Modeling and Simulating Moral Emotions in Organizations: exploring its impact on collaboration

International audienceThe paper presents how moral sensitivity and emotions are modeled in organizational setting by using the SocLab formal framework. Additionally simulation results, including an interesting tendency for a Free Rider model, will be given. SocLab is a platform for the modeling, simulation and analysis of cooperation relationships within social organizations - and more generally Sys-tems of Organized Action. Taking into account the fact that decision-making processes are not merely driven by instrumental interest, the SocLab learning simulation algorithm has been extended to represent moral sensitivity, so actors can prevent bad emotions and search for good emotions. To this end, a moral sensitivity parameter has been introduced in the algorithm to equip virtual ac-tors with moral and emotional behaviour

Proceedings of the 11th European Agent Systems Summer School Student Session

This volume contains the papers presented at the Student Session of the 11th European Agent Systems Summer School (EASSS) held on 2nd of September 2009 at Educatorio della Providenza, Turin, Italy. The Student Session, organised by students, is designed to encourage student interaction and feedback from the tutors. By providing the students with a conference-like setup, both in the presentation and in the review process, students have the opportunity to prepare their own submission, go through the selection process and present their work to each other and their interests to their fellow students as well as internationally leading experts in the agent field, both from the theoretical and the practical sector. Table of Contents: Andrew Koster, Jordi Sabater Mir and Marco Schorlemmer, Towards an inductive algorithm for learning trust alignment . . . 5; Angel Rolando Medellin, Katie Atkinson and Peter McBurney, A Preliminary Proposal for Model Checking Command Dialogues. . . 12; Declan Mungovan, Enda Howley and Jim Duggan, Norm Convergence in Populations of Dynamically Interacting Agents . . . 19; Akın Günay, Argumentation on Bayesian Networks for Distributed Decision Making . . 25; Michael Burkhardt, Marco Luetzenberger and Nils Masuch, Towards Toolipse 2: Tool Support for the JIAC V Agent Framework . . . 30; Joseph El Gemayel, The Tenacity of Social Actors . . . 33; Cristian Gratie, The Impact of Routing on Traffic Congestion . . . 36; Andrei-Horia Mogos and Monica Cristina Voinescu, A Rule-Based Psychologist Agent for Improving the Performances of a Sportsman . . . 39; --Autonomer Agent,Agent,Künstliche Intelligenz

Modèles de la rationalité des acteurs sociaux

Cette thèse s inscrit dans le cadre du projet SocLab, qui propose une formalisation de la sociologie de l action organisée de Crozier et Friedberg. Cette formalisation repose sur un métamodèle de la structure des organisations sociales, et plus généralement des systèmes d'action collective, qui permet de décrire la structure d une organisation particulière, de développer une étude analytique de ses propriétés et surtout de calculer, par simulation, les comportements que les acteurs de cette organisation sont susceptibles d adopter les uns vis-à-vis des autres. Selon cette approche, une organisation est vue comme un système qui, en fonction du comportement des acteurs les uns envers les autres, procure à chacun d eux une certaine capacité d action pour atteindre ses objectifs, sans distinguer ceux qui relèvent de son rôle organisationnel et ceux qui lui sont propres. Ces comportements sont relativement stabilisés, condition indispensable à la coordination des acteurs dans l accomplissement, au moins partiel, de ce qui constitue la raison d être de l organisation, et donc indispensable à l existence même de cette organisation. Même s'ils s'écartent de ce qui est prescrit, ces comportements s avèrent de plus être globalement coopératifs, condition nécessaire au bon fonctionnement de l'organisation. Les caractéristiques de ces comportements sont un phénomène qui émerge des interactions entre les rationalités mises en œuvre par les acteurs dans le jeu social que constitue un contexte d interaction organisationnel. Selon la sociologie de l action organisée, cette rationalité est stratégique, guidée par la recherche de son intérêt, et elle s exerce dans le cadre d une rationalité (très) limitée. Le modèle qui en est proposé dans cette thèse cherche à être vraisemblable tant du point de vue social que du point de vue psycho-cognitif, et il s inscrit dans le paradigme de l apprentissage par renforcement. Dans la mesure où la structure de l organisation le permet, les simulations convergent donc vers des configurations que l on peut qualifier d optima Paretoéquitables. On étudie aussi diverses variantes de cet algorithme qui correspondent à des rationalités qui conduisent une organisation à se réguler vers un équilibre de Nash ou vers des configurations socialement bien typées - optimum social, (anti-)élitistes, (anti-)protectrices ou (anti-)égalitaristes..This thesis is part of the SocLab project, which proposes a formalization of the sociology of organized action (Crozier et Friedberg). This formalization is based on a meta-model of the structure of social organizations, and more generally collective action systems, which provides means to describe the structure of a particular organization, to develop an analytical study of its properties and mainly, to compute by simulation the behaviors that the actors of the organization are likely to adopt one to each other. Under this approach, an organization is viewed as a system that, depending on the behaviors of the actors to each other, gives every of them a certain capacity of action to achieve its objectives, without distinguishing those related to his role within the organization and those that are its own. These behaviors are relatively stable, which is essential for the coordination of the actors. Although they deviate from what is prescribed, these behaviors appear to be generally cooperative, which is necessary to the proper functioning of the organization and the achievement, at least partially, of its raison d être. The characteristics of these behaviors are a phenomenon that emerges from the interactions between the rationalities adopted by the actors in the social game that constitutes the context of their organizational interactions. According to the sociology of organized action, this rationality is strategic, guided by the research of own interest, and it is exercised within the framework of a (very) limited rationality. The model of social actors' rationality proposed in this thesis seeks to be plausible, from the social and the psycho-cognitive points of view, and it fits into the paradigm of reinforcement learning. Insofar the possibilities offered by structure of the organization, the simulations converge towards configurations that can be qualified as equitable Pareto optima. We also study variants of this algorithm corresponding to rationalities that drive an organization to regulate toward Nash equilibrium, or towards well-typed social configurations social optimum, (anti-) elitist, (anti-) protective or (anti-) egalitarian.TOULOUSE1-SCD-Bib. electronique (315559902) / SudocSudocFranceF

