Information collection in bargaining

I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of preference settings, the uninformed player does not collect information when he is quite sure about his opponent’s type. There exist preference settings in which the uninformed player collects information until he is sufficiently sure about his opponent’s type, as long as the information source is accurate enough. With additional assumptions, the uninformed player is more likely to draw signals and is better off, if the information is more accurate.bargaining, alternate offers, incomplete information, delay

Information collection in bargaining

I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of preference settings, the uninformed player does not collect information when he is quite sure about his opponent’s type. There exist preference settings in which the uninformed player collects information until he is sufficiently sure about his opponent’s type, as long as the information source is accurate enough. With additional assumptions, the uninformed player is more likely to draw signals and is better off, if the information is more accurate

Information collection in bargaining

I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of preference settings, the uninformed player does not collect information when he is quite sure about his opponent’s type. There exist preference settings in which the uninformed player collects information until he is sufficiently sure about his opponent’s type, as long as the information source is accurate enough. With additional assumptions, the uninformed player is more likely to draw signals and is better off, if the information is more accurate

Higher Education Faculty Association, SDSU Branch Records

The Higher Education Faculty Association was the predecessor to the Council of Higher Education which is the collective bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, grievance procedures and other conditions of employment. This collection is composed of correspondence, lobbying information, minutes, newsletters, a synopsis of activities, and miscellaneous items generated by the South Dakota State University branch of this association

Co-evolving automata negotiate with a variety of opponents

Real-life negotiations typically involve multiple parties with different preferences for the different issues and bargaining strategies which change over time. Such a dynamic environment (with imperfect information) is addressed in this paper with a multi-population evolutionary algorithm (EA). Each population represents an evolving collection of bargaining strategies in our setup. The bargaining strategies are represented by a special kind of finite automata, which require only two transitions per state. We show that such automata (with a limited complexity) are a suitable choice in a computational setting. We furthermore describe an EA which generates highly-efficient bargaining automata in the course of time. A series of computational experiments shows that co-evolving automata are able to discriminate successfully between different opponents, although they receive no explicit information about the identity or preferences of their opponents. These results are important for the further development of evolving automata for real-life (agent system) applications

Information creates relative bargaining power in vendor negotiations

Purpose: This paper aims to examine how libraries can create relative bargaining power and presents a methodology for analyzing collections and preparing for negotiations. Design/methodology/approach: A brief literature review of the current state of collection budgets and electronic resource prices is presented prior to proposing a methodology based on business analysis frameworks and techniques. Findings: Electronic resource subscription prices are increasing at a rate significantly higher than inflation, while collection budgets grow slowly, remain stagnant or decrease. Academic libraries have the ability to counteract this trend by creating relative bargaining power through organizational efforts that take advantage of size and concentration (e.g. consortia), vertical integration through practices such as library publishing and open access and through individual efforts using information. This paper proposes metrics and methodologies that librarians can use to analyze their collections, set negotiation priorities and prepare for individual resource negotiations to create relative bargaining power. Practical implications: The proposed methodology enables librarians and buyers of information resources to harness the information available about their electronic resource collections to better position themselves when entering negotiations with vendors. Originality/value: This paper presents metrics, some not commonly used (i.e. average annual price increase/decrease), that aid in understanding price sensitivity. Pareto analysis has been traditionally used to analyze usage, but this paper suggests using it in relation to costs and budgets for setting negotiation priorities

Creating Relative Bargaining Power Through Information When Approaching Vendor Negotiations

Librarians have the ability to shift the buyer/supplier dynamic during electronic resource negotiations through information analysis common in the business world. This use of information creates relative bargaining power. This poster describes a method of analysis used by a business subject liaison to understand her own collection, set priorities, and plan for negotiations of database resources. It will describe quantitative and qualitative metrics, as well as demonstrate how this information aids negotiation strategy

Interest Arbitration A Case Study Lancaster Police Benevolent Association And The Town of Lancaster

