Kaplan's Sloppy Thinker and the Demonstrative Origine of Indeicals

In this paper we give some suggestions from etymology on the contrast between Kaplan’s direct reference theory and a neo-Fregean view on indexicals. After a short summary of the philosophical debate on indexicals (§1), we use some remarks about the hidden presence of a demonstrative root in all indexicals to derive some provisional doubts concerning Kaplan’s criticism of what he calls “sloppy thinker” (§2). To support those doubts, we will summarise some etymological data on the derivation of the so-called “pure indexicals” from an original demonstrative root (§ 3). The aim of the paper is to consider etymological data as providing evidence for alternative theories of language and fostering new directions in linguistic and philosophical research on specific topics

Problema de Frege, valor cognitivo e referência direta

Orientadores: Marco Antonio Caron Ruffino, Lucas AngioniDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasResumo: Devemos lidar com o Problema de Frege dentro da semântica? É o valor cognitivo da linguagem um aspecto do significado? O próprio Frege assumiu uma resposta afirmativa a essas questões, assim como vários teóricos da referência direta, como David Kaplan e John Perry. Apesar de defenderem uma teoria semântica que é anti-fregeana por natureza, eles compartilham da concepção de que é tarefa da semântica resolver o Problema de Frege e explicar fenômenos de valor cognitivo. Há duas maneiras tradicionais de se fazer isso numa semântica referencialista. Uma é via caráter e outra é via conteúdo reflexivo. Meu objetivo nesta dissertação é argumentar que ambas falham. Para isso, primeiramente examino o que é exatamente o Problema de Frege, e se o que tradicionalmente é chamado de "Problema de Frege" na literatura corresponde ao que Frege tinha em mente. Depois disso, explico como supostamente funcionam as soluções ao Problema de Frege através do caráter e através do conteúdo reflexivo no caso dos indexicais ¿ onde elas são mais plausíveis ¿ e no caso de nomes próprios. Argumento que nenhuma versão dessas soluções é bem sucedida em explicar todos os fenômenos que devem ser explicados. Concluo então que, se esse é o caso, então temos boas razões para acreditar que o Problema de Frege não deve ser solucionado dentro da semântica, e que o valor cognitivo não é um aspecto do significado como comumente se supõeAbstract: Should we deal with Frege¿s Puzzle on semantic grounds? Is the cognitive value of language an aspect of meaning? Frege himself assumed an affirmative answer to those questions, and so did many direct reference theorists, such as David Kaplan and John Perry. Even though they defend a theory that is anti-Fregean by nature, they share the view that it is semantics¿ business to account for Frege¿s Puzzle and cognitive value. There are two traditional ways to do so in referentialist semantics. One is via character and the other via reflexive content. My aim in this dissertation is to argue that both fail. To do that, I first examine what exactly Frege¿s Puzzle is, and if what traditionally goes under the name of "Frege¿s Puzzle" really corresponds to the puzzle that Frege himself formulated. I then examine how the solutions to the puzzle in terms of character and reflexive content are supposed to work for indexicals, where they are most appealing, and for proper names. I argue that there is no version of these solutions that is able to account for all the relevant phenomena. I conclude that, if this is the case, then we have serious reasons to suspect that Frege¿s Puzzle should not be explained by semantics, and that cognitive value is not an aspect of meaning as it is often supposedMestradoFilosofiaMestre em Filosofia2013/22364-4FAPES

Unity in the Variety of Quotation

This chapter argues that while quotation marks are polysemous, the thread that runs through all uses of quotation marks that involve reference to expressions is pure quotation, in which an expression formed by enclosing another expression in quotation marks refers to that enclosed expression. We defend a version of the so-called disquotational theory of pure quotation and show how this device is used in direct discourse and attitude attributions, in exposition in scholarly contexts, and in so-called mixed quotation in indirect discourse and attitude attributions. We argue that uses of quotation marks that extend beyond pure quotation have two features in common. First, the expressions appearing in quotation marks are intended to be understood, and that they are intended to be understood is essential to the function that such quotations play in communication, though this does not always involve the expressions contributing their extensional properties to fixing truth conditions for the sentences in which they appear. Second, they appeal to a relation to the expression appearing in quotation marks that plays a role in determining the truth conditions of the sentences in which they appear

I and "you" in spoken discourse

Contents of indexicals and how they are expressed are discussed in the present paper. Kaplan\u27s (1989) analysis of indexicals, in particular, his distinction among the utterer, the agent, and the referent of a token of "I" (Corazza et al. 2001) is closely examined to clarify the uniqueness of an utterance which includes it. It will be claimed that the uniqueness lies in the fact the utterer is identified and referred to as the agent of the present instance of discourse in Benveniste\u27s (1973) sense, not as an individual in the world. That is, the utterer is not specified in terms of her/his particularities which distinguish her/him from others in the world, but in terms of her/his speech or inscription of a token in the present instance of discourse. This causes the utterer her/himself to be highlighted. To clarify this uniqueness of the utterance with a token of "I", a short conversational exchange from the movie Sommersby is examined, and the utterance with an indexical is compared with equivalent utterances with a coreferring proper name and a co-referring definite description. The complexities of the relationship among the utterer, the agent, and the referent of a token of "I" are also described in discussing the so-called answering machine paradox and relevant cases. Furthermore, the analysis of different entities of a token of "I" is extended to other pure indexicals such as "you", "here", and "now", in which the hearer/place/time is distinguished from the agent(addressee)/spatial location/temporal location of the present instance of discourse

