On Quine's Ontology: quantification, extensionality and naturalism (or from commitment to indifference)

Much of the ontology made in the analytic tradition of philosophy nowadays is founded on some of Quine’s proposals. His naturalism and the binding between existence and quantification are respectively two of his very influential metaphilosophical and methodological theses. Nevertheless, many of his specific claims are quite controversial and contemporaneously have few followers. Some of them are: (a) his rejection of higher-order logic; (b) his resistance in accepting the intensionality of ontological commitments; (c) his rejection of first-order modal logic; and (d) his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. I intend to argue that these controversial negative claims are just interconnected consequences of those much more accepted and apparently less harmful metaphilosophical and methodological theses, and that the glue linking all these consequences to its causes is the notion of extensionality

Kolmogorov Complexity in perspective. Part II: Classification, Information Processing and Duality

We survey diverse approaches to the notion of information: from Shannon entropy to Kolmogorov complexity. Two of the main applications of Kolmogorov complexity are presented: randomness and classification. The survey is divided in two parts published in a same volume. Part II is dedicated to the relation between logic and information system, within the scope of Kolmogorov algorithmic information theory. We present a recent application of Kolmogorov complexity: classification using compression, an idea with provocative implementation by authors such as Bennett, Vitanyi and Cilibrasi. This stresses how Kolmogorov complexity, besides being a foundation to randomness, is also related to classification. Another approach to classification is also considered: the so-called "Google classification". It uses another original and attractive idea which is connected to the classification using compression and to Kolmogorov complexity from a conceptual point of view. We present and unify these different approaches to classification in terms of Bottom-Up versus Top-Down operational modes, of which we point the fundamental principles and the underlying duality. We look at the way these two dual modes are used in different approaches to information system, particularly the relational model for database introduced by Codd in the 70's. This allows to point out diverse forms of a fundamental duality. These operational modes are also reinterpreted in the context of the comprehension schema of axiomatic set theory ZF. This leads us to develop how Kolmogorov's complexity is linked to intensionality, abstraction, classification and information system.Comment: 43 page

Intensional Models for the Theory of Types

In this paper we define intensional models for the classical theory of types, thus arriving at an intensional type logic ITL. Intensional models generalize Henkin's general models and have a natural definition. As a class they do not validate the axiom of Extensionality. We give a cut-free sequent calculus for type theory and show completeness of this calculus with respect to the class of intensional models via a model existence theorem. After this we turn our attention to applications. Firstly, it is argued that, since ITL is truly intensional, it can be used to model ascriptions of propositional attitude without predicting logical omniscience. In order to illustrate this a small fragment of English is defined and provided with an ITL semantics. Secondly, it is shown that ITL models contain certain objects that can be identified with possible worlds. Essential elements of modal logic become available within classical type theory once the axiom of Extensionality is given up.Comment: 25 page

An Intensional Concurrent Faithful Encoding of Turing Machines

The benchmark for computation is typically given as Turing computability; the ability for a computation to be performed by a Turing Machine. Many languages exploit (indirect) encodings of Turing Machines to demonstrate their ability to support arbitrary computation. However, these encodings are usually by simulating the entire Turing Machine within the language, or by encoding a language that does an encoding or simulation itself. This second category is typical for process calculi that show an encoding of lambda-calculus (often with restrictions) that in turn simulates a Turing Machine. Such approaches lead to indirect encodings of Turing Machines that are complex, unclear, and only weakly equivalent after computation. This paper presents an approach to encoding Turing Machines into intensional process calculi that is faithful, reduction preserving, and structurally equivalent. The encoding is demonstrated in a simple asymmetric concurrent pattern calculus before generalised to simplify infinite terms, and to show encodings into Concurrent Pattern Calculus and Psi Calculi.Comment: In Proceedings ICE 2014, arXiv:1410.701

Non‐Classical Knowledge

The Knower paradox purports to place surprising a priori limitations on what we can know. According to orthodoxy, it shows that we need to abandon one of three plausible and widely-held ideas: that knowledge is factive, that we can know that knowledge is factive, and that we can use logical/mathematical reasoning to extend our knowledge via very weak single-premise closure principles. I argue that classical logic, not any of these epistemic principles, is the culprit. I develop a consistent theory validating all these principles by combining Hartry Field's theory of truth with a modal enrichment developed for a different purpose by Michael Caie. The only casualty is classical logic: the theory avoids paradox by using a weaker-than-classical K3 logic. I then assess the philosophical merits of this approach. I argue that, unlike the traditional semantic paradoxes involving extensional notions like truth, its plausibility depends on the way in which sentences are referred to--whether in natural languages via direct sentential reference, or in mathematical theories via indirect sentential reference by Gödel coding. In particular, I argue that from the perspective of natural language, my non-classical treatment of knowledge as a predicate is plausible, while from the perspective of mathematical theories, its plausibility depends on unresolved questions about the limits of our idealized deductive capacities

Invention, Intension and the Limits of Computation

This is a critical exploration of the relation between two common assumptions in anti-computationalist critiques of Artificial Intelligence: The first assumption is that at least some cognitive abilities are specifically human and non-computational in nature, whereas the second assumption is that there are principled limitations to what machine-based computation can accomplish with respect to simulating or replicating these abilities. Against the view that these putative differences between computation in humans and machines are closely related, this essay argues that the boundaries of the domains of human cognition and machine computation might be independently defined, distinct in extension and variable in relation. The argument rests on the conceptual distinction between intensional and extensional equivalence in the philosophy of computing and on an inquiry into the scope and nature of human invention in mathematics, and their respective bearing on theories of computation