Fair Labor Association 2007 Annual Report

Assesses the progress made by companies in the move towards sustainable corporate responsibility in their labor standards. Breaks up data by company

Responsible Sourcing and Supply Chain Traceability

This paper explores a buyer\u27s tracing and its supplier\u27s own sourcing decisions in a multi-tier supply chain. We explore what different stakeholders can do to achieve a more transparent and/or responsible supply chain. We establish that under rather general conditions, the two firms will adopt mixed strategies in equilibrium, a focal case of our analysis. The mixed-strategy results first explain at the micro level why many companies are not certain about whether their supply chains are ethical or not. At the more macro level, they also help explain why a significant proportion of the buyers did not trace or comply with transparency regulations. We then show that more responsible sourcing can be induced by lowering the buyer\u27s tracing cost but not by reducing the supplier\u27s own responsible sourcing cost. We also find that more transparency does not always imply more responsible sourcing. For the external stakeholders, more responsible sourcing may be obtained through lowering tracing costs, improving tracing or public discovery of violations, and imposing more significant reputational damage or penalties only on the buyer. For the internal stakeholders, a contract incorporating both responsible sourcing cost sharing and non-compliance penalty if found may be constructed for the first-best supply chain efficiency and likely social optimality under some simple sufficient conditions

Supplier sustainability: A comprehensive review and future research directions

Sustainability is not a one-player task. Organizations have started to realize that their supply chains have a significant social and environmental impact, usually greater than their own operations, and managing sustainability at suppliers is crucial for supply chain-wide sustainability. Supplier sustainability management (SSM) research is fast evolving across multiple disciplines but lacks an interdisciplinary review to guage the progress made, and to decide the path forward. Heightened global focus on sustainability compels us to explore research avenues in SSM for meaningful progress. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive review of SSM research including the most recent work. We propose the Motivation-Measure-Analyze-Improve-Govern (MMAIG) framework for supplier sustainability, identify the limitations of current SSM research in enabling this framework, and propose future research directions. Our key observations are that (a) current SSM research is heavily focused on measuring and monitoring supplier sustainability, and (b) supplier sustainability improvement/development research is limited and the majority of it is about sustainable supplier selection. The future research directions that we propose are centered around (a) optimizing the investments towards supplier sustainability through collaboration, proposing mechanisms that consider risks, liabilities, and gains of all parties, and (b) considering behavioral aspects to overcome SSM implementation issues. Organizations can achieve efficient improvement in supplier sustainability by using a collaborative approach that is data-driven and trust-based. We discuss several mechanisms within our MMAIG framework that can help organizations in their collaborative approach

Labor standard compliance and the role of buyers: the case of the Cambodian garment sector

This dissertation consists of four chapters investigating the role of buyers in regulating suppliers' compliance with labor standards in the Cambodian garment sector. The first chapter evaluates an innovative monitoring scheme of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the Cambodian garment sector, Better Factories Cambodia (BFC). The findings suggest that monitoring standards and procedures are rigorous and positive impacts are felt in monitored factories. Nonetheless, BFC runs in parallel to state institutions and enforcement depends on buyers, throwing its sustainability into question. The second chapter examines the effects of 'reputation-conscious buyers' on labor standard compliance in supplier facilities. Using unique factory-level panel data, this chapter shows that factories producing for reputation-conscious buyers are associated with higher compliance levels than other factories, controlling for factory characteristics. Field interviews also demonstrate that reputation-conscious buyers regulate supplier compliance both 'reactively' and 'proactively.' The third chapter explores the determinants of labor standard compliance across different issue categories (i.e. contract, wage, hours, leave, welfare, occupational safety and health, fundamental rights). Suppliers of reputation-conscious buyers are consistently associated with better compliance levels across many different issue categories including fundamental rights. The result lends support to the behavioral theory rather than the deterrence theory of regulatory compliance and challenges claims that buyer-driven regulation produces effects that are confined only to visible and easyto-fix issues. The fourth chapter exploits original survey data and examines different channels through which buyers influence their supplier compliance. The findings suggest that the main channel linking buyers and supplier compliance-performance is the nature of their relationships: market-based relationships mediated through agents are systematically associated with poorer compliance performance than established relationships. The result suggests the need to develop longer-term buyer-supplier relationships marked by open dialogue, trust, and commitment, which in turn help to foster an environment supportive of continuous improvement in working conditions

Strategic Innovation Procurement: Managerial Practices in Buyer-Supplier R&D Collaboration

