37,494 research outputs found

    Internet Auctions: Description, Bidders' Profiles and Implications

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    The increasing quantity of items bough and sold over the internet led to the success of internet auctions, to the introduction of new auction rules and the creation of new businesses and merger among existing ones. In this paper, we present a description of existing internet auction rules and typical profile of consumers who use them. We found that bidders are most likely located in the U.S., have some internet experience and skills and that they belong to the 26-50 years old age group. We also discuss the implication of online auctions on resource allocation.Internet Auctions, Online Auctions

    Bidding Strategies in Internet Yankee Auctions

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    A bidding strategy commonly observed in Internet auctions, though not frequently in live auctions, is that of "jump-bidding," or entering a bid larger than necessary to be a current high bidder. In this paper, we argue that the cost associated with entering on-line bids and the uncertainty concerning bidding competition -- both of which distinguish Internet from live auctions -- can explain this phenomenon. We present a simple theoretical model that accounts for the preceding characteristics, and derive the conditions under which jump-bidding constitutes an equilibrium strategy in a format commonly used for on- line trading, the Yankee Auctionâ. We then present evidence recorded from hundreds of Internet auctions that is consistent with the basic predictions from our model. We find that jump-bidding is more likely earlier in an Internet auction, when jumping has a larger strategic value, and that the incentives to jump bid increase as bidder competition becomes stronger. Several of our results have implications for starting bid and minimum bid increment rules set by Internet auction houses. We also discuss possible means of reducing bidding costs, and evidence that Internet auctioneers are pursuing this goal.internet auctions, bidding costs, jump bidding

    Economic Insights from Internet Auctions: A Survey

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    This paper surveys recent studies of Internet auctions. Four main areas of research are summarized. First, economists have documented strategic bidding in these markets and attempted to understand why sniping, or bidding at the last second, occurs. Second, some researchers have measured distortions from asymmetric information due, for instance, to the winner's curse. Third, we explore research about the role of reputation in online auctions. Finally, we discuss what Internet auctions have to teach us about auction design.

    An Experimental Assessment of Confederate Reserve Price Bids in Online Auction

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    internet auctions, bid shilling, reserve price, internet fraud, market design

    Sequential Internet Auctions with Different Ending Rules

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    Two ending rules, a soft close and a hard close, exist in Internet auctions. In hard close auctions, each auction ends with a fixed deadline determined by a seller. In soft close auctions, the end time automatically extends if at least one bid is submitted in the last few minutes, so each buyer has an opportunity to reply to other buyers' bids. The reserve prices set by the seller in hard close auctions are higher than the reserve prices in soft close auctions. The result is consistent with data of DS Lite auctions in Yahoo! Japan.

    Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction

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    In second price internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders ‘snipe’, i.e., they submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. Late bids of this sort are much less frequent in auctions that are automatically extended if a bid is submitted very late, as in auctions conducted on Amazon. We propose a model of second price internet auctions, in which very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and show that sniping in a fixed deadline auction can occur even at equilibrium in auctions with private values, as well as in auctions with uncertain, dependent values. Sniping in fixed-deadline auctions also arises out of equilibrium, as a best reply to incremental bidding. However, the strategic advantages of sniping are eliminated or severely attenuated in auctions that apply the automatic extension rule. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the field data. There is more sniping on eBay than on Amazon, and this difference grows with experience. We also study the incidence of multiple bidding, and its relation to late bidding. It appears that one substantial cause of late bidding is as a strategic response to incremental bidding.

    Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price Internet Auctions

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    auctions;internet;electronic commerce

    Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions

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    Bidding in the last seconds or minutes of an auction is a common strategy in Internet auctions with fixed end-times. This paper examines the three explanations of late bidding in eBay auctions that survived the first scrutiny in Roth and Ockenfels (2002). There is no indication that late bidding could lead to collusive gains for bidders. Late bidding is a strategic response to the presence of bidders placing multiple bids. Experts protecting their private information are typically the last to bid while collectors are often the first. As bidders gain familiarity with eBay rules, they tend to bid slightly earlierOnline Auctions, Internet, Late Bidding, eBay

    Stochastic Deadlines: A Comparison of Parallel Multiple Auction Designs

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    In online auction platforms, offers are listed side by side and may end at the same point in time. While theoretical studies predict efficient coordination across auctions, experimental and empirical studies observe efficiency losses, i.e. goods remain unsold. In order to mitigate this coordination failure, we contribute to the literature of auction design by introducing a stochastic deadline in parallel multiple auctions. In these parallel Candle Auctions, several auctions start at the same time but end (separately) due to a stochastic process. We think that the stochastic ending rule decreases the coordination failure because the threat of a sudden termination forces the bidders to coordinate across auctions early in the auction process. Indeed, we find that coordination is less pronounced in parallel Candle Auctions resulting in higher efficiencySimultaneous Auctions, Internet, Auction Design, Experimental Economics

    Least Unmatched Price Auctions: A First Approach

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    Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly, they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique) bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize, bidding cost and the number of participants are known. We use a large data-set of such auctions in order to contrast actual behavior of players with game-theoretic predictions. In the aggregate, bidding behaviour seems to conform with a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.games, experiments
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