Fuzzy measures and integrals in MCDA

This chapter aims at a unified presentation of various methods of MCDA based onfuzzy measures (capacity) and fuzzy integrals, essentially the Choquet andSugeno integral. A first section sets the position of the problem ofmulticriteria decision making, and describes the various possible scales ofmeasurement (difference, ratio, and ordinal). Then a whole section is devotedto each case in detail: after introducing necessary concepts, the methodologyis described, and the problem of the practical identification of fuzzy measuresis given. The important concept of interaction between criteria, central inthis chapter, is explained in details. It is shown how it leads to k-additivefuzzy measures. The case of bipolar scales leads to thegeneral model based on bi-capacities, encompassing usual models based oncapacities. A general definition of interaction for bipolar scales isintroduced. The case of ordinal scales leads to the use of Sugeno integral, andits symmetrized version when one considers symmetric ordinal scales. Apractical methodology for the identification of fuzzy measures in this contextis given. Lastly, we give a short description of some practical applications.Choquet integral; fuzzy measure; interaction; bi-capacities

Fuzzy judgment in bargaining games : diverse patterns of price determination and transaction in buyer-seller exchange

game theory;bargaining

A decade of application of the Choquet and Sugeno integrals in multi-criteria decision aid

The main advances regarding the use of the Choquet and Sugeno integrals in multi-criteria decision aid over the last decade are reviewed. They concern mainly a bipolar extension of both the Choquet integral and the Sugeno integral, interesting particular submodels, new learning techniques, a better interpretation of the models and a better use of the Choquet integral in multi-criteria decision aid. Parallel to these theoretical works, the Choquet integral has been applied to many new fields, and several softwares and libraries dedicated to this model have been developed.Choquet integral, Sugeno integral, capacity, bipolarity, preferences

Nonlinear Interval Parameter Programming Combined with Cooperative Games: a Tool for Addressing Uncertainty in Water Allocation Using Water Diplomacy Framework

This paper shows the utility of a new interval cooperative game theory as an effective water diplomacy tool to resolve competing and conflicting needs of water users from different sectors including agriculture, domestic, industry and environment. Interval parameter programming is applied in combination with cooperative game theoretic concepts such as Shapley values and the Nucleolus to provide mutually beneficial solutions for water allocation problems under uncertainty. The allocation problem consists of two steps: water resources are initially allocated to water users based on the Nash bargaining model and the achieved nonlinear interval parameter model is solved by transforming it into a problem with a deterministic weighted objective function. Water amounts and net benefits are reallocated to achieve efficient water usage through net benefit transfers. The net benefit reallocation is done by the application of different cooperative game theoretical methods. Then, the optimization problem is solved by linear interval programming and by converting it into a problem with two deterministic objective functions. The suggested model is then applied to the Zarrinehrud sub-basin, within Urmia Lake basin in Northwestern Iran. Findings suggest that a reframing of the problem using cooperative strategies within the context of water diplomacy framework - creating flexibility in water allocation using mutual gains approach - provides better outcomes for all competing users of water

Structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality

The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little effect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set. We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully rational agents) varies continuously with the parameter values of the model. Our notions of a model and of rationality are quite broad, allowing us to cover cases in which bounded rationality refers to imperfect optimization, non-rational expectations, or arbitrary behavior by a subset of agents. We show that a model is robust to bounded rationality if and only if it is structurally stable. Thus, we can characterize which models will be robust to bounded rationality and which ones will not, independently of the exact form that bounded rationality takes. In addition, from our characterization it follows that introducing a small amount of bounded rationality will have large effects on predicted outcomes if and only if parameters are near a critical point where the equilibrium set changes in a discontinuous way JEL classification: C69, C79, D51, E19

Household Models: An Historical Perspective

This paper is a survey of the literature on theoretical models of the household, paying particular attention to some of the earlier contributions, and using them to place the current state of the theory in perspective. One of its aims is to suggest that the literature’s neglect of Samuelson’s proposal, that households can be modelled as if they maximised a form of social welfare function, was a mistake. However, the idea following directly from the Nash bargaining models, that the household’s preference ordering over the utility profiles of its members depends on exogenous variables, in particular wage rates and non-wage incomes, is an important one. Combined with Samuelson’s proposal, it can be made the basis for a general approach to modelling household decision taking, flexible enough to encompass non-cooperative behaviour and Pareto inefficiencies arising out of the inevitable incompleteness and unenforceability of domestic agreements. We also point out the importance of household production and some of the implications of its neglect in modelling households. Above all, the aim is to provide a deeper understanding of the current theoretical literature on household economics by means of a survey of its history.household behavior, family economics, household welfare, time allocation, labor supply, household production, child care, gender, discrimination, cooperative models, non-cooperative models, trade models, microeconomic history

Iterative Methods for Stochastic Variational Inequalities

In this work, we consider stochastic variational inequalities arising from a certain class of equilibrium problems with uncertainties. Uncertainties in the models are introduced through data that are known through their probabilistic distributions. We consider several extragradient methods for the solutions of the variational inequalities and compare their relative efficiency and eectiveness through thorough numerical comparisons. Several applications such as trac equilibrium, environmental games, and oligopolistic market equilibrium are considered