From Semantics to Pragmatics

The topic of this thesis is the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Semantics is concerned with the literal meanings of expressions, what is explicitly expressed with expressions and providing truth conditions for sentences. While the subject matter of pragmatics, being the more nebulous one, is focused on non-literal meanings of expressions, what is implicitly conveyed with expressions and non-truth-conditional content. In this thesis I will present two theories: David Kaplan’s theory of indexicals and demonstratives and Robert Stalnaker’s assertion theory. The guiding question of this work is how these theorists distinguish semantics from pragmatics. How does the distinction appear in their theories? To point out, neither of the theories is aimed to specifically solve how the distinction is to be made. Kaplan’s aim is to create semantics for indexical expressions, whereas Stalnaker wants to explain how necessary a posteriori identity statements can be informative according to his two-dimensional semantic theory. Despite the differing goals underlying their theories, Kaplan and Stalnaker are not oblivious of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. In fact, how the distinction is eventually made by these theorists, strongly depends on how each of the theories is built.Tutkielmassani käsittelen semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välistä erottelua. Karkeasti ottaen semantiikalla tarkoitetaan tutkimusalaa, joka käsittelee ilmaisujen kirjaimellista merkitystä, mitä ilmaisuilla eksplisiittisesti ilmaistaan sekä lauseiden totuusehtojen muodostamista. Pragmatiikan alaan lasketaan perinteisesti kuuluvan ilmaisujen ei-kirjaimellisen merkityksen tarkastelun, mitä ilmaisuilla implisiittisesti välitetään sekä lauseiden ei-totuusehdollisen sisällön tarkastelun. Esittelen tutkielmassani kaksi teoriaa: David Kaplanin teorian indeksikaaleista ja demonstratiiveista sekä Robert Stalnakerin teorian siitä, miten väittämä vaikuttaa kontekstiin. Tutkielmani keskeinen kysymys on, miten semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välinen erottelu ilmenee Kaplanin ja Stalnakerin teorioissa. Mainittakoon, että kumpikaan teoria ei ensisijaisesti pyri vastaamaan asettamaani kysymykseen. Kaplanin tarkoitus on osoittaa, että indeksikaalisille ilmaisuille voidaan luoda semantiikka. Stalnaker pyrkii puolestaan esittämään, miten välttämättömät a posteriori identiteettiväitteet voivat olla informatiivisia hänen kehittämän kaksiulotteisen semanttisen teorian mukaan. Erilaisista päämääristä huolimatta sekä Kaplan että Stalnaker ovat varsin tietoisia erottelusta semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välillä, mikä ilmenee erityisesti luvussa 4

Content, character, and cognitive significance

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43402/1/11098_2004_Article_BF00646454.pd

Scare-quoting and incorporation

I explain a mechanism I call “incorporation,” that I think is at work in a wide range of cases often put under the heading of “scare-quoting.” Incorporation is flagging some words in one’s own utterance to indicate that they are to be interpreted as if uttered by some other speaker in some other context, while supplying evidence to one’s interpreter enabling them to identify that other speaker and context. This mechanism gives us a way to use others’ vocabularies and contexts, thereby extending our expressive capacities on the fly. Explaining incorporation involves explaining intra-sentential shifts in lexicon and in context. Shifts of the former sort are familiar to linguists under the heading of “code-switching.” Shifts of the latter sort have been less explored; accordingly I explain how to modify Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives to allow for such shifts. I compare the incorporation account of scare-quoting with accounts offered by Brandom, Recanati, Geurts and Maier, Benbaji, Predelli, and Shan. Finally I note a possible implication concerning the speech act of assertion: that you can properly assert a content you do not believe, let alone know, because part of it is expressed with words you do not understand

Demonstratiivid ja publikukeskne osutusteooria

According to the audience-control theory of demonstratives, the content of a demonstrative in a context is what an attentive and competent audience would reasonably take to be its content in the context. In this thesis, I will respond to the arguments that have been made against the this theory, and have not been responded in the literature. Three of these arguments can be responded to by relying the existing framework of the audience-control theory, worked out by Wettstein (1984) and Romdenh-Romluc (2002, 2004). Responding to the two remaining requires specifying what the theory would predict in cases where the interlocutors could disagree about what the content of a demonstrative is. In the thesis, I will develop two ways to make this specification. According to the first response, in these cases, the content of the demonstrative is indeterminate, and according to the second response, the demonstrative has different content relative to different audience members. The thesis concludes by assessing these two responses by considering how they handle situations where disagreements about what a demonstrative refers to are revealed