Dynamic MDS Matrices for Substantial Cryptographic Strength

Ciphers get their strength from the mathematical functions of confusion and diffusion, also known as substitution and permutation. These were the basics of classical cryptography and they are still the basic part of modern ciphers. In block ciphers diffusion is achieved by the use of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) matrices. In this paper we present some methods for constructing dynamic (and random) MDS matrices.Comment: Short paper at WISA'10, 201

Securing Real-Time Internet-of-Things

Modern embedded and cyber-physical systems are ubiquitous. A large number of critical cyber-physical systems have real-time requirements (e.g., avionics, automobiles, power grids, manufacturing systems, industrial control systems, etc.). Recent developments and new functionality requires real-time embedded devices to be connected to the Internet. This gives rise to the real-time Internet-of-things (RT-IoT) that promises a better user experience through stronger connectivity and efficient use of next-generation embedded devices. However RT- IoT are also increasingly becoming targets for cyber-attacks which is exacerbated by this increased connectivity. This paper gives an introduction to RT-IoT systems, an outlook of current approaches and possible research challenges towards secure RT- IoT frameworks

Synesthesia: Detecting Screen Content via Remote Acoustic Side Channels

We show that subtle acoustic noises emanating from within computer screens can be used to detect the content displayed on the screens. This sound can be picked up by ordinary microphones built into webcams or screens, and is inadvertently transmitted to other parties, e.g., during a videoconference call or archived recordings. It can also be recorded by a smartphone or "smart speaker" placed on a desk next to the screen, or from as far as 10 meters away using a parabolic microphone. Empirically demonstrating various attack scenarios, we show how this channel can be used for real-time detection of on-screen text, or users' input into on-screen virtual keyboards. We also demonstrate how an attacker can analyze the audio received during video call (e.g., on Google Hangout) to infer whether the other side is browsing the web in lieu of watching the video call, and which web site is displayed on their screen

Power Side Channels in Security ICs: Hardware Countermeasures

Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat to many cryptographic-equipped devices including smart cards, encrypted FPGA designs, and mobile phones. Designers and manufacturers of cryptographic devices have in response developed various countermeasures for protection. Attacking methods have also evolved to counteract resistant implementations. This paper reviews foundational power analysis attack techniques and examines a variety of hardware design mitigations. The aim is to highlight exposed vulnerabilities in hardware-based countermeasures for future more secure implementations

Ultralow-Power and Secure S-Box Circuit Using FinFET Based ECRL Adiabatic Logic

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the widely used technique in critical cyber security applications. In AES architecture S-box is the most important block. However, the power consumed by      S-box is 75% of the total AES design. The   S-box is also prone to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack which is one of the most threatening types of attacks in cryptographic systems. In this paper, a     three-stage positive polarity Reed-Muller (PPRM) S-box is implemented with 45nm FinFET using Efficient Charge Recovery Logic (ECRL) to reduce power consumption. The simulation results indicate up to 66% power savings for FinFET based S-box as compared to CMOS design. Further, the FinFET ECRL 8-bit     S-box circuit is evaluated for transitional energy fluctuations and peak current traces to compare its resistance against side-channel attacks. The lower energy variations and uniform current trace exhibit the improved security performance of the circuit to withstand DPA and Differential Electromagnetic Radiation Attacks (DEMA)

Side channel attacks on smart home systems: A short overview

This paper provides an overview on side-channel attacks with emphasis on vulnerabilities in the smart home. Smart homes are enabled by the latest developments in sensors, communication technologies, internet protocols, and cloud services. The goal of a smart home is to have smart household devices collaborate without involvement of residents to deliver the variety of services needed for a higher quality of life. However, security and privacy challenges of smart homes have to be overcome in order to fully realize the smart home. Side channel attacks assume data is always leaking, and leakage of data from a smart home reveals sensitive information. This paper starts by reviewing side-channel attack categories, then it gives an overview on recent attack studies on different layers of a smart home and their malicious goals