33,334 research outputs found
Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness
This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them
Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference
I happen to believe that though human experiences are to be characterized as pluralistic they are all rooted in the one reality. I would assume the thesis of pluralism but how could I maintain my belief in the realism? There are various discussions in favor of realism but they appear to stay within a particular paradigm so to be called âinternal realismâ. In this paper I would try to justify my belief in the reality by discussing a special use of indexicals. I will argue for my indexical realism by advancing the thesis that indexicals can be used as an inter-agentic referential term.
Three arguments for the thesis will be presented. The first argument derives from a revision of Kaplan-Kvartâs notion of exportation. Their notions of exportation of singular terms can be analyzed as intra-agentic exportation in the context of a single speaker and theirs may be revised so as to be an inter-agentic exportation in the context of two speakers who use the same indexicals. The second is an argument from the notion of causation which is specifically characterized in the context of inter-theoretic reference. I will argue that any two theories may each say âthisâ in order to refer what is beyond its own theory. Two theories address themselves to âthisâ same thing though what âthisâ represents in each theory turn out to be different objects all together. The third argument is an argument which is based on a possibility of natural reference. Reference is used to be taken mostly as a 3-place predicate: Abe refers an object oi with an expression ej. The traditional notion of reference is constructive and anthropocentric. But I would argue that natural reference is a reference that we humans come to recognize among denumerably many objects in natural states: at a moment mi in a natural state there is a referential relation among objects o1, o2, o3, . . , oj, o j+1, . . which interact to each other as agents of information processors. Natural reference is an original reference which is naturally given and to which humans are passive as we derivatively refer it by using âthisâ
Inférences réflexives dans la publicité
Advertisements are so
ubiquitous nowadays that capturing the
addresseeâs attention and maintaining it
long enough for them to be fully
processed have become fundamental
objectives for advertisers. Employing
specific strategies in the design of the
advertisement contributes efficiently to
achieving these goals, getting the
audience not only to attend the
stimulus but also to process it in certain
ways favourable for the advertiser. We
argue that Relevance theory, an
approach to communication built on a
massively modular view of cognition,
offers the right tools to explain the
nature of the interpretative processes
in verbal comprehension. Knowledge of
the relevance-based reflexive
inferential procedures involved in
utterance interpretation allows
advertisers to foresee the addresseeâs
processing behaviour, giving them the
possibility to control it in a such a way
that the intended interpretative effects
are achieved in the desired way
There is Nothing It is Like to See Red: Holism and Subjective Experience
The Nagel inspired âsomething-it-is-likeâ (SIL) conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I then develop a holistic conception of SIL for entities (not states) and argue that it has at least equal pre-empirical warrant, is more conservative philosophically in that it decides less from the a priori âarmchair,â and enjoys a fruitful two-way relationship with empirical work
Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality
This paper asks whether phenomenal intentionality (intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone) has a relational structure of the sort envisaged in Russellâs theory of acquaintance. I put forward three arguments in favor of a relation view: one phenomenological, one linguistic, and one based on the viewâs ability to account for the truth conditions of phenomenally intentional states. I then consider several objections to the relation view. The chief objection to the relation view takes the form of a dilemma between Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the properties constitutive of the contents of phenomenally intentional states on this view: the Aristotelian view seems unable to account for all the apparent contents of phenomenally intentional states, but the Platonic view seems to be ontologically unacceptable. I also consider other objections from physicalism, phenomenology, and epistemology
Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophical Critique
Giulio Tononi (2008) has offered his integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) as a âprovisional manifestoâ. I critically examine how the approach fares. I point out some (relatively) internal concerns with the theory and then more broadly philosophical ones; finally I assess the prospects for IITC as a fundamental theory of consciousness. I argue that the IITCâs scientific promise does carry over to a significant extent to broader philosophical theorizing about qualia and consciousness, though not as directly as Tononi suggests, since the account is much more focused on the qualitative character of experience rather than on consciousness itself. I propose understanding it as âintegrated information theory of qualiaâ(IITQ), rather than of consciousness
âOughtâ-contextualism beyond the parochial
Despite increasing prominence, âoughtâ-contextualism is regarded with suspicion by most metaethicists. As Iâll argue, however, contextualism is a very weak claim, that every metaethicist can sign up to. The real controversy concerns how contextualism is developed. I then draw an oft-overlooked distinction between âparochialâ contextualismâon which the contextually-relevant standards are those that the speaker, or others in her environment, subscribe toâand âaspirationalâ contextualismâon which the contextually-relevant standards are the objective standards for the relevant domain. However, I argue that neither view is acceptable. I suggest an original compromise: âecumenical contextualismâ, on which some uses of âoughtâ are parochial, others aspirational. Ecumenical contextualism is compatible with realism or antirealism, but either combination yields interesting results. And though itâs a cognitivist view, it is strengthened by incorporating an expressivist insight: for robustly normative usages of âoughtâ, the contextually-relevant standards must be endorsed by the speaker
The mindsized mashup mind isnât supersized after all
I rather like Andy Clarkâs book, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, but it certainly hasnât put my mind at rest. As always Clarkâs writing is uncomplicated and energetic, managing to make everything, from the physiology of the moving body, through an analysis of the scaffolding role, he maintains is, played by language, to the strategic use of representation, computation and control by the biological brain, both intelligible and interesting. And I have a great deal of sympathy with his main thesis: that we must consider the whole body, rather than merely the brain, as the locus where sensing and acting are synthesized and through which cognitive systems can engage with their world. But still I find that I have a couple of rather fundamental reservations, alongside a number of ancillary comments that arise from my own puzzlement with some â of what can at first glance seem â disarmingly simple claims
Management as a Symbolizing Construction?
In this article, we outline the concept of management as a symbolizing construction. According to Niklas LUHMANN, organizations process by referring to decisions. But decisions are not simply "given" and in principle invisible. This is the reason why organizations institute formalities like protocols, signatures or other insignia of the official that symbolize the decisionâwithout actually being a decision. These symbols allow for making decisions "process-able." And just like a protocol or a signature, management symbolizes decisions as well. Management provides an organizational practice with symbols of decision making without being the "unity" of the decisions, as decisions perpetually have to be reconstructed, redefined and rearranged in the communication of all organizational units. Therefore management symbolizes on the one hand more than it can achieve. On the other hand the importance of management as a symbolizing construction lies in allowing the reconstruction, redefining and rearrangement of decisions by making them visible and recognizable. Heroic managers, meetings, management tools and procedures are solutions to the paradox of decision making. By symbolizing decidedness they create credibilities that conceal the self-referential construction of organizational communication and the paradox of its decision praxis
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