Intensional Models for the Theory of Types

In this paper we define intensional models for the classical theory of types, thus arriving at an intensional type logic ITL. Intensional models generalize Henkin's general models and have a natural definition. As a class they do not validate the axiom of Extensionality. We give a cut-free sequent calculus for type theory and show completeness of this calculus with respect to the class of intensional models via a model existence theorem. After this we turn our attention to applications. Firstly, it is argued that, since ITL is truly intensional, it can be used to model ascriptions of propositional attitude without predicting logical omniscience. In order to illustrate this a small fragment of English is defined and provided with an ITL semantics. Secondly, it is shown that ITL models contain certain objects that can be identified with possible worlds. Essential elements of modal logic become available within classical type theory once the axiom of Extensionality is given up.Comment: 25 page

A Theory of Names and True Intensionality

Standard approaches to proper names, based on Kripke's views, hold that the semantic values of expressions are (set-theoretic) functions from possible worlds to extensions and that names are rigid designators, i.e.\ that their values are \emph{constant} functions from worlds to entities. The difficulties with these approaches are well-known and in this paper we develop an alternative. Based on earlier work on a higher order logic that is \emph{truly intensional} in the sense that it does not validate the axiom scheme of Extensionality, we develop a simple theory of names in which Kripke's intuitions concerning rigidity are accounted for, but the more unpalatable consequences of standard implementations of his theory are avoided. The logic uses Frege's distinction between sense and reference and while it accepts the rigidity of names it rejects the view that names have direct reference. Names have constant denotations across possible worlds, but the semantic value of a name is not determined by its denotation

Mechanizing Principia Logico-Metaphysica in Functional Type Theory

Principia Logico-Metaphysica contains a foundational logical theory for metaphysics, mathematics, and the sciences. It includes a canonical development of Abstract Object Theory [AOT], a metaphysical theory (inspired by ideas of Ernst Mally, formalized by Zalta) that distinguishes between ordinary and abstract objects. This article reports on recent work in which AOT has been successfully represented and partly automated in the proof assistant system Isabelle/HOL. Initial experiments within this framework reveal a crucial but overlooked fact: a deeply-rooted and known paradox is reintroduced in AOT when the logic of complex terms is simply adjoined to AOT's specially-formulated comprehension principle for relations. This result constitutes a new and important paradox, given how much expressive and analytic power is contributed by having the two kinds of complex terms in the system. Its discovery is the highlight of our joint project and provides strong evidence for a new kind of scientific practice in philosophy, namely, computational metaphysics. Our results were made technically possible by a suitable adaptation of Benzm\"uller's metalogical approach to universal reasoning by semantically embedding theories in classical higher-order logic. This approach enables one to reuse state-of-the-art higher-order proof assistants, such as Isabelle/HOL, for mechanizing and experimentally exploring challenging logics and theories such as AOT. Our results also provide a fresh perspective on the question of whether relational type theory or functional type theory better serves as a foundation for logic and metaphysics.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figures; preprint of article with same title to appear in The Review of Symbolic Logi

Theory of Concepts

UID/FIL/00183/2013authorsversionpublishe

Analytic Tableaux for Simple Type Theory and its First-Order Fragment

We study simple type theory with primitive equality (STT) and its first-order fragment EFO, which restricts equality and quantification to base types but retains lambda abstraction and higher-order variables. As deductive system we employ a cut-free tableau calculus. We consider completeness, compactness, and existence of countable models. We prove these properties for STT with respect to Henkin models and for EFO with respect to standard models. We also show that the tableau system yields a decision procedure for three EFO fragments

Predication and cognitive context: Between minimalism and contextualism

In this paper, we suggest a strategy for modelling cognitive context within a truth\u2010conditional semantics, using Asher's model of predication. This allows us to introduce the notion of type presupposition intended as a lexical constraint to the composition of the truth\u2010conditional content. More specifi\u2010cally, we suggest that this model of predication produces a notion of truth\u2010conditional meaning where the cognitive context fixes a set of lexical restrictions and forced modifi\u2010cations. We conclude that this model might offer an inter\u2010mediate position between Minimalism and Contextualism: an account that provides intuitive truth conditions within a formal semantic theory

Faithful Semantical Embedding of a Dyadic Deontic Logic in HOL

A shallow semantical embedding of a dyadic deontic logic by Carmo and Jones in classical higher-order logic is presented. This embedding is proven sound and complete, that is, faithful. The work presented here provides the theoretical foundation for the implementation and automation of dyadic deontic logic within off-the-shelf higher-order theorem provers and proof assistants.Comment: 23 pages, 3 figure