18,285 research outputs found
Execution Integrity with In-Place Encryption
Instruction set randomization (ISR) was initially proposed with the main goal
of countering code-injection attacks. However, ISR seems to have lost its
appeal since code-injection attacks became less attractive because protection
mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) as well as code-reuse
attacks became more prevalent.
In this paper, we show that ISR can be extended to also protect against
code-reuse attacks while at the same time offering security guarantees similar
to those of software diversity, control-flow integrity, and information hiding.
We present Scylla, a scheme that deploys a new technique for in-place code
encryption to hide the code layout of a randomized binary, and restricts the
control flow to a benign execution path. This allows us to i) implicitly
restrict control-flow targets to basic block entries without requiring the
extraction of a control-flow graph, ii) achieve execution integrity within
legitimate basic blocks, and iii) hide the underlying code layout under
malicious read access to the program. Our analysis demonstrates that Scylla is
capable of preventing state-of-the-art attacks such as just-in-time
return-oriented programming (JIT-ROP) and crash-resistant oriented programming
(CROP). We extensively evaluate our prototype implementation of Scylla and show
feasible performance overhead. We also provide details on how this overhead can
be significantly reduced with dedicated hardware support
SOFIA : software and control flow integrity architecture
Microprocessors used in safety-critical systems are extremely sensitive to software vulnerabilities, as their failure can lead to injury, damage to equipment, or environmental catastrophe. This paper proposes a hardware-based security architecture for microprocessors used in safety-critical systems. The proposed architecture provides protection against code injection and code reuse attacks. It has mechanisms to protect software integrity, perform control flow integrity, prevent execution of tampered code, and enforce copyright protection. We are the first to propose a mechanism to enforce control flow integrity at the finest possible granularity. The proposed architectural features were added to the LEON3 open source soft microprocessor, and were evaluated on an FPGA running a software benchmark. The results show that the hardware area is 28.2% larger and the clock is 84.6% slower, while the software benchmark has a cycle overhead of 13.7% and a total execution time overhead of 110% when compared to an unmodified processor
Evaluating XMPP Communication in IEC 61499-based Distributed Energy Applications
The IEC 61499 reference model provides an international standard developed
specifically for supporting the creation of distributed event-based automation
systems. Functionality is abstracted into function blocks which can be coded
graphically as well as via a text-based method. As one of the design goals was
the ability to support distributed control applications, communication plays a
central role in the IEC 61499 specification. In order to enable the deployment
of functionality to distributed platforms, these platforms need to exchange
data in a variety of protocols. IEC 61499 realizes the support of these
protocols via "Service Interface Function Blocks" (SIFBs). In the context of
smart grids and energy applications, IEC 61499 could play an important role, as
these applications require coordinating several distributed control logics.
Yet, the support of grid-related protocols is a pre-condition for a wide-spread
utilization of IEC 61499. The eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
on the other hand is a well-established protocol for messaging, which has
recently been adopted for smart grid communication. Thus, SIFBs for XMPP
facilitate distributed control applications, which use XMPP for exchanging all
control relevant data, being realized with the help of IEC 61499. This paper
introduces the idea of integrating XMPP into SIFBs, demonstrates the
prototypical implementation in an open source IEC 61499 platform and provides
an evaluation of the feasibility of the result.Comment: 2016 IEEE 21st International Conference on Emerging Technologies and
Factory Automation (ETFA
Cryptographically Secure Information Flow Control on Key-Value Stores
We present Clio, an information flow control (IFC) system that transparently
incorporates cryptography to enforce confidentiality and integrity policies on
untrusted storage. Clio insulates developers from explicitly manipulating keys
and cryptographic primitives by leveraging the policy language of the IFC
system to automatically use the appropriate keys and correct cryptographic
operations. We prove that Clio is secure with a novel proof technique that is
based on a proof style from cryptography together with standard programming
languages results. We present a prototype Clio implementation and a case study
that demonstrates Clio's practicality.Comment: Full version of conference paper appearing in CCS 201
Stacco: Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure Enclaves
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to
protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems.
The SSL/TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard for protecting
transport-layer network communications, has been broadly deployed for a secure
communication channel. However, in this paper, we show that the marriage
between SGX and SSL may not be smooth sailing.
Particularly, we consider a category of side-channel attacks against SSL/TLS
implementations in secure enclaves, which we call the control-flow inference
attacks. In these attacks, the malicious operating system kernel may perform a
powerful man-in-the-kernel attack to collect execution traces of the enclave
programs at page, cacheline, or branch level, while positioning itself in the
middle of the two communicating parties. At the center of our work is a
differential analysis framework, dubbed Stacco, to dynamically analyze the
SSL/TLS implementations and detect vulnerabilities that can be exploited as
decryption oracles. Surprisingly, we found exploitable vulnerabilities in the
latest versions of all the SSL/TLS libraries we have examined.
To validate the detected vulnerabilities, we developed a man-in-the-kernel
adversary to demonstrate Bleichenbacher attacks against the latest OpenSSL
library running in the SGX enclave (with the help of Graphene) and completely
broke the PreMasterSecret encrypted by a 4096-bit RSA public key with only
57286 queries. We also conducted CBC padding oracle attacks against the latest
GnuTLS running in Graphene-SGX and an open-source SGX-implementation of mbedTLS
(i.e., mbedTLS-SGX) that runs directly inside the enclave, and showed that it
only needs 48388 and 25717 queries, respectively, to break one block of AES
ciphertext. Empirical evaluation suggests these man-in-the-kernel attacks can
be completed within 1 or 2 hours.Comment: CCS 17, October 30-November 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, US
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