Decisive Markov Chains

We consider qualitative and quantitative verification problems for infinite-state Markov chains. We call a Markov chain decisive w.r.t. a given set of target states F if it almost certainly eventually reaches either F or a state from which F can no longer be reached. While all finite Markov chains are trivially decisive (for every set F), this also holds for many classes of infinite Markov chains. Infinite Markov chains which contain a finite attractor are decisive w.r.t. every set F. In particular, this holds for probabilistic lossy channel systems (PLCS). Furthermore, all globally coarse Markov chains are decisive. This class includes probabilistic vector addition systems (PVASS) and probabilistic noisy Turing machines (PNTM). We consider both safety and liveness problems for decisive Markov chains, i.e., the probabilities that a given set of states F is eventually reached or reached infinitely often, respectively. 1. We express the qualitative problems in abstract terms for decisive Markov chains, and show an almost complete picture of its decidability for PLCS, PVASS and PNTM. 2. We also show that the path enumeration algorithm of Iyer and Narasimha terminates for decisive Markov chains and can thus be used to solve the approximate quantitative safety problem. A modified variant of this algorithm solves the approximate quantitative liveness problem. 3. Finally, we show that the exact probability of (repeatedly) reaching F cannot be effectively expressed (in a uniform way) in Tarski-algebra for either PLCS, PVASS or (P)NTM.Comment: 32 pages, 0 figure

A Metric for Linear Temporal Logic

We propose a measure and a metric on the sets of infinite traces generated by a set of atomic propositions. To compute these quantities, we first map properties to subsets of the real numbers and then take the Lebesgue measure of the resulting sets. We analyze how this measure is computed for Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas. An implementation for computing the measure of bounded LTL properties is provided and explained. This implementation leverages SAT model counting and effects independence checks on subexpressions to compute the measure and metric compositionally

An Application of Quantum Finite Automata to Interactive Proof Systems

Quantum finite automata have been studied intensively since their introduction in late 1990s as a natural model of a quantum computer with finite-dimensional quantum memory space. This paper seeks their direct application to interactive proof systems in which a mighty quantum prover communicates with a quantum-automaton verifier through a common communication cell. Our quantum interactive proof systems are juxtaposed to Dwork-Stockmeyer's classical interactive proof systems whose verifiers are two-way probabilistic automata. We demonstrate strengths and weaknesses of our systems and further study how various restrictions on the behaviors of quantum-automaton verifiers affect the power of quantum interactive proof systems.Comment: This is an extended version of the conference paper in the Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Implementation and Application of Automata, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Kingston, Canada, July 22-24, 200

Endogenous Social Preferences, Heterogeneity and Cooperation

We set up an analytical framework focusing on the problem of interaction over time when economic agents are characterized by various types of distributional social preferences. We develop an evolutionary approach in which individual preferences are endogenous and account for the evolution of cooperation when all the players are initially entirely selfish. In particular, within motivationally heterogeneous agents embedded in a social network, we adopt a variant of the indirect evolutionary approach, where material payoffs play a critical role, and assume that a coevolutionary process occurs in which subjective preferences gradually evolve due to a key mechanism involving behavioral choices, relational intensity and degree of social openness. The simulations we carried out led to strongly consistent results with regard to the evolution of player types, the dynamics of material payoffs, the creation of significant interpersonal relationships among agents and the frequency of cooperation. In the long run, cooperation turns out to be the strategic choice that obtains the best performances, in terms of material payoffs, and "nice guys", far from finishing last, succeed in coming out ahead.Behavioral Economics; Cooperation; Prisoner's Dilemma; Social Evolution; Heterogeneous Social Preferences; Indirect Evolutionary Approach