelutavan ja yksilökäsityksen rajoja sekä puolustetaan totuutta.Keskustelu valistuksesta ja valistuksen projektin merkittävyydestä jatkuu. Helmikuun 24. päivä alkanut Venäjän laajamittainen hyökkäys Ukrainaan tuo keskusteluun oman sävynsä.</p