The MIMO Iterative Waterfilling Algorithm

This paper considers the non-cooperative maximization of mutual information in the vector Gaussian interference channel in a fully distributed fashion via game theory. This problem has been widely studied in a number of works during the past decade for frequency-selective channels, and recently for the more general MIMO case, for which the state-of-the art results are valid only for nonsingular square channel matrices. Surprisingly, these results do not hold true when the channel matrices are rectangular and/or rank deficient matrices. The goal of this paper is to provide a complete characterization of the MIMO game for arbitrary channel matrices, in terms of conditions guaranteeing both the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and the convergence of asynchronous distributed iterative waterfilling algorithms. Our analysis hinges on new technical intermediate results, such as a new expression for the MIMO waterfilling projection valid (also) for singular matrices, a mean-value theorem for complex matrix-valued functions, and a general contraction theorem for the multiuser MIMO watefilling mapping valid for arbitrary channel matrices. The quite surprising result is that uniqueness/convergence conditions in the case of tall (possibly singular) channel matrices are more restrictive than those required in the case of (full rank) fat channel matrices. We also propose a modified game and algorithm with milder conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium and convergence, and virtually the same performance (in terms of Nash equilibria) of the original game.Comment: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing (accepted

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Real and Complex Monotone Communication Games

Noncooperative game-theoretic tools have been increasingly used to study many important resource allocation problems in communications, networking, smart grids, and portfolio optimization. In this paper, we consider a general class of convex Nash Equilibrium Problems (NEPs), where each player aims to solve an arbitrary smooth convex optimization problem. Differently from most of current works, we do not assume any specific structure for the players' problems, and we allow the optimization variables of the players to be matrices in the complex domain. Our main contribution is the design of a novel class of distributed (asynchronous) best-response- algorithms suitable for solving the proposed NEPs, even in the presence of multiple solutions. The new methods, whose convergence analysis is based on Variational Inequality (VI) techniques, can select, among all the equilibria of a game, those that optimize a given performance criterion, at the cost of limited signaling among the players. This is a major departure from existing best-response algorithms, whose convergence conditions imply the uniqueness of the NE. Some of our results hinge on the use of VI problems directly in the complex domain; the study of these new kind of VIs also represents a noteworthy innovative contribution. We then apply the developed methods to solve some new generalizations of SISO and MIMO games in cognitive radios and femtocell systems, showing a considerable performance improvement over classical pure noncooperative schemes.Comment: to appear on IEEE Transactions in Information Theor

A Non-Cooperative Game Theoretical Approach For Power Control In Virtual MIMO Wireless Sensor Network

Power management is one of the vital issue in wireless sensor networks, where the lifetime of the network relies on battery powered nodes. Transmitting at high power reduces the lifetime of both the nodes and the network. One efficient way of power management is to control the power at which the nodes transmit. In this paper, a virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network (VMIMO-WSN)communication architecture is considered and the power control of sensor nodes based on the approach of game theory is formulated. The use of game theory has proliferated, with a broad range of applications in wireless sensor networking. Approaches from game theory can be used to optimize node level as well as network wide performance. The game here is categorized as an incomplete information game, in which the nodes do not have complete information about the strategies taken by other nodes. For virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network architecture considered, the Nash equilibrium is used to decide the optimal power level at which a node needs to transmit, to maximize its utility. Outcome shows that the game theoretic approach considered for VMIMO-WSN architecture achieves the best utility, by consuming less power.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

Mean Field Energy Games in Wireless Networks

This work tackles the problem of energy-efficient distributed power control in wireless networks with a large number of transmitters. The problem is modeled by a dynamic game. Each transmitter-receiver communication is characterized by a state given by the available energy and/or the individual channel state and whose evolution is governed by certain dynamics. Since equilibrium analysis in such a (stochastic) game is generally difficult and even impossible, the problem is approximated by exploiting the large system assumption. Under an appropriate exchangeability assumption, the corresponding mean field game is well defined and studied in detail for special cases. The main contribution of this work is to show how mean field games can be applied to the problem under investigation and provide illustrative numerical results. Our results indicate that this approach can lead to significant gains in terms of energy-efficiency at the resulting equilibrium.Comment: IEEE Proc. of Asilomar Conf. on Signals, Systems, and Computers, Nov. 2012, Pacific Grove, CA, US