Modèles de la rationalité des acteurs sociaux

The work presented in this paper is part of the project SocLab, which proposes a formalization of the sociology of organized action (Crozier et Friedberg). This formalization is based on a meta-model of the structure of social organizations, which provides means to describe the structure of a particular organization, to develop an analytical study of its properties and mainly, to calculate by simulation the behaviors that the actors of the organization are likely to adopt one to each other. Under this approach, an organization is viewed as a system that, depending on the behavior of the actors to each other, gives every of them a certain capacity of action to achieve its objectives, without distinguishing those related to his role within the organization and those that are its own. These behaviors are relatively stable. This is an essential condition for the coordination of the actors so that they can coordinate in performing, at least partially, what constitutes the raison d'être of the organization. These behaviors appear also to be generally cooperative facilitating the achievement of personal objectives of each one as well as those of the collective as a whole. This thesis focuses on the modeling of the rationality which leads a social actor to adopt such behavior in the " social game " constituted by a context of organizational interactions. According to the sociology of organized action, this rationality is strategic, guided by the research of own interest, and it is exercised within the framework of a (very) limited rationality. The proposed model seeks to be plausible, from the social and the psycho-cognitive points of view, and it fits into the paradigm of reinforcement learning. Insofar as the structure of the organization allows it, the simulations converge towards configurations that can be described as Pareto optima. We also study variants of this algorithm corresponding to rationalities that drive an organization to regulate toward other configurations that are elitist, protective or egalitarian, or Nash equilibria.Le travail présenté dans ce mémoire s'inscrit dans le cadre du projet SocLab, qui propose une formalisation de la sociologie de l'action organisée de Crozier et Friedberg. Cette formalisation repose sur un méta-modèle de la structure des organisations sociales, à partir duquel il est possible de décrire la structure d'une organisation particulière, de développer une étude analytique de ses propriétés et surtout de calculer, par simulation, les comportements que les acteurs de cette organisation sont susceptibles d'adopter les uns vis-à-vis des autres. Selon cette approche, une organisation est vue comme un système qui, en fonction du comportement des acteurs les uns envers les autres, procure à chacun d'eux une certaine capacité d'action pour atteindre ses objectifs, sans distinguer ceux qui relèvent de son rôle et ceux qui lui sont propres. Ces comportements sont relativement stabilisés, condition indispensable à la coordination des acteurs dans l'accomplissement, au moins partiel, de ce qui constitue la raison d'être de l'organisation, et donc indispensable à l'existence même de cette organisation. Ces comportements s'avèrent de plus être globalement coopératifs, facilitant ainsi la réalisation des objectifs, aussi bien ceux propres à chacun que ceux du collectif dans son ensemble. Cette thèse porte sur la modélisation de la rationalité qui conduit un acteur social à adopter un tel comportement dans le " jeu social " que constitue un contexte d'interaction organisationnel. Selon la sociologie de l'action organisée, cette rationalité est stratégique, guidée par la recherche de son intérêt, et elle s'exerce dans le cadre d'une rationalité (très) limitée. Le modèle proposé cherche à être vraisemblable, du point de vue social et du point de vue psycho-cognitif, et il s'inscrit dans le paradigme de l'apprentissage par renforcement. Dans la mesure où la structure de l'organisation le permet, les simulations convergent donc vers des configurations que l'on peut qualifier d'optima Pareto-équitables. On étudie aussi diverses variantes de cet algorithme correspondant à des rationalités qui conduisent une organisation à se réguler vers des configurations élitistes, protectrices ou égalitaristes, ou encore vers un équilibre de Nash

Impact of Tenacity upon the Behaviors of Social Actors

International audienceThe Sociology of the Organized Actions is a well-established theory that focuses upon the actual behaviors of the members of social organizations, and reveals the (to a large extent implicit) motives of social actors. The formalization of this theory leads to model the structure of an organization as a social game, including the Prisoners' Dilemma as a specific case. In order to perform simulations of social organizations modeled in this way, the SocLab environment contains an algorithm allowing the model's actors to play the social game and so to determine how they could cooperate with each other. This algorithm includes several parameters, and we study the influence of one of them, the Tenacity

Impact of tenacity upon the Behaviors of Social Actors (regular paper)

International audienceThe Sociology of the Organized Actions is a well-established theory that focuses upon the actual behaviors of the members of social organizations, and reveals the (to a large extent implicit) motives of social actors. The formalization of this theory leads to model the structure of an organization as a social game, including the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a specific case. In order to perform simulations of social organizations modeled in this way, the SocLab environment contains an algorithm allowing the model’s actors to play the social game and so to determine how they could cooperate with each other. This algorithm includes several parameters, and we study the influence of one of them, the Tenacity