Competing for Contacts: Network Competition, Trade Intermediation and Fragmented Duopoly

A two-sided, pair-wise matching model is developed to analyse the strategic interaction between two information intermediaries who compete in commission rates and network size, giving rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure. The model suggests that network competition between information intermediaries has a distinctive market structure, where intermediaries are monopolistic service providers to some contacts but duopolists over contacts they share in their network overlap. the intermediaries' inability to price discriminate between the competitive and non-competitive market segments, gives rise to an undercutting game, which has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The incentive to randomise commission rates yields a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, competition is affected by the technology of network development. The analysis shows that either a monopoly or a fragmented duopoly can prevail in equilibrium, depending on the network-building technology. Under convexity assumptions, both intermediaries invest in a network and compete over common matches, while randomising commission rates. In contrast, linear network development costs can only give rise to a monopolistic outcome.International Trade, Pairwise Matching, Information Cost, Intermediation, Networks

TRACEABILITY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE MEAT SUPPLY CHAIN: IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRM ORGANIZATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE

The traditional food supply chain is arranged as a complex array of producers, handlers, processors, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. As the food supply chain grew in complexity over time, little emphasis was placed on preserving information regarding the origin of raw materials and their transformation, often by multiple handlers, into consumer-ready products. This paper provides case illustrations of the implementation of information systems for support of traceability in Europe. Observations on these firms coupled with the literature on information asymmetry and transactions costs is used to provide insights into how traceability implementation might affect U.S. meat-industry structure.Agribusiness, Industrial Organization,

Market structure, screening activity and bank lending behaviour

In this paper we construct a theoretical model of spatial banking competition that considers the differential information among banks and potential borrowers in order to investigate how market structure affects the lending behavior of banks and their incentives to invest in screening technology. Consistent with the prevailing view in the relevant literature, our results reveal that competition reduces lending cost, which, in turn, encourages the entry of new customers in the loan market. Also, that the transportation cost that potential borrowers have to pay in order to reach the bank of their interest is decreased with the degree of competitiveness. Importantly, we demonstrate that market structure exerts a considerable positive effect on banks’ incentives to screen their loan applicants since banks are found to invest more in screening as competition in the market becomes higher. This is to say, banks resort to screening that serves as a buffer mechanism against bad credit which entails higher risk and which is more likely under competitive conditions. Overall, our findings provide support to a rather close link between the degree of competition, bank lending activity, and the investment of banks in screening technology

The impact of M&A on the R&D process. An empirical analysis of the role of technological and market relatedness.

While the impact of M&A on R&D and innovation examined at the aggregate level left inconclusive evidence, we find that at the level of the R&D process both the technological and market relatedness between the target and acquirer are helpful dimensions to identify effects. Using information on 31 in-depth cases of individual M&A deals we show that technological relatedness between M&A partners directly affects the inputs and organizational structure of the R&D process. M&A partners that operate in the same technological fields tend to reduce their R&D effort and rationalize the R&D process after the M&A compared to firms active in complementary technological fields that merge. These firms will furthermore face less technological competition in the technology market, but risk creating a more bureaucratic R&D process with a less motivated workforce. Market relatedness between partners, while having comparable aggregate effects on the R&D process, operates on different dimensions of the R&D process. Former rivals that engage in a M&A are significantly less likely to expand into new R&D fields or leverage their technological competences across the products and markets of the new entity. Non-rival firms that join forces, on the contrary, significantly increase R&D output and productivity through these activities.Competition; Effects; Field; Firms; Information; Innovation; International; M&A; Market; Market relatedness; Markets; Organizational structure; Processes; Product; R&D; Risk; Scale and scope; Structure; Subsidiaries; Technolocal relatedness; Technology diffusion;

Signaling in Auctions among Competitors

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy

Identification and estimation of hedonic models

This paper considers the identification and estimation of hedonic models. We establish that technology and preferences in a separable version of the hedonic model are generically identified up to a±ne transformations from data on demand and supply in a single hedonic market. For a very general parametric structure, preferences and technology are fully identified from demand data. Much of the confusion in the empirical literature that claims that hedonic models estimated on data from a single market are fundamentally underidentified is based on linearizations that do not use all of the information in the model. The exact economic model that justifies the linear approximations has strange properties so the approximation is doubly poor. A semiparametric estimation method is proposed, and alternative estimators are considered. Instrumental variables estimators can be applied to identify technology and preference parameters from a single market even though there are no exclusion restrictions.

International Joint Venture under Asymmetric Information: Technology vis-à-vis Information Advantage

We study the relationship between a multinational corporation (MNC) and a domestic firm under demand uncertainty. The MNC possesses a superior production technology, but the domestic firm is better at predicting market demand. We examine how the MNC’s preference for, and the ownership structure of, a joint venture depend on the credit market, demand uncertainty, the domestic firm’s ability to gather demand information, the MNC’s technology advantage, and the efficiency of technology transfer. We also consider a dynamic setting with technology spillover and show that whether technology spillover hinders or facilitates joint venture depends on the nature of the credit market

Signaling in Auctions among Competitors

We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders’ costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy.Auction; Oligopoly; Signaling

Innovation and Competition in Canadian Equity Markets

Innovations in communications and information technology and the related globalization of financial markets have created the potential for important changes to the structure of Canadian equity markets. Established marketplaces can now compete more effectively on an inter-regional and international basis. At the same time, reduced costs have lowered the barriers to entry faced by new competitors known as alternative trading systems (ATSs). In response to this heightened competition, established Canadian stock exchanges have taken measures to improve market quality. While regulators see innovation as positive for the development of Canadian markets, there is some concern that market liquidity may be fragmented in the short run. The Canadian Securities Administrators have proposed a framework that attempts to address this issue and that would allow ATSs to compete with traditional exchanges for the first time. The authors provide an overview of the Canadian equity market and its structure, focusing on these recent developments.