Multi-item Auctions for Automatic Negotiation

Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as a market in which there are vendor agents and buyer agents trading on items representing the resources. These agents use multi-item auctions which are viewed here as a process of automatic negotiation, and implemented as a network of intelligent software agents. In this negotiation, agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities which let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. For example, the "richer" an agent is, the more items it can buy, i.e. the more resources it can acquire. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, then we discuss experimental evidence of such a model. Dans un environnement multiagent, les ressources peuvent toujours s'avérer insuffisantes relativement à un nombre élevé de demandes. Dans ce cahier, nous proposons une approche mixant les enchères et les agents logiciels en vue de contribuer à résoudre ce problème. Cette approche consiste en fait à utiliser le mécanisme d'enchères multi-articles en vue d'allouer les ressources à un ensemble d'agents. À cet effet, nous considérons le problème de ressources comme un marché dans lequel évoluent des agents acheteurs et des agents vendeurs négociant des articles représentant des ressources. Ces agents utilisent des enchères multi-articles et par conséquent ils constituent un processus de négociation automatisé et programmé comme un réseau d'agents logiciels. Dans ce type de négociation, chaque agent exhibe différentes capacités d'acquisition lui permettant ainsi d'agir différemment selon le contexte ou la situation de marché. Par exemple, plus on est riche, plus on peut acheter d'articles. Nous présentons pour ce modèle une enchère anglaise et nous discuterons ses résultats expérimentaux.Multi-agent systems, Negotiations, Multi-item auctions, Systèmes multiagents, négociations, enchères multi items

Panel 11 Web-based Auctions: Theoretical Issues and Practical Experience

Auctions are formalized trading procedures in which the trading partners’ interaction is governed by specific rules for competi- tive bidding and trade execution. Auction markets provide procedures for the exposure of purchase and sales orders to the market participants in order to determine the price of trade objects. Empirically, we find a multiplicity of auction types with different trade objects, access rules for participants, and trading rules

A Last-Minute E-Auction for Hotel Rooms

Electronic auctions have rapidly become one of the most widespread applications in electronic commerce. Within e-auctions, the online products are almost anything imaginable such as electronic parts, artwork, vacation packages, airline tickets, etc. In this paper, the reverse auction was implemented by proposing a suitable bidding mechanism for perishable products like hotel rooms. These vacant rooms should be sold as soon as possible before their value zeroes. Therefore, the Last-Minute Auction not only helps the buyers get their desired rooms, but also helps the hotels to selling their rooms in time. The research combined the Hungarian algorithm and Branch-and-Bound search to match the buyers\u27 demand and the sellers\u27 supply and optimizing the auction site’s revenue

A Double-Sided Multiunit Combinatorial Auction for Substitutes: Theory and Algorithms

Combinatorial exchanges have existed for a long time in securities markets. In these auctions buyers and sellers can place orders on combinations, or bundles of different securities. These orders are conjunctive: they are matched only if the full bundle is available. On business-to-business (B2B) exchanges, buyers have the choice to receive the same product with different attributes; for instance the same product can be produced by different sellers. A buyer indicates his preference by submitting a disjunctive order, where he specifies how much of the product he wants, and how much he values each attribute. Only the goods with the best attributes and prices will be matched. This article considers a doubled-sided multi-unit combinatorial auction for substitutes, that is, a uniform price auction where buyers and sellers place both types of orders, conjunctive and disjunctive. We prove the existence of a linear price which is both competitive and surplus-maximizing when goods are perfectly divisible, and nearly so otherwise. We describe an algorithm to clear the market, which is particularly efficient when the number of traders is large.Combinatorial auction, economic equilibrium

Assessing Online B2B Utilization Among Business Owners in Bayan Lepas Pulau Pinang

This project paper discusses the assessing online B2B utilization among businesses owners in Bayan Lepas, Pulau Pinang. This study involves 103 respondents who were selected via judgement sampling technique. They were asked not only on their assessing towards B2B but also the factors influencing them to use B2B in running their businesses. The analyses show that the samples’ perceptions towards B2B are not nearly positive while the independent variables (confident, experience and knowledge, service and attitude) listed in the model do not significantly correlate with the dependent variable (B2B online usage). Even though there are so many businesses owners know the online transaction and run their business through online but they still could not have a confident and knowledge regarding B2B. In the nutshell, B2B is not really popular among businesses’ owners in Bayan Lepas, Pulau Pinang

A Global Comparative Study of Online Auction Markets

Online auctions have demonstrated how e-commerce can transform business, and not merely transplanting conventional processes to a new medium. The resulting emergence and growth of diverse markets pose the intriguing question of what ‘shape’ a given market is in at a particular moment of development. The approach of Topological Analysis, which is based on the Star Plot method in data visualization, provides such a model using only operational data, without any expert knowledge of the specific auction market, or financial details from the transactions. Using extensive analysis of data available on eBay.com, the foremost online auction platform to date, a global comparative study of four markets in eight countries is conducted. The results shed light on the evolution of electronic markets, as well as their regional and cultural variations

An explanatory study on electronic commerce for reverse logistics.

In this paper we consider the role Electronic Commerce plays and can play for Reverse Logistics. After short introductions to electronic commerce and reverse logistics, we give an overview of existing internet sites for reverse logistics. These sites can be classified as electronic markets, supply of used parts and complete reverse logistic solutions. Finally we draw some lines to the future

Multi-item Auctions for Automatic Negotiation

Dans un environnement multiagent, les ressources peuvent toujours s'avérer insuffisantes relativement à un nombre élevé de demandes. Dans ce cahier, nous proposons une approche mixant les enchères et les agents logiciels en vue de contribuer à résoudre ce problème. Cette approche consiste en fait à utiliser le mécanisme d'enchères multi-articles en vue d'allouer les ressources à un ensemble d'agents. À cet effet, nous considérons le problème de ressources comme un marché dans lequel évoluent des agents acheteurs et des agents vendeurs négociant des articles représentant des ressources. Ces agents utilisent des enchères multi-articles et par conséquent ils constituent un processus de négociation automatisé et programmé comme un réseau d'agents logiciels. Dans ce type de négociation, chaque agent exhibe différentes capacités d'acquisition lui permettant ainsi d'agir différemment selon le contexte ou la situation de marché. Par exemple, plus on est riche, plus on peut acheter d'articles. Nous présentons pour ce modèle une enchère anglaise et nous discuterons ses résultats expérimentaux.Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as a market in which there are vendor agents and buyer agents trading on items representing the resources. These agents use multi-item auctions which are viewed here as a process of automatic negotiation, and implemented as a network of intelligent software agents. In this negotiation, agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities which let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. For example, the "richer" an agent is, the more items it can buy, i.e. the more resources it can acquire. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, then we discuss experimental evidence of such a model

An Empirical Classification of Bidders in Online Auctions

Auctions have been a popular way of transaction on the Internet. Most of the studies of auction assume participants attending the auction are homogeneous. However, this assumption is open to question. In fact, every participant has his own personality, risk attitude, behavior, and cost when attending online auctions. This study takes an empirical approach and uses four variables, time of entry, time of exit, number of bids, and number of jump bids, to find the heterogeneity among bidders. We first used k-means clustering method to identify the types of bidders of online auctions, and then used C5.0 decision tree learning algorithm to find the rules to differentiate bidders. A taxonomy of four types of bidders is proposed in the study, which include observers, adventurers, opportunists, and early players. The results also suggest pacing of the auctions is an important factor that will affect bidder’s behavior in online auctions