Arbitration is a process wherein a dispute is submitted to an impartial third party for a binding decision. Interest Arbitration involves a dispute over the terms of a proposed collective bargaining agreement. In an Interest Arbitration an impartial third party renders a binding decision on the terms of the collection bargaining agreement. The case study describes a situation where the Lancaster Police Benevolent Association (Union) is negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with the Town of Lancaster. As the parties were unable to resolve the contract through negotiations, an impasse was declared. A demand for arbitration was made by the Union, and the matter was ultimately resolved through the Interest Arbitration process in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Arbitration Procedure contained in the collective bargaining agreement. The case presents the positions of the Lancaster Police Benevolent Association (Union) and the Town of Lancaster on the open issues in the impasse. The case requires students to review the information in the case and develop an appropriate Award (Arbitration decision for the case) for each of the issues. The case represents an actual impasse that went to a formal Interest Arbitration hearing. The Interest Arbitration case is designed for use in a class in Labor Relations/Collective Bargaining or in a Human Relations class. The arbitration process is stressed as well as the difference between Rights Arbitration and Interest Arbitration

Wages: A working conditions and industrial relations perspective

[Excerpt] This paper looks at wages from two different angles: from the perspective of individual employees, discussed in conjunction with their working conditions, and from the perspective of the industrial relations system. After a brief overview of EU-level policy developments with a potential impact on national level pay determination, this report gives a comparative overview of the levels of collective wage setting and how they are set throughout Europe and goes on to report on reforms, changes or debates linked to these processes between the different actors at both the Member State and the European level in 2011 and 2012. This includes, for instance, debates on potential changes of indexation mechanisms in Belgium, Luxembourg and Cyprus, as a result of the Commission’s recommendations within the Euro Plus Pact. While in some countries (Estonia, Bulgaria) social partners resumed collective bargaining (either on wages or on minimum wages) and came to agreements, in other countries (Lithuania, Romania), no agreements could be reached. Some changes in the way collective bargaining is organised were recently introduced in Spain, Romania, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Information on these issues stems from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO). Furthermore, this paper also summarises the current changes and debates among the social partners and governments in relation to the setting and the level of minimum wages across Europe. It then looks into the area of ‘working poor’, that is people who are in employment but still at risk of poverty. To what extent do governments and social partners put forth policy responses to address the issue of in-work-poverty? And to what extent did the crisis have an impact? In order to answer these questions, the paper draws on Eurofound research on the situation of the ‘Working poor’. Finally the paper presents a collection of recent ‘information updates’ from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) on various issues in relation to pay from Member States

An Evaluation of the New York State Workers’ Compensation Pilot Program for Alternative Dispute Resolution

In 1995, the State 0f New York enacted legislation authorizing the establishment of a workers\u27 compensation alternative dispute resolution pilot program for the unionized sector of the construction industry. Collective bargaining agreements could establish an alternative dispute resolution process for resolving claims (including but not limited to mediation and arbitration), use of an agreed managed care organization or list of authorized providers for medical treatment that constitutes the exclusive source of all medical and related treatment, supplemental benefits, return-to-work programs, and vocational rehabilitation programs. The legislation also directed the School ofIndustrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University (ILR) to evaluate compliance with state and federal due process requirements provided in the collective bargaining agreements authorized by this act, and the use, costs and merits of the alternative dispute resolution system established pursuant to this act. In response to this legislative mandate, ILR reviewed the research previously conducted on alternative dispute resolution (ADR), generally, and in workers\u27 compensation. This included examining the purported advantages and disadvantages of ADR, the prevalence of ADR, and published statistical or anecdotal evidence regarding the impact of ADR. ILR created a research design for claimant-level and project-level analyses, and developed data collection instruments for these analyses that included an injured worker survey for ADR claimants and claimants in the traditional (statutory)workers\u27 compensation system, an Ombudsman\u27s log, a manual of data elements pertaining to ADR and comparison group claimants, and interview questions for ADR signatories and other officials. The findings in this report draw upon a comparison of claimant-level, descriptive statistics (averages) for injured workers in the ADR and traditional (statutory) workers\u27 compensation system; the results of more sophisticated, statistical analyses of claimant-level data; and project-level information (including, but not limited to, interviews with ADR signatories and dispute resolution officials)