A user-oriented network forensic analyser: the design of a high-level protocol analyser

Network forensics is becoming an increasingly important tool in the investigation of cyber and computer-assisted crimes. Unfortunately, whilst much effort has been undertaken in developing computer forensic file system analysers (e.g. Encase and FTK), such focus has not been given to Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs). The single biggest barrier to effective NFATs is the handling of large volumes of low-level traffic and being able to exact and interpret forensic artefacts and their context – for example, being able extract and render application-level objects (such as emails, web pages and documents) from the low-level TCP/IP traffic but also understand how these applications/artefacts are being used. Whilst some studies and tools are beginning to achieve object extraction, results to date are limited to basic objects. No research has focused upon analysing network traffic to understand the nature of its use – not simply looking at the fact a person requested a webpage, but how long they spend on the application and what interactions did they have with whilst using the service (e.g. posting an image, or engaging in an instant message chat). This additional layer of information can provide an investigator with a far more rich and complete understanding of a suspect’s activities. To this end, this paper presents an investigation into the ability to derive high-level application usage characteristics from low-level network traffic meta-data. The paper presents a three application scenarios – web surfing, communications and social networking and demonstrates it is possible to derive the user interactions (e.g. page loading, chatting and file sharing ) within these systems. The paper continues to present a framework that builds upon this capability to provide a robust, flexible and user-friendly NFAT that provides access to a greater range of forensic information in a far easier format

Wanted: Trained Security Specialists\u27

This paper looks at security concerns within the IT industry and how to increase student interest in this field of study. One specific activity is presented as a way to expose students to security concerns they are likely to encounter as a system administrator

Wanted: Trained Security Specialists\u27

This paper looks at security concerns within the IT industry and how to increase student interest in this field of study. One specific activity is presented as a way to expose students to security concerns they are likely to encounter as a system administrator

Why We Cannot (Yet) Ensure the Cybersecurity of Safety-Critical Systems

There is a growing threat to the cyber-security of safety-critical systems. The introduction of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software, including Linux, specialist VOIP applications and Satellite Based Augmentation Systems across the aviation, maritime, rail and power-generation infrastructures has created common, vulnerabilities. In consequence, more people now possess the technical skills required to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in safety-critical systems. Arguably for the first time there is the potential for cross-modal attacks leading to future ‘cyber storms’. This situation is compounded by the failure of public-private partnerships to establish the cyber-security of safety critical applications. The fiscal crisis has prevented governments from attracting and retaining competent regulators at the intersection of safety and cyber-security. In particular, we argue that superficial similarities between safety and security have led to security policies that cannot be implemented in safety-critical systems. Existing office-based security standards, such as the ISO27k series, cannot easily be integrated with standards such as IEC61508 or ISO26262. Hybrid standards such as IEC 62443 lack credible validation. There is an urgent need to move beyond high-level policies and address the more detailed engineering challenges that threaten the cyber-security of safety-critical systems. In particular, we consider the ways in which cyber-security concerns undermine traditional forms of safety engineering, for example by invalidating conventional forms of risk assessment. We also summarise the ways in which safety concerns frustrate the deployment of conventional mechanisms for cyber-security, including intrusion detection systems

Incident Analysis & Digital Forensics in SCADA and Industrial Control Systems

SCADA and industrial control systems have been traditionally isolated in physically protected environments. However, developments such as standardisation of data exchange protocols and increased use of IP, emerging wireless sensor networks and machine-to-machine communication mean that in the near future related threat vectors will require consideration too outside the scope of traditional SCADA security and incident response. In the light of the significance of SCADA for the resilience of critical infrastructures and the related targeted incidents against them (e.g. the development of stuxnet), cyber security and digital forensics emerge as priority areas. In this paper we focus on the latter, exploring the current capability of SCADA operators to analyse security incidents and develop situational awareness based on a robust digital evidence perspective. We look at the logging capabilities of a typical SCADA architecture and the analytical techniques and investigative tools that may help develop forensic readiness to the level of the current threat environment requirements. We also provide recommendations for data capture and retention

Defending Against Firmware Cyber Attacks on Safety-Critical Systems

In the past, it was not possible to update the underlying software in many industrial control devices. Engineering teams had to ‘rip and replace’ obsolete components. However, the ability to make firmware updates has provided significant benefits to the companies who use Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), switches, gateways and bridges as well as an array of smart sensor/actuators. These updates include security patches when vulnerabilities are identified in existing devices; they can be distributed by physical media but are increasingly downloaded over Internet connections. These mechanisms pose a growing threat to the cyber security of safety-critical applications, which are illustrated by recent attacks on safety-related infrastructures across the Ukraine. Subsequent sections explain how malware can be distributed within firmware updates. Even when attackers cannot reverse engineer the code necessary to disguise their attack, they can undermine a device by forcing it into a constant upload cycle where the firmware installation never terminates. In this paper, we present means of mitigating the risks of firmware attack on safety-critical systems as part of wider initiatives to secure national critical infrastructures. Technical solutions, including firmware hashing, must be augmented by organizational measures to secure the supply chain within individual plants, across companies and throughout safety-related industries