Fund Management and Systemic Risk - Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so-called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non-bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article

The Interconnections Between the Shadow Banking System and the Regular Banking System. Evidence from the Euro Area

One of the most important lessons of the global financial crisis has been the deep interconnectedness between the shadow banking system and the regular banking system. These two systems are linked through several channels, of which one of the most important is the financing provided by regular banks to the shadow banking system and vice versa. In addition, regular banks can originate loans that are securitized. Subsequently, part of the securitized instruments may remain on the balance sheet of the originating banks or be found on the balance sheet of other regular banks and shadow banking entities. These links between the two systems can increase contagion and systemic risks, which in turn may affect financial stability. The financial crisis has acutely revealed the negative effects these interconnections can generate. The interconnections are underestimated by the available data because of the difficulties in gathering information on the euro area. Within this context, our paper tries to evaluate and analyze the interconnections between the shadow banking system and the regular banking system within the euro area, both in the pre-crisis period and currently. Finally, some measures to regulate the interconnections between these two systems are raised

A critique on the proposed use of external sovereign credit ratings in Basel II

This paper deals with the proposed use of sovereign credit ratings in the "Basel Accord on Capital Adequacy" (Basel II) and considers its potential effect on emerging markets financing. It investigates in a first attempt the consequences of the planned revisions on the two central aspects of international bank credit flows: the impact on capital costs and the volatility of credit supply across the risk spectrum of borrowers. The empirical findings cast doubt on the usefulness of credit ratings in determining commercial banks' capital adequacy ratios since the standardized approach to credit risk would lead to more divergence rather than convergence between investment-grade and speculative-grade borrowers. This conclusion is based on the lateness and cyclical determination of credit rating agencies' sovereign risk assessments and the continuing incentives for short-term rather than long-term interbank lending ingrained in the proposed Basel II framework

Systemic risk determinants in the European banking industry during financial crises, 2006-2012

The recent financial turmoil has stimulated a rich debate in banking and financial literature on the identification of systemic risk determinants and devices to forecast and prevent crises. This paper explores the contribution of corporate variables to systemic risk using the CoVaR approach (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). Using balanced panel data on 141 European banks from 24 countries, which were listed from 2006Q1 to 2012Q4, we investigated the impact of corporate variables during the three regimes that characterised the European banking sector-the subprime crisis (2007Q3-2008Q3), the European Great Financial Depression (2008Q4-2010Q2), and the sovereign debt crisis (2010Q3-2012Q4). Our results show that size did not play a significant role in spreading systemic risk, while maturity mismatch did. However, the nature and intensity of these two determinants varied across the three regimes

Getting up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide

All economists should be conversant with “what happened?” during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We select and summarize 16 documents, including academic papers and reports from regulatory and international agencies. This reading list covers the key facts and mechanisms in the build-up of risk, the panics in short-term-debt markets, the policy reactions, and the real effects of the financial crisis.

Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure

Unlike many other areas of regulation, financial regulation operates in the context of a complex interdependent system. The interconnections among firms, markets, and legal rules have implications for financial regulatory policy, especially the choice between ex ante regulation aimed at preventing financial failure and ex post regulation aimed at responding to that failure. Regulatory theory has paid relatively little attention to this distinction. Were regulation to consist solely of duty-imposing norms, such neglect might be defensible. In the context of a system, however, regulation can also take the form of interventions aimed at mitigating the potentially systemic consequences of a financial failure. We show that this dual role of financial regulation implies that ex ante regulation and ex post regulation should be balanced in setting financial regulatory policy, and we offer guidelines for achieving that balance

A Critique on the Proposed Use of External Sovereign Credit Ratings in Basel II

This paper deals with the proposed use of sovereign credit ratings in the "Basel Accord on Capital Adequacy" (Basel II) and considers its potential effect on emerging markets financ-ing. It investigates in a first attempt the consequences of the planned revisions on the two central aspects of international bank credit flows: the impact on capital costs and the volatility of credit supply across the risk spectrum of borrowers. The empirical findings cast doubt on the usefulness of credit ratings in determining commercial banks’ capital adequacy ratios since the standardized approach to credit risk would lead to more divergence rather than conver-gence between investment-grade and speculative-grade borrowers. This conclusion is based on the lateness and cyclical determination of credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk assess-ments and the continuing incentives for short-term rather than long-term interbank lending ingrained in the proposed Basel II framework.Sovereign Risk, Credit Ratings, Basel II

Bank liquidity and financial stability.

Fluctuations in investor risk aversion are often cited as a factor explaining crises on financial markets. The alternation between periods of bullishness prompting investors to make risky investments, and periods of bearishness, when they retreat to the safest forms of investments, could be at the root of sharp fluctuations in asset prices. One problem in the assessment of these different periods is clearly distinguishing the risk perceived by agents from risk aversion itself. There are several types of risk aversion indicators used by financial institutions (the VIX, the LCVI, the GRAI, etc.). These indices, which are estimated in diverse ways, often show differing developments, although it is not possible to directly assess which is the most accurate. An interesting method in this respect is to link the indicators to financial crises. In principle, financial crises should coincide with periods in which risk aversion increases. Here we estimate probabilities of financial crises –currency and stock market crises– using the different risk aversion indicators as explanatory variables. This allows us to assess their respective predictive powers. The tests carried out show that risk aversion does tend to increase before crises, at least when it is measured by the most relevant indices. This variable is a good leading indicator of stock market crises, but is less so for currency crises.