Way of ignorance

Preprint of an article by Jules Winterton, Associate Director and Librarian at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

Limits of Learning about a Categorical Latent Variable under Prior Near-Ignorance

In this paper, we consider the coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty of Walley, in which beliefs are represented through sets of probability distributions, and we focus on the problem of modeling prior ignorance about a categorical random variable. In this setting, it is a known result that a state of prior ignorance is not compatible with learning. To overcome this problem, another state of beliefs, called \emph{near-ignorance}, has been proposed. Near-ignorance resembles ignorance very closely, by satisfying some principles that can arguably be regarded as necessary in a state of ignorance, and allows learning to take place. What this paper does, is to provide new and substantial evidence that also near-ignorance cannot be really regarded as a way out of the problem of starting statistical inference in conditions of very weak beliefs. The key to this result is focusing on a setting characterized by a variable of interest that is \emph{latent}. We argue that such a setting is by far the most common case in practice, and we provide, for the case of categorical latent variables (and general \emph{manifest} variables) a condition that, if satisfied, prevents learning to take place under prior near-ignorance. This condition is shown to be easily satisfied even in the most common statistical problems. We regard these results as a strong form of evidence against the possibility to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real statistical problems.Comment: 27 LaTeX page

Why is (Claiming) Ignorance of the Law no Excuse?

In this paper I will discuss two aspects of ignorance of the law: ignorance of illegality (including mistaking the law) and ignorance of the penalty; and I will look at the implications for natives, for tourists and for immigrants. I will argue that Carlos Nino's consensual theory of punishment need to rely on two premises in order to justify that (claiming) ignorance of the law is no excuse. The first premise explains why individuals are presumed to 'know' current laws. The second premise explains why individuals are presumed to 'know' new legislation

The Republic of Ignorance

Ignorance is trending. Despite universal compulsory education; despite new tools for learning and great advances in knowledge; despite breathtaking increases in our ability to store, access, and share a superabundance of information - ignorance flourishes. [excerpt

Ignorance and indifference

The epistemic state of complete ignorance is not a probability distribution. In it, we assign the same, unique, ignorance degree of belief to any contingent outcome and each of its contingent, disjunctive parts. That this is the appropriate way to represent complete ignorance is established by two instruments, each individually strong enough to identify this state. They are the principle of indifference (PI) and the notion that ignorance is invariant under certain redescriptions of the outcome space, here developed into the 'principle of invariance of ignorance' (PII). Both instruments are so innocuous as almost to be platitudes. Yet the literature in probabilistic epistemology has misdiagnosed them as paradoxical or defective since they generate inconsistencies when conjoined with the assumption that an epistemic state must be a probability distribution. To underscore the need to drop this assumption, I express PII in its most defensible form as relating symmetric descriptions and show that paradoxes still arise if we assume the ignorance state to be a probability distribution. Copyright 2008 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved

From Democracy to Ochlocracy

democracy, ochlocracy, ignorance of ignorance

The Problem of Ignorance

Holly Smith (2014) contends that subjective deontological theories – those that hold that our moral duties are sensitive to our beliefs about our situation – cannot correctly determine whether one ought to gather more information before acting. Against this contention, I argue that deontological theories can use a decision-theoretic approach to evaluating the moral importance of information. I then argue that this approach compares favourably with an alternative approach proposed by Philip Swenson (2016)

Hiding Ignorance Using High Dimensions

The absence of information -- entirely or partly -- is called ignorance. Naturally, one might ask if some ignorance of a whole system will imply some ignorance of its parts. Our classical intuition tells us yes, however quantum theory tells us no: it is possible to encode information in a quantum system so that despite some ignorance of the whole, it is impossible to identify the unknown part arXiv:1011.6448. Experimentally verifying this counter-intuitive fact requires controlling and measuring quantum systems of high dimension $(d {>} 9)$. We provide this experimental evidence using the transverse spatial modes of light, a powerful resource for testing high dimensional quantum phenomenon

Exploring the Notion of Forgetting

Ignorance and forgetting are similar in some regards, as both involve a state of not knowing. Often forgetting, like ignorance, can put us at a disadvantage in regards to a lack of retaining knowledge. Forgetting can lead to ignorance if not realized and remedied. However, just as ignorance is more than a lack of knowledge, forgetting is more than a lack of remembrance. There are many kinds of forgetting, each with different kinds memories lost and purposes served. Despite the inherent risks of forgetting, there are advantages, ones that make forgetting an essential part of human cognition. In fact, without the ability to forget, we could never remember

The Disappearance of Ignorance

Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. Second, it must explain how it can seem that we don’t know these things. In slogan form, DeRose’s argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the “appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. In my critical discussion, I will argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength” of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it