Increasing competition to satisfy the end-customer needs, fluctuating market conditions and constant technological innovation in the global market place, has made the attainment of competitive advantage more challenging than ever. From Supply Chain Management (SCM) point of view, industrial organizations are simply forced to reconsider their current procurement strategies and processes, optimize supply bases and identify the best practices to enhance supplier, relationship and customer performance. This study reviews the different types of Supplier Development (SD) practices and their relation to relationship specific dimensions: relational structure, relational capital or trust and relationship learning. The study applies qualitative multiple case study approach to analyze four buyer-supplier R&D collaborations. My research indicates that the case company would benefit from in-depth analysis of the embedded SD strategies and practices, which are related to relational structure, relationship capital and relational learning. This would yield collaborative advantages in R&D project management. In addition, more attention should be paid to practices, which facilitate relationship learning. My study is one of the first ones to examine different types of SD practices utilized in context of buyer-supplier R&D collaboration. Thus, extends the existing literature on Supplier Development.fi=Opinnäytetyö kokotekstinä PDF-muodossa.|en=Thesis fulltext in PDF format.|sv=Lärdomsprov tillgängligt som fulltext i PDF-format

Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.Auditing, quality, self-enforcement, regulation, diversification

Outsourcing Corporate Accountability

This Article addresses the problem of preventing human rights violations abroad that result from the globalization of business. It specifically explores the challenge of improving labor standards in global value chains. The modern business has changed dramatically and has “gone global” in order to court foreign markets and secure resources, including labor. Familiar household names, such as Nike and Apple, have “outsourced” many of their functions to suppliers overseas. As multinational buyers, they dominate one end of the global value chain. At the opposite end of the value chain are the local managers and owners of the factories and workhouses where tablets are assembled, running shoes are made, and gowns are sown. These facilities are often the sites of serious human rights violations, such as forced labor and child labor. Some actors have attempted to rein in transnational corporate misconduct through litigation in domestic courts regarding the corporation’s actions abroad. However, after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, it is unclear how successful such strategies will prove in the future. This Article takes a different approach and focuses on preventing these human rights violations by improving labor practices in global value chains. Unfortunately, current approaches focus on encouraging better due diligence regarding the behavior of their suppliers. These approaches rely on auditing, monitoring, and disclosures and have dominated international (UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework), national (Danish Act on Financial Statement), and sub-state (California’s Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010) efforts to combat human rights violations. However, this Article explains that these and similar efforts will have limited effects because of the problem of misaligned incentives between buyers and suppliers in global value chains. Suppliers have different business profiles, interests, and constraints compared to their multinational buyers. Therefore, conventional drivers for better labor practices that rely on reputational risks and consumer boycotts will not work for suppliers. Instead, public actors and other stakeholders must identify incentives that are appropriate for suppliers. Second, they must also adopt a reflexive law governance approach in order to transmit these incentives effectively in global value chains. This Article concludes by offering examples of strategies that public actors should adopt in order to prevent another Foxconn or Rana Plaza tragedy

Outsourcing Corporate Accountability

This Article addresses the problem of preventing human rights violations abroad that result from the globalization of business. It specifically explores the challenge of improving labor standards in global value chains. The modern business has changed dramatically and has “gone global” in order to court foreign markets and secure resources, including labor. Familiar household names, such as Nike and Apple, have “outsourced” many of their functions to suppliers overseas. As multinational buyers, they dominate one end of the global value chain. At the opposite end of the value chain are the local managers and owners of the factories and workhouses where tablets are assembled, running shoes are made, and gowns are sown. These facilities are often the sites of serious human rights violations, such as forced labor and child labor. Some actors have attempted to rein in transnational corporate misconduct through litigation in domestic courts regarding the corporation’s actions abroad. However, after Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, it is unclear how successful such strategies will prove in the future. This Article takes a different approach and focuses on preventing these human rights violations by improving labor practices in global value chains. Unfortunately, current approaches focus on encouraging better due diligence regarding the behavior of their suppliers. These approaches rely on auditing, monitoring, and disclosures and have dominated international (UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework), national (Danish Act on Financial Statement), and sub-state (California’s Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010) efforts to combat human rights violations. However, this Article explains that these and similar efforts will have limited effects because of the problem of misaligned incentives between buyers and suppliers in global value chains. Suppliers have different business profiles, interests, and constraints compared to their multinational buyers. Therefore, conventional drivers for better labor practices that rely on reputational risks and consumer boycotts will not work for suppliers. Instead, public actors and other stakeholders must identify incentives that are appropriate for suppliers. Second, they must also adopt a reflexive law governance approach in order to transmit these incentives effectively in global value chains. This Article concludes by offering examples of strategies that public actors should adopt in order to prevent another Foxconn or Rana Plaza tragedy

The Hershey Company 2014 Corporate Social Responsibility Report

This report describes how we are working with our stakeholders on the issues of greatest importance to them and our company. A common thread running through this report -- linking our efforts, programs and performance -- is engagement with key stakeholders both internally and externally. Unless otherwise noted, this report covers our performance on our priority issues and our progress toward our goals and targets in the 2014 calendar year, which is also our fiscal year. We report on the operations of The Hershey Company, including Hershey's wholly owned operations and joint-venture operations over which our company exercises operating control. While we have provided information regarding our joint ventures and co-manufacturers, we report progress on goals/targets and profile and performance indicators only for our wholly owned facilitie