836 research outputs found
State of the art of cyber-physical systems security: An automatic control perspective
Cyber-physical systems are integrations of computation, networking, and physical processes. Due to the tight cyber-physical coupling and to the potentially disrupting consequences of failures, security here is one of the primary concerns. Our systematic mapping study sheds light on how security is actually addressed when dealing with cyber-physical systems from an automatic control perspective. The provided map of 138 selected studies is defined empirically and is based on, for instance, application fields, various system components, related algorithms and models, attacks characteristics and defense strategies. It presents a powerful comparison framework for existing and future research on this hot topic, important for both industry and academia
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Security-based resilient event-triggered control of networked control systems under denial of service attacks
This paper is concerned with the security control problem of the networked control system (NCSs) subjected to denial of service (DoS) attacks. In order to guarantee the security performance, this paper treats the influence of packet dropouts due to DoS attacks as a uncertainty of triggering condition. Firstly, a novel resilient triggering strategy by considering the uncertainty of triggering condition caused by DoS attacks is proposed. Secondly, the event-based security controller under the resilient triggering strategy is designed while the DoS-based security performance is preserved. At last, the simulation results show that the proposed resilient triggering strategy is resilient to DoS attacks while guaranteing the security performance
A Systematic Review of the State of Cyber-Security in Water Systems
Critical infrastructure systems are evolving from isolated bespoke systems to those that use general-purpose computing hosts, IoT sensors, edge computing, wireless networks and artificial intelligence. Although this move improves sensing and control capacity and gives better integration with business requirements, it also increases the scope for attack from malicious entities that intend to conduct industrial espionage and sabotage against these systems. In this paper, we review the state of the cyber-security research that is focused on improving the security of the water supply and wastewater collection and treatment systems that form part of the critical national infrastructure. We cover the publication statistics of the research in this area, the aspects of security being addressed, and future work required to achieve better cyber-security for water systems
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Cybersecurity through Real-Time Distributed Control Systems
Critical infrastructure sites and facilities are becoming increasingly dependent on interconnected physical and cyber-based real-time distributed control systems (RTDCSs). A mounting cybersecurity threat results from the nature of these ubiquitous and sometimes unrestrained communications interconnections. Much work is under way in numerous organizations to characterize the cyber threat, determine means to minimize risk, and develop mitigation strategies to address potential consequences. While it seems natural that a simple application of cyber-protection methods derived from corporate business information technology (IT) domain would lead to an acceptable solution, the reality is that the characteristics of RTDCSs make many of those methods inadequate and unsatisfactory or even harmful. A solution lies in developing a defense-in-depth approach that ranges from protection at communications interconnect levels ultimately to the control system s functional characteristics that are designed to maintain control in the face of malicious intrusion. This paper summarizes the nature of RTDCSs from a cybersecurity perspec tive and discusses issues, vulnerabilities, candidate mitigation approaches, and metrics
Fault Detection and Isolation in Controlled Multi-Robot Systems
Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) have attracted much popularity, since the previous decade due to their potential wide range of applications. Indeed, connected MASs are deployed in order to achieve more complex objectives that could otherwise not be achievable by a single agent. In distributed schemes, agents must share their information with their neighbours, which are then used for common control and fault detection purposes, and thus do not require any central monitoring unit. This translates into the necessity to develop efficient distributed algorithms in terms of robustness and safety. Indeed, the problem of safety in connected cooperative MASs has arisen as a consequence of their complexity and the nature of their operations and wireless communication exchanges, which renders them vulnerable to not only physical faults, but also to cyber-attacks. The main focus of this thesis is the study of distributed fault and attack detection and isolation in connected MASs. First, a distributed methodology for global detection of actuator faults in a class of linear MASs with unknown disturbances is proposed using a cascade of fixed-time Sliding Mode Observers (SMOs), where each agent having access to their state, and neighbouring information exchanges, can give an exact estimate of the state of the overall MAS. An LMI-based approach is then applied to design distributed global robust residual signals at each agent capable of detecting faults anywhere in the network. This is then extended to agents with nonlinear nonholonomic dynamics where a new distributed robust Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) scheme is proposed using predefined-time stability techniques to derive adequate distributed SMOs. This enables to reconstruct the global system state in a predefined-time and generate proper residual signals. The case of MASs with higher order integrator dynamics, where only the first state variable is measurable and the topology is switching is investigated, where a new approach to identify faults and deception attacks is introduced. The proposed protocol makes an agent act as a central node monitoring the whole system activities in a distributed fashion whereby a bank of distributed predefined-time SMOs for global state estimation are designed, which are then used to generate residual signals capable of identifying cyber-attacks despite the switching topology. The problem of attack and FDI in connected heterogeneous MASs with directed graphs, is then studied. First, the problem of distributed fault detection for a team of heterogeneous MASs with linear dynamics is investigated, where a new output observer scheme is proposed which is effective for both directed and undirected topologies. The main advantage of this approach is that the design, being dependant only on the input-output relations, renders the computational cost, information exchange and scalability very effective compared to other FDI approaches that employ the whole state estimation of the agents and their neighbours as a basis for their design. A more general model is then studied, where actuator, sensor and communication faults/attacks are considered in the robust detection and isolation process for nonlinear heterogeneous MASs with measurement noise, dynamic disturbances and communication parameter uncertainties, where the topology is not required to be undirected. This is done using a distributed finite-frequency mixed H_/H1 nonlinear UIO-based approach. Simulation examples are given for each of the proposed algorithms to show their effectiveness and robustness
A critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems
Modern Building Automation Systems (BASs), as the brain that enables the
smartness of a smart building, often require increased connectivity both among
system components as well as with outside entities, such as optimized
automation via outsourced cloud analytics and increased building-grid
integrations. However, increased connectivity and accessibility come with
increased cyber security threats. BASs were historically developed as closed
environments with limited cyber-security considerations. As a result, BASs in
many buildings are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that may cause adverse
consequences, such as occupant discomfort, excessive energy usage, and
unexpected equipment downtime. Therefore, there is a strong need to advance the
state-of-the-art in cyber-physical security for BASs and provide practical
solutions for attack mitigation in buildings. However, an inclusive and
systematic review of BAS vulnerabilities, potential cyber-attacks with impact
assessment, detection & defense approaches, and cyber-secure resilient control
strategies is currently lacking in the literature. This review paper fills the
gap by providing a comprehensive up-to-date review of cyber-physical security
for BASs at three levels in commercial buildings: management level, automation
level, and field level. The general BASs vulnerabilities and protocol-specific
vulnerabilities for the four dominant BAS protocols are reviewed, followed by a
discussion on four attack targets and seven potential attack scenarios. The
impact of cyber-attacks on BASs is summarized as signal corruption, signal
delaying, and signal blocking. The typical cyber-attack detection and defense
approaches are identified at the three levels. Cyber-secure resilient control
strategies for BASs under attack are categorized into passive and active
resilient control schemes. Open challenges and future opportunities are finally
discussed.Comment: 38 pages, 7 figures, 6 tables, submitted to Annual Reviews in Contro
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